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Abstract
Secret sharing-based distributed storage systems can provide long-term protection of
confidentiality and integrity of stored data. This is achieved by periodically refreshing
the stored shares and by checking the validity of the generated shares through
additional audit data. However, in most real-life environments (e.g. companies),
this type of solution is not optimal for three main reasons. Firstly, the access rules
of state of the art secret sharing-based distributed storage systems do not match
the hierarchical organization in place in these environments. Secondly, data owners
are not supported in selecting the most suitable storage servers while first setting
up the system nor in maintaining it secure in the long term. Thirdly, state of the
art approaches require computationally demanding and unpractical and expensive
building blocks that do not scale well. In this thesis, we mitigate the above mentioned
issues and contribute to the transition from theory to more practical secret sharing-
based long-term secure distributed storage systems. Firstly, we show that distributed
storage systems can be based on hierarchical secret sharing schemes by providing
efficient and secure algorithms, whose access rules can be adapted to the hierarchical
organization of a company and its future modifications. Secondly, we introduce a
decision support system that helps data owners to set up and maintain a distributed
storage system. More precisely, on the one hand, we support data owners in selecting
the storage servers making up the distributed storage system. We do this by providing
them with scores that reflect their actual performances, here used in a broad sense
and not tied to a specific metric. These are the output of a novel performance
scoring mechanism based on the behavioral model of rational agents as opposed
to the classical good/bad model. On the other hand, we support data owners in
choosing the right secret sharing scheme parameters given the performance figures of
the storage servers and guide them in updating them accordingly with the updated
performance figures so as to maintain the system secure in the long term. Thirdly,
we introduce efficient and affordable distributed storage systems based on a trusted
execution environment that correctly outsources the data and periodically computes
valid shares. This way, less information-theoretically secure channels have to be
established for confidentiality guarantees and more efficient primitives are used for
the integrity safeguard of the data. We present a third-party privacy-preserving
mechanism that protects the integrity of data by checking the validity of the shares.
xi

Zusammenfassung
Verteilte Speichersysteme auf Secret-Sharing-Basis können anhaltenden Schutz in
Vertraulichkeit und Integrität bieten. Dies kann durch regelmäßiges Aktualisieren der
gespeicherten Anteile (Shares) sowie der Kontrolle ihrer Gültigkeit durch zusätzliche
Audit Daten erreicht werden. Allerdings ist diese Art von Lösung in den meisten
lebensnahen Situationen wie z.B. auch in grossen Unternehmen aus drei Gründen
nicht optimal. Erstens stimmen die Zugriffsrechte der modernsten verteilten Speich-
ersysteme auf Secret-Sharing-Basis nicht mit der hierarchischen Organisation in den
Unternehmen überein. Zweitens bekommen die Datenbesitzer weder Unterstützung
im Auswählen von passenden Speichersystemen noch im Erhalten der langfristigen
Sicherheit eben dieser. Drittens fordern modernste Vorgehensweisen rechnerisch
aufwändige und unpraktische sowie teure Bestandteile, die ökonomisch nicht sinnvoll
sind.
In dieser Doktorarbeit entschärfen wir die oben genannten Probleme und tra-
gen zum Übergang von Theorie zur Praxis von verteilten Speichersystemen auf
Secret-Sharing-Basis bei. Erstens zeigen wir, dass verteilte Speichersysteme auf
hierarchischen Secret-Sharing-Verfahren gründen können, indem wir schnelle und
sichere Algorithmen einführen, deren Zugriffsrechte an die hierarchischen Strukturen
eines Unternehmens angepasst und in Zukunft auch verändert werden können. Zweit-
ens stellen wir ein Entscheidungs-Unterstützungs-System vor, das Datenbesitzern
dabei hilft, ein verteiltes Speichersystem aufzubauen und zu halten. Konkreter unter-
stützen wir Datenbesitzer auf der einen Seite dabei, den Speicherserver des verteilten
Speichersystems auszuwählen. Dies machen wir durch gegenseitige Bewertung ihrer
tatsächlichen Leistung. Das ist der Output eines neuen Bewertungsverfahrens, das auf
dem Verhalten von rationalen Teilnehmern als statt auf dem klassischen gut/schlecht-
Modell basiert. Auf der anderen Seite unterstützen wir Datenbesitzer beim Auswählen
der besten Secret-Sharing- Verfahrensparameter unter Berücksichtigung der Bew-
ertungen der Speicherserver und leiten sie beim Aktualisieren entsprechend der
neuesten Bewertungsentwicklungen, um das System langfristig sicherzuhalten. Drit-
tens stellen wir schnelle und finanziell tragbare verteilte Speichersysteme vor, die auf
einem Trusted Execution Environment gründen, welches Daten korrekt auslagert und
regelmäßig gültige Anteile berechnet. So müssen weniger Kanäle mit informations-
theoretischer Sicherheit hergestellt werden, um die Vertraulichkeit zu garantieren
xiii
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und schnellere Verfahren werden benutzt, um vollständige Schutzmaßnahmen der
Daten zu gewährleisten. Darüber hinaus stellen wir ein Third-party Verfahren zur
Wahrung der Vertraulichkeit vor, welches den vollständigen langfristigen Schutz von
Daten durch die Kontrolle der Gültigkeit der Anteile garantiert.
xiv
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1 Introduction
The goal of this thesis is to design practical and affordable long-term secure distributed
storage systems that can be employed by hospitals, companies, and institutions to
protect the confidentiality and the integrity of the data they issue in an outsourced
scenario.
Outsourcing digital data has recently become a common practice for data storage
due to its scalability and low costs. When it comes to sensitive data, confidentiality
and integrity must be guaranteed for decades. For instance, electronic health records
must be protected for at least the entire lifetime of the patient, or even longer to
protect the privacy of descendants. The integrity of a health record is crucial to
ensure the right treatment of the patient, its confidentiality is crucial to prevent
discrimination. These two requirements must hold even when the record is used as
input by hospitals or pharmaceutical companies to perform statistics. Also, the access
rules to the outsourced records should mirror the inner organization and hierarchy
in which hospitals and companies are structured. For instance, if in principle a nurse
or a technician can access health records only given the doctor’s approval, then this
access rule should be fulfilled as well the for the digitized and outsourced data.
As pointed out by Buchmann et al. [29], currently used cryptographic techniques
are unsuitable to protect the storage of data for decades. On one hand, there is the
threat of a advancement in cryptanalysis, for instance, the design of faster integer
factorization algorithms that would compromise the computational hardness of state
of the art encryption schemes. On the other hand, there is the threat of quantum
computing. Sufficiently large quantum computers can run Shor’s algorithm [104],
which can break most used public-key cryptography (e.g., RSA [96], the ElGamal
cryptosystem [48], and DSA [85]). Even though large quantum computers are not
available yet, the significant and continuous progress being made in this direction
is undeniable [38,112]. Furthermore, it should not be underestimated that entities
with large storage capabilities, such as intelligence agencies or data providers, might
operate maliciously and store large quantities of encrypted data now, only to decrypt
them decades later once the underlying mathematical problems of cryptosystems
become tractable, which the NSA is feared to be doing with encrypted Internet
1
1 Introduction
traffic [45]. Therefore, encrypting and then storing sensitive data on a storage server
is not a viable solution for long-term security.
Secret sharing [102] is suitable for the long-term protection of sensitive data be-
cause these schemes provide information-theoretic confidentiality, also known as
unconditional security. Hence, the security of secret sharing schemes is neither
compromised by cryptanalytic progress nor by quantum computers. Secret sharing
schemes generate shares of data such that only specific subsets of shares can recon-
struct the original message, while all other subsets of shares reveal no information.
In an outsourcing scenario, it is natural to build long-term secure distributed storage
systems based on secret sharing schemes. Long-term secure distributed storage sys-
tems are composed of several storage servers, where each storage server is provisioned
with a share of the data generated through a secret sharing scheme. In particular,
long-term secure distributed storage systems are built on Shamir’s secret sharing
scheme, where the subsets of shares eligible for reconstructing the outsourced data
are those whose cardinality is larger than a certain threshold. This solution not only
provides confidentiality because subsets of storage servers whose cardinality is smaller
than the threshold cannot get any information with respect to the outsourced data.
In addition, such systems provide robustness against a certain amount of unreliable
or compromised storage servers. However, secret sharing alone does not guarantee
confidentiality in the long term. This solution is prone to a mobile adversary that
corrupts over time enough storage servers so that it can reconstruct the data by itself
with the shares collected.
The protection of the confidentiality of outsourced data is provided by so called
proactive secret sharing [62]. In proactive secret sharing schemes, the shares dis-
tributed to the storage servers are renewed without the intervention of the data owner
and without reconstructing the outsourced data. At regular time intervals, fresh
new shares that are completely unlinked to the previous ones are generated (so that
they still reconstruct to the original data), and the old shares are deleted. Proactive
secret sharing is an effective countermeasure against that mobile adversary, which
is bounded in the number of storage servers it is capable of corrupting over short
windows of time but not over lengthy periods, which is generally assumed in practice.
If share renewal is performed often enough, this renders the malicious behavior
of a mobile adversary ineffective as it is assumed computationally bounded and
cannot collect enough shares to successfully reconstruct the data, thus guaranteeing
long-term confidentiality [25]. Verifiable secret sharing [34] enables verifying the
consistency of the shares with the outsourced data by checking them against some
additional audit data by means of commitment schemes. Verifying the consistency of
the shares ensures that these reconstruct exactly to the same data that was originally
outsourced, thus integrity of the data is preserved. When proactive secret sharing is
equipped with commitment schemes, it is possible to check the consistency of the
2
updated shares every time these are computed. Thus, proactive and verifiable secret
sharing can together guarantee the protection of confidentiality and integrity of data
in outsourcing scenarios like those of long-term secure storage systems.
However, this approach combining proactive and verifiable secret sharing does not
address more practical scenarios where efficient and affordable means to protect the
confidentiality and the integrity of data are needed, which is the target of this thesis.
Firstly, data owners outsourcing their data are often part of a larger organization
and environment rather than single entities. This is the case for companies, hospitals,
institutions where employees cover a specific position with specific rights and power
within a hierarchical organization. Furthermore, this hierarchical organization con-
tinually changes (more levels are added as a company grows and vice versa) and so
should be the access capabilities granted to them with respect to the data outsourced
in the distributed storage system. Secondly, distributed storage systems have to be
built in practice using several storage servers (i.e. data centers) from different storage
service providers. This approach is to prevent that the shares are vulnerable to a
single point of failure, i.e. the key management of the storage service provider hosting
the shares. The storage servers are not equivalent and their performance depends
strictly on the choices of the storage service provider they belong to in terms of
technological upgrades and maintenance. It is extremely difficult in practice to chose
the right storage servers making up the storage system. On the one hand, data owners
lack the expertise to recognize good performance and quality of service of the storage
servers. On the other hand, a standardized and transparent way to reliably compute
performance figures across all storage servers is missing, where here performance is
used in a broad sense and is not tied to a specific metric. Storage service providers
might commercially benefit from the lack of accurate means to measure their quality
of service in order to stay longer in the marketplace and increase their income. Also,
even with available performance figures, users lack of the cryptographic knowledge
to choose the right secret sharing instantiation and to set up the distributed storage
system in the first place. Thirdly, state of the art secret sharing-based distributed
storage systems are expensive and somewhat impractical infrastructures that compa-
nies, hospitals, and other entities on a budget cannot afford to adopt. Confidentiality
of the outsourced data is guaranteed provided that the communication between any
two parties involved in the system occurs through an information-theoretically secure
channel. Each of these channels requires quantum-key distribution protocols in place,
which is very expensive, inefficient, and does not scale well. Integrity is provided
by verifiable secret sharing through the usage of several computationally intensive
schemes. Furthermore, additional privacy preserving means to ensure that the shares
stored have not been corrupted are still missing. In summary, state of the art solutions
for secret sharing-based distributed storage systems are not suitable to be used by
non-expert data owners in environments with a hierarchical organization among them.
3
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In this thesis, we propose a more practical and affordable long-term secure dis-
tributed storage systems that are, while still fulfilling the same security guarantees
in terms of confidentiality and integrity of data of state of the art approaches. We
address the first problem by building long-term secure distributed storage systems
based on dynamic hierarchical secret sharing schemes. These are secret sharing
schemes whose access rules fit hierarchical organizations and can be flexibly modified.
We address the second problem by embedding the distributed storage system into a
larger service managed by a trusted third-party authority, whose unique aim is to
support data owners in setting up and maintaining a long-term secure distributed
storage system. To do that, the trusted authority periodically runs a performance
scoring mechanism that outputs accurate performance figures by enforcing the storage
service providers to issue accurate ratings, regardless of their economic interests. In
addition, given the performance figures, the trusted authority guides the data owners
in selecting the best parameters of the secret sharing scheme used and sends alerts
when such setup needs to be modified. We address the third problem by introducing
an efficient and more affordable long-term secure storage systems where a trusted
execution environment is leveraged for the correct computation of the shares, for
their renewal, and for the original data retrieval. This approach leads to significantly
less information-theoretically secure channels needed to ensure confidentiality of
the outsourced data, as well as computationally efficient means to protect their
integrity, thus evolving from theory to a more feasible deployment of long-term
secure distributed storage systems. To protect integrity of data in the long term,
we also propose an alternative solution by introducing the first third party audit
mechanism that checks the validity of the shares, while preserving their confiden-
tiality is an information-theoretically manner. In summary, we propose a long-term
secure distributed storage system that fit the access rules of hierarchically-organized
environments, are less expensive to build, and support data owners in setting up and
maintaining such an infrastructure.
Contribution and Outline
In the following, the outline of this thesis together with a summary of the contributions
are provided.
Background (Chapter 2). In this chapter, basic knowledge about secret sharing
are presented. Then, hierarchical secret sharing schemes are introduced. Finally,
notions about game theory are provided, which are needed for the formalization of
the rational behaviors of agents in Chapter 5.
Dynamic and Hierarchical Secret Sharing-Based Distributed Storage Systems
(Chapter 3). In this chapter, we provide a hierarchical long-term secure distributed
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storage system that mirrors the inner organization of companies and institutions
and fulfill their needs for flexibility within their hierarchical structure. We define
a secret sharing scheme with the above mentioned features as dynamic. More
precisely, besides providing confidentiality guarantees through the periodic renewal
of the shares, a dynamic secret sharing scheme also allows to add shareholders and
modify the access rules in a distributed fashion, i.e. without first reconstructing the
outsourced data. We provide such algorithms for Tassa’s hierarchical secret sharing
schemes and prove their security. Furthermore, we provide algorithms to compute
linear operations and multiplications over such hierarchically shared data, together
with their security proofs and audit procedures to ensure that the computations are
performed correctly. We run evaluations and show empirically that the run time of
our algorithms for adding shareholders, modifying the access rules, and performing
computations for Tassa’s hierarchical secret sharing schemes is comparable with the
run time of corresponding algorithms for Shamir’s secret sharing scheme. Thus, we
show that Tassa’s hierarchical secret sharing-based distributed storage systems are a
viable solution for the long-term storage of data from entities with an ever-changing
organizational structure.
Preventing Security Threats Through Adaptive Social Secret Sharing and Pri-
vate Third-Party Auditing (Chapter 4). In this chapter, we introduce AS3, an
adaptive social secret sharing scheme. An adaptive social secret sharing scheme is a
secret sharing scheme that adjusts the distribution of the shares to storage servers
according to how their performance evolves over time. The capability of AS3 to
adapt how much reconstruction capability is granted to storage servers is due to
the fact that AS3 is built over Tassa’s hierarchical secret sharing schemes, which
are dynamic. Furthermore, AS3 supports the data owner both in first building a
distributed storage system and in protecting the confidentiality of the outsourced
data in the long-term. This is done by defining how to initialize the parameters of
the hierarchical secret sharing scheme, given the performance scores of the storage
servers making up the system. Moreover, we support the data owner throughout the
entire storage process by setting up alarms triggered when the status of the storage
servers might lead to data loss or data breach. In addition, we support the data
owner in protecting the integrity of the outsourced data by introducing the first third
party audit mechanism that checks the validity of the shares stored by the storage
servers without compromising on confidentiality. The mechanism does not leak any
information about the shares to be audited and is compatible with proactive secret
sharing schemes, thus preserving the stringent information-theoretically confiden-
tiality requirements that secret sharing-based distributed storage systems aim at
fulfilling. We provide a batch version of our audit mechanism where the integrity of
multiple data can be checked at once to lower communication complexity and make
the procedure more efficient.
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Coalition-Resistant Performance Scoring Mechanism for Long-Term Confiden-
tiality (Chapter 5). In this chapter, we provide means to compute accurate per-
formance scores for the storage servers. This is achieved by designing a so called
performance scoring mechanism that is resilient to unreliable inputs submitted by
storage servers owned by coalitions of SSPs. We introduce a novel game-theoretic
behavioral model to reflect the real-life motivations of SSPs, which do not fit the
classical good/bad model. Thus, we treat the computation of accurate aggregate
scores through mutual ratings in distributed storage systems as an economic problem.
More precisely, we formalize, for the first time, the preferences of the storage servers
with respect to gaining or losing a share by introducing a utility function. Assuming
the rationality of the SSPs, which want to maximize their income by maximizing the
shares distributed to their storage servers, we provide a game-theoretical model of
the peer rating strategies of the storage servers and the SSPs. Assuming a honest
majority, the performance scoring mechanism outputs aggregate scores that reflect
the actual performances of the storage servers by taking advantage of their ratio-
nality. A trusted authority is introduced, which acts as a mediator, and rewards
and discourages the submission of, respectively, accurate and inconsistent ratings
by, respectively, positively and negatively affecting the final aggregate score of the
storage server submitting those ratings. It is the trusted authority that provides
the data owner with the accurate performance scores. The data owner uses these
accurate performance scores to make informed decisions when it comes to choosing
the storage servers making up a distributed storage system. Lastly, we show how
accurate and inaccurate ratings can be distinguished in practice by instantiating our
performance scoring mechanism through machine learning techniques. We provide
evaluations to demonstrate that submitters of inaccurate ratings are detected and
penalized.
Efficient Proactive Distributed Storage System Based on Trusted Execution
Environments (Chapter 6). In this chapter, we propose LSTee, the first long-term
secure distributed storage system that relies on a trusted execution environment
(TEE) for the generation and the periodical renewal of the shares, as well as for the
reconstruction of the originally outsourced message. Leveraging the TEE in this way
leads to a more efficient and affordable long-term secure distributed storage system
compared to state of the art approaches for two main reasons. First, the commitment
schemes used to check the validity of the shares distributed to the storage servers
are replaced with more practical signature schemes. It is the TEE that signs each
(updated) share before distributing it to the respective storage server. This enables the
TEE to check later on their validity (and, thus, the integrity of the outsourced data)
prior to performing the renewal. Second, LSTee significantly reduces the number of
information-theoretically secure channel to be established among the parties involved.
Since all the computations needed to protect the confidentiality and the integrity of
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the outsourced data are performed inside the TEE, only an information-theoretically
secure channel between the TEE and between the data owner and the TEE and each
of the storage server have to be established. Assuming a trustworthy TEE, LSTee
provides the same security guarantees in terms of confidentiality and integrity of
state of the art approaches. Moreover, we address the challenges of robustness and
portability in LSTee by constructing it to be TEE-agnostic, such that secure and
seamless migration from a compromised or unavailable TEE to another trustworthy
one is supported. Lastly, to show it feasibility, we prototype LSTee on a TEE,
instantiated with Intel SGX. We present run times for generation and the renewal of
shares as well as for the reconstruction of files.
Conclusion (Chapter 7). This chapter concludes this thesis with a discussion on
possible directions for future work.
7

2 Background
In this chapter, secret sharing is formally introduced. More precisely, threshold secret
sharing, proactive secret sharing, verifiable secret sharing, hierarchical secret sharing,
in particular Tassa’s hierarchical secret sharing schemes, and social secret sharing
are defined and their properties are explained.
2.1 Secret Sharing
Secret sharing is a cryptographic primitive enabling a data owner to distribute
a message among a set of shareholders, each of whom is allocated a share of the
message. More precisely, to distribute a message m ∈ M to a set of shareholders
S = {s1, . . . , sn} the data owner computes shares σ1, . . . , σn ∈ Σ, whereM is the
message space and Σ the space of all possible shares. The message can be recon-
structed only when an authorized subset A ⊂ S of these shareholders combine their
shares while unauthorized subsets U ⊂ S are prevented from doing it. The access
structure Γ ∈ P(S)1 determines both sets, i.e. A ∈ Γ and U /∈ Γ. From now on, the
number of shareholders of a subset R ⊂ S is denoted as r := |R|.
In the following, we formalize the security definition of a secret sharing scheme.
On a high level, a secret sharing scheme is secure if any unauthorized subset of
participants learns nothing about the message, while any authorized subset of
participants is able to fully reconstruct the secret (the latter property is referred
to as accessibility). In particular, in this thesis, we focus on secret sharing schemes
that are perfectly secure, i.e. secure in an information-theoretic sense. That is, we
do not consider here secret sharing schemes where unauthorized subsets can gain
some knowledge about the secret to be reconstructed, even though they cannot fully
determine it. We define in the following the security of the secret sharing schemes
that we consider by formalizing the notion of perfect security and accessibility.
Definition 2.1 ([107]). Let us assume that m ∈M is the message distributed by a
secret sharing scheme among a set S of shareholders according to access structure Γ.
1P(S) denotes the partition of the set S.
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For an authorized subset A ∈ S, i.e. A ∈ Γ, let us denote by σA the set of shares
owned by the shareholders si ∈ A, i.e. σA := {σi such that si ∈ A} . The accessibility
of a secret sharing scheme is the property such that: H(m|σA) = 0, ∀ A ∈ Γ. In
contrast, any unauthorized subset U ∈ S, i.e. U /∈ Γ, should not be able to reconstruct
the secret. If in addition no information about m ∈M is leaked to the shareholders
in U , then the secret sharing scheme is perfectly secure: H(m|σU ) = H(m), ∀ U /∈ Γ.
Note that to have perfect security, it is implicitly assumed that all communications
happen through an information-theoretically secure channel, for which eavesdropping
is not possible. Another important property that characterizes secret sharing schemes
is the length of the shares generated with respect to the message they reconstruct to.
To achieve perfects security, the length of the shares has to be at least as large as
the length of the message. A perfect secure secret sharing scheme where the shares
have precisely the same length as the message is called ideal.
We propose in the following a more intuitive definition for secret sharing schemes
that uses algorithms. This type of formalization is complaint with the use case of
secure distributed storage systems for sensitive data discussed in Chapter 1 and we
base all the other definitions proposed in the rest of this thesis on it.
Definition 2.2. For a message spaceM, a space of shares Σ, a set of shareholders
S = {s1, . . . , sn}, where i ∈ I is the unique ID of shareholder si ∈ S, and an access
structure Γ ⊂ P(S), a secret sharing scheme satisfying the security requirements of
Definition 2.1 is a pair of PPT algorithms Share and Reconstruct performed by a
data owner.
Share It takes as input a message m ∈M and it outputs n shares σ1, . . . , σn ∈ Σ,
where share σi is to be sent to shareholder si, for i = 1, . . . , n.
Reconstruct It takes as input a set of shares σ1, . . . , σr held by a subset R ⊂ S of
shareholders. It outputs m ∈M if R ∈ Γ, and ⊥ otherwise.
In the following, we present threshold secret sharing schemes and, in particular,
Shamir’s secret sharing scheme in Section 2.1.1. In Section 2.1.2, we discuss verifiable
secret sharing schemes and how to instantiate them.
2.1.1 Shamir’s Threshold Secret Sharing Scheme
Among the most studied schemes due to their usage in practical scenarios there are
threshold secret sharing schemes. In threshold secret sharing schemes, the authorized
subsets of shares are those whose cardinality is larger than a certain value, i.e.
a threshold usually denoted by t. More precisely, authorized subsets A ⊂ S are
composed of t or more shareholders, that is |A| ≥ t. Unauthorized subsets U ⊂ S are
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composed of t− 1 or less shareholders, that is |U | ≤ t− 1. Thus, for threshold secret
sharing schemes, the access structure Γ is defined as Γ = {A ∈ S such that|A| ≥ t}.
In 1979, Shamir introduced a threshold secret sharing scheme based on interpolation
of polynomials in [102]. We formalize in the following the Share and Reconstruct
protocols of Shamir’s (t, n)-threshold secret sharing scheme, where t is the recon-
structing threshold and n is the size of the set S = {s1, . . . , sn} of shareholders.
Share takes as input a message m ∈ Fq. It selects a polynomial f(x) = a0 +
a1x + · · · + at−1xt−1 of degree deg(f(x)) = t − 1, where a0 := m and coefficients
a1, . . . , at−1 ∈ Fq are chosen uniformly at random. It computes share σi ∈ Fq for
shareholder si ∈ S as a point on polynomial f(x), i.e. σi := f(i), where i ∈ I
is the ID of shareholder si. It distributes share σi to shareholder si through an
information-theoretically secure channel, for i = 1, . . . , n.
Reconstruct takes as input a set of shares σ1, . . . , σr held by a subset R ∈ S of
shareholders. If R /∈ Γ, then it outputs ⊥. Otherwise, it reconstructs polynomial
f(x)using Lagrange’s interpolation formula as follows:
f(x) ≡ ∑
si∈R
f(i)
∏
sj∈R,j 6=i
x− j
i− j ,
and outputs message m ∈ Fq as f(0) = m.
Shamir’s secret sharing scheme is secure according to Definition 2.1. More precisely,
the requirements of perfect security and accessibility are satisfied because a polynomial
of degree t− 1 in a finite field is fully determined by t of its points, while it cannot
be determined when t− 1 or less of its points are given. It is also ideal because all
computations are performed in the same finite field. The full proof can be found
in [102]. Note that Shamir’s secret sharing scheme, as well as all the other secret
sharing primitive discussed in the rest of this thesis, are linear schemes, meaning
that the distribution of the shares is a linear mapping and the message space and
the shares space are instantiated with the same finite field. Again, in our context
and according to Definition 2.2, algorithms Share and Reconstruct are performed by
a data owner who wants to outsource a message.
2.1.2 Verifiable Secret Sharing
Verifiable secret sharing was introduced by Chor et al. in [34] to provide means for
shareholders to check the validity of shares received from the data owner. More
precisely, audit data are generated that allow the shareholders to check whether the
shares of each authorized subset of shareholders lead to the same message during
the reconstruction algorithm. Verifiable secret sharing was originally meant to
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protect shareholders from a malicious data owner providing them with invalid shares
that do not reconstruct to the secret the data owner is supposed to share. More
precisely, verifiable secret sharing ensures that, even if the data owner is untrusted,
the shareholders can still reconstruct a well-defined secret. A verifiable secret sharing
scheme is a secret sharing scheme as in Definition 2.2 satisfying the security properties
formalized in Definition 2.1 with the following additional requirements.
Definition 2.3 ([93]). In a verifiable secret sharing scheme, the algorithm Share of a
secret sharing scheme as in Definition 2.2 satisfying perfect security and accessibility
as in Definition 2.1 is extended by an additional protocol executed between an untrusted
data owner and the shareholders S = {s1 . . . sn} where a majority of them is honest,
such that the following properties are fulfilled.
Completeness If the parties computing the shares, e.g. data owner and shareholders,
follow the algorithms correctly, then each shareholder accepts the share with probability
1.
Committing If for any two authorized subsets A1 ⊂ S and A2 ⊂ S, i.e. A1, A2 ∈ Γ,
the shareholders of A1 and A2 accept their shares, then the following holds except
with negligible probability: if mi is the message reconstructed by the shareholders in
Ai (for i = 1, 2), then m1 = m2.
In the framework of secret sharing-based distributed storage system, verifiable
secret sharing protects the storage servers from malicious data owner that provision
them with invalid shares to later blame them that they failed to properly store them.
It also protects the data owners from untrusted storage servers by giving them means
to check whether they have tampered with the shares during the reconstruction of
the secret.
To provide verifiable secret sharing usually commitment schemes are used, which
come with two properties. First, bindingness ensures that it is not possible to change
the message committed to. Second, hidingness ensures that no information about
the message is leaked. Furthermore, there are several commitment schemes with
homomorphic properties available, i.e. operations performed on the values committed
to can be transferred to operations performed on the commitments. Verifiable secret
sharing uses Feldman commitment presented in [46], which is unconditionally binding
and computationally hiding, or Pedersen commitment presented in [93], which
is computationally binding and unconditionally hiding. In the following, we use
Feldmann commitment for the sake of simplicity, but our solutions work with both
schemes. In the following, we recall the definition of Feldman commitment and
Pedersen commitment (in brackets).
Definition 2.4 ([46],[93]). Feldman (Pedersen) commitment scheme is a triple
(Setup,Commit,Open) of the following algorithms.
Setup It takes as input a security parameter λ and it outputs a prime q, a group
G of order q, and a generator g ∈ G (distinct generators g, h ∈ G).
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Commit It takes as input a message m ∈ Fq (and randomness r ∈ Fq) and it
outputs commitment c = gm (c = gmhr).
Open It takes as input a commitment c ∈ G, a message m ∈ Fq (and randomness
r ∈ Fq) and it outputs ‘1’ if c = gm (if c = gmhr) and ‘0’ otherwise.
There exists solutions [50], [47], [70], [6] for verifiable secret sharing providing both
information-theoretic confidentiality and bindingness. However, they are not secure
against a mobile adversary that is able to collect over time enough shares to retrieve
the message. The solution proposed in [6] is an interactive protocol while we only
consider non-interactive protocol having less communication complexity.
2.2 Hierarchical Secret Sharing
Hierarchical secret sharing schemes are secret sharing schemes where the shareholders
are not equal in their reconstruction capabilities, i.e. the shares generated are not
equivalent. This means that some shareholders are distributed highly informative
shares (i.e. shares such that few of them are needed to reconstruct the message), while
some other shareholders are distributed low informative shares (i.e. shares such that
many of them are needed to reconstruct the message). Hierarchical secret sharing
schemes address in practice scenarios where there is a hierarchical organization on
place, such as companies. These schemes mirror the powers that the members of a
company has by providing them with an according reconstruction capabilities through
more or less informative shares. In general, shareholders of a hierarchical secret
sharing schemes are organized in levels depending on the their power. Each level
is associated with a threshold so that perfect secrecy holds when less shareholders
attempt to reconstruct the message. In the following, in Section 2.2.1 we survey
existing instantiation of hierarchical secret sharing. In Section 2.2.2, we present in
detail Tassa’s hierarchical secret sharing schemes together with requirements to be
fulfilled for the well-definedness of such schemes in Section 2.2.3.
2.2.1 Overview on Existing Solutions
The first solutions for hierarchical secret sharing have been proposed by Shamir in
[102] and Kothari in [72]. In Shamir’s approach the higher a shareholder is in the
hierarchy, the more shares it gets, overloading the most powerful shareholders. In
Kothari’s solution, shareholders are grouped in sets and for each set an independent
secret sharing scheme is instantiated. This requires managing multiple secret sharing
schemes and does not allow for cooperation among sets during the reconstruction.
The solution proposed by Shamir with respect to hierarchical secret sharing is often
referred to as weighted secret sharing. Disjunctive secret sharing as introduced by
Simmons in [105], is the first approach using only one secret sharing scheme and
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supporting cooperations of shareholders assigned to different sets, or rather levels in
a hierarchy. However, his approach is not ideal meaning that the higher a shareholder
in the hierarchy the larger the share to be stored. Brickell in [27] improved this by
providing a disjunctive secret sharing scheme that is ideal with respect to the size of
the shares, but apart from that rather inefficient. Later, Ghodosi et al. showed in
[52] how to achieve efficient schemes for specific access structures. Finally, in [107]
Tassa further improved this line of research by providing an efficient disjunctive secret
sharing scheme for general access structures. Furthermore, he introduced conjunctive
secret sharing that does not only allow concurrency among levels, but strictly requires
the presence of a minimum amount of shareholders from the highest levels. Both
conjunctive and disjunctive secret sharing are good solutions for hierarchical secret
sharing and our contribution builds on Tassa’s work. None of these approaches
provide verifiability, nor do they allow, without reconstructing the shared message,
to add or remove shareholders, to modify the conditions for accessing the message,
nor to renew shares.
2.2.2 Tassa’s Hierarchical Secret Sharing Schemes
The so called conjunctive and disjunctive schemes proposed by Tassa in [107] are the
first hierarchical secret sharing schemes based on Birkhoff interpolation of polyno-
mials. More precisely, shares are either points on a polynomial or points on one of
the derivatives of such polynomial. More precisely, a hierarchy is composed of levels
L0, . . . , L`, where L0 is the highest level, L` the lowest, and ` ≤ n. The cardinality
of each level Lh is denoted by nh and each shareholder is assigned to one level only.
In addition, a threshold th is associated with each level Lh, for h ∈ 0, . . . , `, such
that 0 < t0 < · · · < t`. Tassa individuated two types of access structures, defining,
respectively the conjunctive and the disjunctive hierarchical secret sharing. On
the one hand, the conjunctive access structure determines that a subset A ⊂ S is
authorized if, for all levels Lh, it contains th shareholders assigned to levels equal or
higher than Lh, for h = 0, . . . , `. On the other hand, the disjunctive access structure
specifies that a subset A ⊂ S is authorized if, for at least one level Lh, it contains
th shareholders assigned to levels equal or higher than Lh, for h = 0, . . . , `. In the
following, we write information relating to disjunctive hierarchical secret sharing in
brackets. For conjunctive (disjunctive) hierarchical secret sharing schemes the unique
ID of shareholder si,j ∈ S is a pair (i, j) ∈ I × I, where i = 1, . . . , nh and j := th−1
(j := t`− th), for h = 0, . . . , ` with t−1 := 0 and t := t`. In the following, we formally
describe how algorithms Share and Reconstruct of Definition 2.2 are instantiated
for Tassa’s hierarchical conjunctive (disjunctive) secret sharing schemes. Note that
these algorithms are both run by a data owner and satisfy the security properties of
Definition 2.1, as formally proved in [107].
Share The algorithm takes as input a message m ∈ Fq and generates a polynomial
14
2.2 Hierarchical Secret Sharing
f(x) = a0+a1x+· · ·+at−1xt−1 of degree deg(f(x)) = t−1, where a0 := m (at−1 := m)
and the coefficients a1, . . . , at−1 ∈ Fq (a0, . . . , at−2 ∈ Fq) are chosen uniformly at
random. It outputs share σi,j ∈ Fq for shareholder si,j ∈ S computed as σi,j := f j(i),
where f j(x) is the j-th derivative of polynomial f(x) and pair (i, j) ∈ I × I is the
unique ID of shareholder si,j ∈ S, for i = 1, . . . , nh and h = 0, . . . , `.
Reconstruct The algorithm takes as input a set of shares held by a subset R ⊂ S of
shareholders. If R is unauthorized, i.e. R /∈ Γ, then it outputs ⊥. If R is authorized,
i.e. R ∈ Γ, then it reconstructs polynomial f(x) using Birkhoff interpolation and
outputs m = a0 (m = at−1).
The Birkhoff interpolation problem is a generalization of the Lagrange interpolation
problem and describes the problem of finding a polynomial f(x) = a0 + a1x+ · · ·+
at−1xt−1 satisfying the equalities f j(i) = σi,j. Given an authorized set R ∈ Γ
of shareholders for conjunctive (disjunctive) hierarchical secret sharing schemes,
the Birkhoff interpolation problem can be solved as follows. The interpolation
matrix associated to set R is a binary matrix E where entry ei,j is set to ‘1’ if
shareholder si,j participates with share σi,j and ‘0’ otherwise. Let us denote by
I(E) = {(i, j) such that ei,j = 1} the set containing the entries of E in lexicographic
order, i.e. the pair (i, j) precedes the pair (i′, j′) if and only if i < i′ or i = i′
and j < j′. The elements of I(E) are denoted by (i1, j1), (i2, j2), . . . , (ir, jr), where
r := |R|. Furthermore, we set ϕ := {φ0, φ1, φ2, . . . , φt−1} = {1, x, x2, . . . , xt} and
denote by φjk the j-the derivative of φk, for k = 0, . . . , t − 1. Then the matrix
A(E,X, ϕ) is defined as follows:
A(E,X, ϕ) =

φj10 (i1) φj11 (i1) φj12 (i1) · · · φj1t−1(i1)
φj20 (i2) φj21 (i2) φj22 (i2) · · · φj2t−1(i2)
... ... ... · · · ...
φjr0 (ir) φjr1 (ir) φjr2 (ir) · · · φjrt−1(ir)
 .
Polynomial f(x) can be reconstructed in distributed fashion by computing
f(x) =
t−1∑
k=0
det(A(E,X, ϕk))
det(A(E,X, ϕ)) x
k,
where matrix A(E,X, ϕk) is obtained from matrix A(E,X, ϕ) by replacing its (k+1)-
th column with shares σi,j in lexicographic order.
2.2.3 Requirements for Birkhoff Interpolation Matrices
Intepolation
In this section the necessary requirements and a sufficient condition for the interpo-
lation matrix E are presented, such that the corresponding Birkhoff interpolation
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problem has a unique solution. For the corresponding proofs we refer to [107].
Lemma 2.5. Let A ⊂ S be an authorized subset of shareholders, i.e. A ∈ Γ, and E
the corresponding interpolation matrix, where the entries ei,j of the matrix E satisfy
the following condition:
k∑
j=0
r∑
i=1
ei,j ≥ k + 1, 0 ≤ k ≤ d, (2.1)
where d is the highest derivative order in the problem and r := |A| is the number
of interpolating points.
Before providing the sufficient condition (Theorem 2.7), the following definition is
needed.
Definition 2.6 ([107]). In the interpolation matrix E a 1-sequence is a maximal
run of consecutive 1s in a row of the matrix E itself. Namely, it is a triplet of the
form (i, j0, j1) where 1 ≤ i ≤ r and 0 ≤ j0 ≤ j1 ≤ d, such that ei,j = 1 for all
j0 ≤ j ≤ j1, while ei,j0−1 = ei,j1+1 = 0. A 1-sequence (i, j0, j1) is called supported if
E has 1s both to the northwest and southwest of the leading entry in the sequence,
i.e. there exist indexes nw and sw, where inw < i < isw and jnw, jsw < j0 such that
einw,jnw = eisw,jsw = 1.
Theorem 2.7. The interpolation Birkhoff problem for an authorized subset A and
the corresponding interpolation matrix E has a unique solution, if the interpolation
matrix E satisfies (2.1) and contains no supported 1-sequence of odd length.
In case the Birkhoff interpolation problem is instantiated over a finite field Fq with
q > 0 a prime number, then also the following condition has to hold.
Theorem 2.8. The Birkhoff interpolation problem for an interpolation matrix E
has a unique solution over the finite field Fq, if Theorem 2.7 holds and in addition
also the following inequality is satisfied:
q > 2−d+2 · (d− 1) (d−1)2 · (d− 1)! · x
(d−1)(d−2)
2
r , (2.2)
where d is the highest derivative order of the problem.
2.3 Social secret sharing
Introduced by Nojoumian and Stinson in [87], social secret sharing is a primitive
composed of a secret sharing scheme and a performance scoring mechanism. In the
following, we first present performance scoring mechanisms (Section 2.3.1) so that
social secret sharing schemes, formalized in Section 2.3.2, can be fully understood.
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2.3.1 Performance Scoring Mechanisms
Performance scoring mechanisms [66] are a viable solution to build trust in electronic
environments. Performance scoring mechanism are run so that scores are computed
that rate the entities involved in a certain environment with respect to a given
metric. The metric depends on the environment and on the types of tasks the
entities are expected to carry out and the term “performance”is thus used in a broad
sense to convey the idea that a performance scoring mechanism is not tied to the
specific metric the scores it outputs are supposed to describe. Performance scoring
mechanisms enable trust because entities with higher scores gained a good reputation
with respect to carrying out properly a given task and are therefore likely to be
chosen for future tasks as well. Indeed, the score tracks the reputation that an
entity has built with respect to carrying out a specific task with a certain level of
performance.
Performance scoring mechanism are referred to as evidence-based performance
scoring mechanisms when they rely on evidence derived from past interactions. More
precisely, evidence can be derived from direct interactions between a trustor and a
trustee. Direct interactions, however, may be rare in certain cases, e.g. newcomers
in service marketplaces. Thus, evidence-based mechanisms also consider evidence
derived from indirect interactions. That is, an entity provides another entity with
evidence about its past interactions with a third entity. This is usually referred to as
exchange of recommendations. In case both direct and indirect interactions are not
available, one may rely on evidence derived from virtual cues, e.g., certifications or
stereotypes. Evidence-based performance scoring mechanisms are composed of two
phases: a collection phase and a processing phase. In the collection phase, trustors
observe the behavior of the trustees with respect to a certain metric and issue ratings
to describe the performance of that interaction (i.e. the evidence). In the processing
phase, the ratings from (possibly) multiple trustors issue after several interactions
are processed in a deterministic way proper of the performance scoring mechanism
used and the scores of the trustees are computed. Due to the fact that the scores
aggregate and process several ratings, we refer to them as aggregate scores. For
simplicity, because in this thesis we focus on mechanisms that output scores based on
evidence, from now on, we refer to evidence-based performance scoring mechanism
as simply performance scoring mechanism.
2.3.2 Social Secret Sharing Definition
As already anticipated, social secret sharing is a primitive composed of a secret
sharing scheme and of a performance scoring mechanism. In this way, social secret
sharing grants more informative shares based on the performance of the shareholders
with respect to carrying out a certain task. More precisely, the performance scoring
mechanism outputs periodically an aggregate score for each of the shareholders
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measuring their performance, where, again, performance is meant in a broad sense
and depends on the metric that the scores are supposed to rate. According to these
aggregate scores, more or less informative shares are distributed to the shareholders.
Social secret sharing have been so far instantiated either through Shamir’s weighted
secret sharing [87, 88, 90] or through Tassa’s hierarchical secret sharing schemes [92].
Together with the usual algorithms Share and Reconstruct proper of general secret
sharing schemes, social secret sharing is composed of an additional algorithm called
Tune, which is used to determine how to adjust the shares distributed to the share-
holders according to their behavior. We formalize the notion of social secret sharing
in the following definition.
Definition 2.9. For a message spaceM, a space of shares Σ, a set of shareholders
S = {s1, . . . , sn} where i ∈ I is the unique ID of shareholder si ∈ S, and an access
structure Γ ⊂ P(S), an social secret sharing scheme is a secret sharing scheme with
PPT algorithms Share and Reconstruct as in Definition 2.2 satisfying the security
properties of Definition 2.1 with an additional PPT algorithm Tune run as well by
the data owner as follows.
Share takes as input a message m ∈M and a vector of weights w1, . . . , wn ∈ [0, 1],
where ∑ni=1wi = 1. It outputs n shares σ1, . . . , σn ∈ Σ, where share σi is to be sent
to shareholder si ∈ S and whose reconstruction capability matches weight wi, for
i = 1, . . . , n.
Tune takes as input aggregate scores τ1, . . . , τn ∈ [0, 1] for, respectively, sharehold-
ers s1, . . . , sn computed by a performance scoring mechanism. It outputs weights
w1, . . . , wn for shareholders s1, . . . , sn as well as shares σ1, . . . , σn whose reconstruc-
tion capabilities match the weights.
Reconstruct takes as input a set of shares σ1, . . . , σr held by a subset R ⊂ S of
shareholders. It outputs m ∈M if R ∈ Γ, and ⊥ otherwise.
2.4 Notions of Game Theory
In game theory [91], a set of players P = {P1, . . . , Pn}, an action profile A =
A1 × · · · × An, where Ai is the set of actions of player Pi, and a utility function
ui : A → R are the components of a game. A game is denoted by Γ(Pi,Ai, ui), for
i = 1, . . . , n. The utility function of a player defines its preferences with respect
to the actions it takes and to the actions all other players take. That is, given
two distinct outcomes a,a′ ∈ A, with a = (a1, . . . , an) and a′ = (a′1, . . . , a′n), if
ui(a) ≥ ui(a′), then player Pi prefers a to a′.
Games consist of either one or multiple rounds and the latter are referred to as
repeated games. Among repeated games, there are infinitely and finitely repeated
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games, which consist of, respectively, an infinite or a finite number of rounds. At
each round, all players are asked to choose a certain action simultaneously.
Players can rely on different strategies with respect to the actions to choose. A
strategy for player Pi is a probability distribution σi : Ai → [0, 1] that determines
how the actions ai ∈ Ai are chosen, where σi ∈ Si and Si is called the strategy profile
of player Pi. Since a strategy is a way to choose actions, it is possible to express the
expected outcome of a game by using strategies. That is, a game can be denoted by
Γ(Pi, σi, ui), for i = 1, . . . , n and σi ∈ Si. Given σ = (σ1, . . . , σn) the tuple composed
of each player Pi’s strategy σi, the utility of player Pi when strategy σ is played can
be denoted by ui(σ). We refer to σ as the joint strategy of players P1, . . . , Pn.
We denote by (σ′i,σ−i) the vector of strategies where all players maintained the
same strategies of the joint strategy σ, except for player Pi, which replaced strategy
σi by another strategy σ′i. That is, (σ′i,σ−i) = (σ1, . . . , σi−1, σ′i, σi+1, . . . , σn). Given
a subset C ⊂ P of players of cardinality nC ≤ n, we denote by (σ′C ,σ−C) the vector
of strategies where all players maintained the same strategies of the joint strategy
σ, except for player Pj ∈ C, which replaced strategy σj by another strategy σ′j,
for j = 1, . . . , nC . That is, (σ′C ,σ−C) = (σ′1, . . . , σ′nC−1, σ
′
nC
, σnC+1, . . . , σn), where,
without loss of generality, players in C are the first nC players.
Players act as rational deciders, meaning that they always play the strategy that
maximizes their utilities, which depends on the other players’ actions. No player
knows what strategies other players adopt at a given round, and can only form beliefs
in this respect. The pay-off players get is not only subjected to the way they choose
strategies, but also to the type of game that is played.
There are two types of game. A non-cooperative (or strategic) game deals with
actions chosen by players individually and the pay-off of a player is given solely by its
utility function. Instead, a cooperative (or coalitional) game deals with the actions a
subset of players agree to take collectively and their pay-off is given by splitting the
overall utility among themselves. In non-cooperative games, the concept of a Nash
equilibrium conveys the idea that players choose a strategy by both looking at the
best available actions and by taking into account the belief of how the other players
might behave. A joint strategy σ such that no player Pi alone has an incentive in
choosing a strategy σ′i other than σi, while all other players Pj stick to strategy σj 6=i
is called a Nash equilibrium.
Definition 2.10 ([91]). A joint strategy σ = (σ1, . . . , σn) is called a Nash equilibrium
if ui(σ′i,σ−i) ≤ ui(σi,σ−i), for each player Pi, where σ′i 6= σi. It is a strict Nash
equilibrium if ui(σ′i,σ−i) < ui(σi,σ−i).
The counterpart of a Nash equilibrium for cooperative games is introduced in [2]
and called a k-resilient equilibrium.
Definition 2.11 ([2]). A joint strategy σ = (σ1, . . . , σn) is a k-resilient equilibrium
if ui(σ′C ,σ−C) ≤ ui(σC ,σ−C), for each subset C ⊂ P of cardinality nC ≤ k, where
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σ′i 6= σi, for Pi ∈ C. It is a strongly resilient equilibrium if it is a k-resilient
equilibrium for k ≤ n− 1.
Definition 2.10 and Definition 2.11 can also be expressed by using a game outcome
a sampled from the action profile instead of the joint strategy σ. From now on, we
refer to the subset C of players deviating from the joint strategy in Definition 2.11
as a coalition. Another important concept in game theory is the one of dominated
strategies (or actions). A strategy is dominated by another strategy if it always
provides the player with a lower pay-off. This concept is formalized in the definition
below, denoting by S = S1 × · · · × Sn the strategy profile of players P1, . . . , Pn and
by S−i = S1 × · · · × Si−1 ×Si+1 × · · · × Sn the strategy profile obtained by removing
the set Si of possible strategies for player Pi from S.
Definition 2.12 ([91]). Given two strategies σi, σ′i ∈ Si for player Pi, strategy σi
is weakly dominated by strategy σ′i if ui(σi,σ−i) ≤ ui(σ′i,σ−i) for each σ−i ∈ S−i
and there exist σ′−i ∈ S−i such that ui(σi,σ′−i) < ui(σ′i,σ′−i). Strategy σi is strictly
dominated if ui(σi,σ−i) < ui(σ′i,σ−i) for each strategy σ′i ∈ Si.
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Sharing-Based Distributed Storage
Systems
Distributed storage systems fulfill an important role: they offer highly reliable storage
services because data are stored redundantly in many storage servers. Such systems
are reliable as a whole because the data can be retrieved even if some of the storage
servers involved are not.
There are sensitive data that need protection for decades and whose confidentiality
must never be compromised during this time. Such data are for example electronic
health records. To cope with the stringent protection requirements of such data, in
addition to reliability, distributed storage systems should also provide information-
theoretic confidentiality of the data stored, as well as the following functionalities.
First, they should allow for hierarchical access rules that mirror the structure of the
organizations adopting them. For instance, in the case of electronic health records,
distributed storage systems might be adopted by hospitals. Here, access rules can be
set up so that a health record is accessed by a nurse only if she gets the approval
of the doctor that issued it. The access rules should be dynamic too, meaning that
they should be easily modifiable without resetting the system from scratch. For
instance, additional nurses or doctors can be employed in the hospital and they
all should get their corresponding share of data. In addition, distributed storage
systems should support computations on the shared data and be equipped with audit
mechanisms that ensure that the computations have been performed correctly. For
instance, statistics over electronic health records might provide important insight
on how diseases are correlated to certain symptoms and correct computations are
crucial for good diagnosis.
Secret sharing-based distributed storage systems are an established approach to
the long-term protection of the confidentiality of stored data. Several secret sharing
schemes provide information-theoretic confidentiality: they are not vulnerable to
cryptanalytic progress nor quantum computing and this makes them suitable for the
long-term protection of sensitive data. In the special case of proactive secret sharing
schemes, the adversary model can even be strengthened: the shares stored in the
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storage servers are periodically renewed and this allows these schemes to cope with
an adversary that can over time break into all the storage servers. There are two
types of secret sharing schemes that are suitable to build distributed storage systems:
Shamir’s secret sharing scheme (see Section 2.1) and Tassa’s hierarchical secret
sharing schemes (see Section 2.2). On the one hand, Shamir’s secret sharing scheme
satisfies all the above requirements except that it does not support hierarchical
access rules. This is due to the fact that all the shares generated are equivalent. On
the other hand, Tassa’s hierarchical secret sharing schemes allow for hierarchical
access rules. However, no algorithms for changing these hierarchical access rules,
nor algorithms for computing on hierarchically shared data together with auditing
mechanisms, nor for renewing the shares have been proposed until now. Thus, neither
solution fully satisfies all the requirements that distributed storage systems should
fulfill.
Contributions
In this chapter, we provide a secret sharing-based distributed storage system that has
all the required properties described above, meaning it allows for hierarchical and dy-
namic access rules, for computations on shared data and according audit mechanisms,
and for share renewal. We provide these algorithms for Birkhoff interpolation-based
secret sharing schemes, in particular Tassa’s hierarchical secret sharing schemes. The
idea behind the algorithms we present is that the algorithm Reconstruct for Tassa’s
hierarchical conjunctive and disjunctive secret sharing scheme presented in Section
2.2 uses terms provided by the shareholders that can be computed in distributed
fashion. This allows us provide the algorithms for modifying the access rules, chang-
ing the set of storage servers making up the storage system, renewing the shares,
and computing on shared messages by generalizing the corresponding algorithms
for Lagrange interpolation-based secret sharing schemes (like the one by Shamir’s).
We prove that the computations of such terms needed in algorithm Reconstruct
do not leak information and still allows to reconstrcut the shared message. Thus,
because of the perfect secrecy and accessibility of Tassa’s hierarchical conjunctive
and disjunctive secret sharing schemes, we prove that the algorithms we provide are
secure and correct as well.
The contributions of this chapter are based on published papers [T1] and [T2].
My contributions were the definition of the dynamic secret sharing primitive and
the design of the algorithms for modifying the access rules and for computing on
hierarchically shares messages as well as their respective security proofs.
Outline
The outline of this chapter is as follows. In Section 3.1, we discuss related work with
respect to secret sharing schemes allowing for dynamic access rules, for computations
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on shared data and audit mechanisms, and for share renewal and highlight that
none of those schemes provide hierarchical access to secrets. In Section 3.2, we
provide a definition of dynamic secret sharing as a scheme where the access rules
can be modified, lost shares can be recomputed and renewed and show that Tassa’s
hierarchical secret sharing schemes are dynamic. Also, we prove that these algorithms
that make hierarchical secret sharing dynamic do not lower the underlying security of
the schemes. In Section 3.3, we provide algorithms for computing linear operations
and multiplications on hierarchically shared data, as well as algorithms to perform
the audit of those computations. The security of these algorithms is also proved.
In Section 3.4 the efficiency of the algorithms that make Tassa’s hierarchical secret
sharing schemes dynamic and that allow for computations are compared to the ones
for Shamir’s secret sharing schemes and experimental validations are also provided.
Summary and future work can be found in Section 3.5.
3.1 Related Work
In this section, we review related work with respect to secret sharing schemes allowing
to modify the access rules, to renew the shares, to verify their consistency and to
perform computations over shared messages that can be audited.
The best known and used secret sharing scheme is the one proposed by Shamir
in [102]. Shamir’s secret sharing scheme has been extensively investigated and it
now provides all the aforementioned features and properties that make it a suitable
candidate for distributed storage systems. Herzberg et al. showed in [62] how
shares can be periodically refreshed. Based on the work by Desmedt and Jajodia
presented in [42], Gupta and Gopinath showed in [58] how to modify the access
rules distributedly so that different subsets of shareholder become eligible for the
reconstruction of the message. In [87], Nojoumian et al. presented how new shares
can be generated without the intervention of the data owner, so that compromised
shares can be recovered or new storage servers can join the distributed storage
system. Furthermore, it is possible to perform operations over shared messages as
discussed by Goldreich et al. in [53]. This enables general multi-party computation,
as discussed by Ben-Or et al. in [12], by Chaum et al. in [32], and by Gennaro et al.
in [51]. Furthermore, Schabüser et al. showed in [98] how to perform an auditing
procedure for computations over shared messages, which is based on the work done
by Beaver in [9] and by Damgård and Nielsen in [40].
Hierarchical secret sharing schemes have been investigated. There have been only
two steps towards having hierarchical secret sharing schemes suitable for distributed
storage systems. The first step was made by Pakniat et al. in [92], where it was
shown how to renew the shares. However, their approach was not general enough
to describe polynomial-based hierarchical secret sharing schemes as a whole and
did not allow for any other functionality. The second step was made by by Kasper
23
3 Dynamic and Hierarchical Secret Sharing-Based Distributed Storage Systems
et al. in [69], where conditions on the access structure allowing for multiplication
have been investigated. However, they lead to schemes with either an increased
length of the shares (which is not optimal for our application to distributed storage
systems) or with stronger conditions on the access structure deviating from the
original schemes proposed by Tassa. Thus, the polynomial-based Tassa’s hierarchical
secret sharing schemes currently do not come with any of functionalities available for
Shamir’s secret sharing scheme that would make it another prominent candidate for
secret-sharing based distributed storage systems. Tassa’s hierarchical secret sharing
schemes are linear and, from a theoretical point of view, this means that they can
be equipped with all these functionalities (as one can infer from what is discussed
by Desmedt and Jajodia in [42] and by Cramer et al. in [36]). However, practical
algorithms carrying out these functionalities have not been proposed yet. And this
is what we provide in this work.
3.2 Dynamic and Verifiable Hierarchical Secret
Sharing
In this section, we provide algorithms for Tassa’s hierarchical secret sharing schemes
for modifying the access rules to the message, adding shares, and renewing them
periodically. We first define such secret sharing schemes where these three function-
alities are added as dynamic secret sharing scheme and formalize this idea in Section
3.2.1. By first proving how to distributedly compute certain operations of Tassa’s
conjunctive and disjunctive hierarchical secret sharing schemes, in Section 3.2.3 we
show they are dynamic by introducing the algorithms Add and Reset to the existing
algorithms Share and Reconstruct discussed in Section 2.2. Finally, in Section 3.2.4 it
is proven that these new algorithms are correct and do not compromise the security
of the underlying schemes.
3.2.1 Definition of Dynamic Secret Sharing
In the framework of dynamic secret sharing, we assume that all communication
channels used guarantee reliable delivery of messages, any two shareholders can
communicate via a private channel, all shareholders can receive messages sent over
a broadcast channel, any shareholder can declare and no shareholder can spoof
its identity, and a majority of the shareholders participating in each algorithm is
trustworthy such that wrongly generated shares can be detected. Note that these are
standard assumption for classical secret sharing schemes that provide verifiability
and dynamism and that the latter assumption can be weakened using the complaint
mechanism proposed by Gupta and Gopinath in [58]. Furthermore, our algorithms
assume a synchronous network, but can easily be adapted to asynchronous networks,
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for instance, by using the techniques proposed by Schultz et al. in [100]. In the
following, we formally introduce dynamic secret sharing schemes as secret sharing
schemes that in addition to the algorithm Share and Reconstruct discussed in Section
2.1 allow to perform Add and Reset in distributed fashion.
Definition 3.1. For a message spaceM, a space of shares Σ, a set of shareholders
S = {s1, . . . , sn} where i ∈ I is the unique ID of shareholder si ∈ S, and an access
structure Γ ⊂ P(S), a dynamic secret sharing scheme is a secret sharing scheme with
PPT algorithms Share and Reconstruct run by the data owner as in Definition 2.2
and satisfying the security properties of Definition 2.1 that is equipped by additional
PPT algorithms Add and Reconstruct run distributedly by authorized subsets of share-
holders that also satisfy the security properties of Definition 2.1. More precisely, a
dynamic secret sharing scheme is a tuple of PPT algorithms Share, Add, Reset, and
Reconstruct.
Share takes as input a message m ∈M. It outputs n shares σ1, . . . , σn ∈ Σ, where
share σi is to be sent to shareholder si ∈ S, for i = 1, . . . , n.
Add takes as input a set of shares σ1, . . . , σr held by a subset R ⊂ S of shareholders
and the ID i, i.e. i = n+ 1, of the new shareholder. If R is unauthorized, i.e. R /∈ Γ,
it outputs ⊥. Otherwise, R ∈ Γ and without message reconstruction, it outputs a
corresponding share σi ∈ Σ for the new shareholder si.
Reset takes as input a set of shares σ1, . . . , σr held by a subset R ⊂ S of share-
holders, a new set of shareholders S ′ = {s′1, . . . , s′n′} (that need not be disjoint to S),
and an access structure Γ′ ⊂ P(S ′). If R is unauthorized, i.e. R /∈ Γ, it outputs ⊥.
Otherwise, R ∈ Γ and without message reconstruction, it outputs n′ shares σ′1, . . . , σ′n′,
where share σ′i is to be sent to each new shareholder s′i ∈ S ′, for i = 1, . . . , n′. The
shares σ1, . . . , σn ∈ Σ held by the old shareholders are deleted.
Reconstruct takes as input a set of shares σ1, . . . , σr held by a subset R ⊂ S of
shareholders. It outputs m ∈M if R ∈ Γ, and ⊥ otherwise.
In addition to the algorithms Share, Add, and Reset, a verifiable and dynamic
secret sharing scheme provides audit data for verification according to Definition 2.3.
Algorithm Add differs from algorithm Reset in the sense that the access structure
remains unchanged and old shareholders keep their shares. This is of practical
interest since renewing shares could be a demanding procedure, e.g. in case shares
are distributed on smartcards. A new access structure Γ′ is given as input to algorithm
Reset because here the whole hierarchical organization among the shareholders is
completely modified and can be enlarged or shrinked substantially. Algorithm Reset
can be run to refresh the shares only, without modifying the access structure nor the
set of shareholders. To do that it is sufficient to run it with the old set of shareholder
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S and the old access structure Γ as input. Furthermore, algorithm Reset allows
also to remove shareholders. We stress that it is important to delete the old shares
during algorithm Reset so that the distributed storage system built on dynamic
secret sharing is resilient against the mobile adversary. Note that notions of dynamic
secret sharing have been already proposed, yet with different meanings and less
functionalities with respect to our definition. More precisely, in the work by Blundo
et al. in [17], it is the data owner that decides which shareholders reconstruct which
secret. This implies the active intervention of the data owner, which is not desirable
for long-term storage of data. In the work by Baron et al. in [8], it is not possible to
add shareholders without changing all the shares already distributed.
3.2.2 Distributed Computation of Determinants
To fulfill Definition 3.1, the algorithms Add and Reset have to be performed without re-
constructing the messagem ∈M. This is possible since determinant det(A(E,X, ϕk))
can be computed in distributed fashion (we refer to Section 2.2 for the definition of
this term). From now on we simplify the notation referring to the shareholders within
subset R ⊂ S as sl and no longer as s(i,j). However, we stress that shareholders in R
are not equal from the hierarchical point of view.
Theorem 3.2. The polynomial f(x) = a0 + a1x + a2x2 + · · · + at−1xt−1 ∈ Rt−1[x]
can be computed by
f(x) =
t−1∑
k=0
akx
k =
t−1∑
k=0
r∑
l=1
al,kx
k,
where al,k is computed by shareholder sl ∈ R, for l = 1, . . . , r and R ∈ Γ is an
authorized subset of S, with r =: |R|.
Proof. Let us first recall that Laplace’s expansion formula computes the determi-
nant det(A) of an n × n matrix A as the weighted sum of the determinants of
n sub-matrices of A, each of size (n − 1) × (n − 1). More precisely det(A) =∑n
j′=1 ai,j′(−1)i+j′ det(Ai,j′) =
∑n
i′=1 ai′,j(−1)i′+j det(Ai′,j), where Ai,j results from A
by deleting the i-th row and j-th column.
The fact that A(E,X, ϕ) can be computed by each shareholder from public
information together with Laplace’s expansion formula implies that each shareholder
sl ∈ R, for l = 1, . . . , r, can compute the partial information al,k for coefficient
ak = det(A(E,X,ϕk))det(A(E,X,ϕ)) , by al,k := σl(−1)l−1+k
det(Al−1,k(E,X,ϕ))
det(A(E,X,ϕ)) , where σl is the share held
by shareholder sl, and Al−1,k(E,X, ϕ) is the matrix that results from A(E,X, ϕ) by
removing the l-th row and the (k + 1)-th column. From Laplace’s expansion formula
it follows that:
r∑
l=1
al,k =
r∑
l=1
σl(−1)l−1+kdet(Al−1,k(E,X, ϕ))det(A(E,X, ϕ)) =
det(A(E,X, ϕk))
det(A(E,X, ϕ)) = ak.
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In conclusion, the coefficients ak, for k = 0, . . . , t−1, of polynomial f(x) = a0 +a1x+
a2x
2+· · ·+at−1xt−1 are computed as the sum of the partial coefficients al,k, where al,k
is computed by shareholder sl ∈ R and R ∈ Γ is an authorized set. Importantly, this
also implies that f(x) = ∑rl=1 fl(x), where f(x) = ∑rl=1 fl(x) = ∑rl=1∑t−1k=0 al,kxk.
In the following, the notation defined above holds. That is, al,k is the partial
information held by shareholder sl about the coefficient ak of polynomial f(x) and
fl(x) =
∑t−1
k=0 al,kx
k is the partial Birkhoff interpolation polynomial of shareholder
sl. Note that Theorem 3.2 implies that also derivatives of polynomial f(x) can be
computed in a distributed fashion.
Theorem 3.3. The j-th derivative f j(x) of polynomial f(x) = a0 + a1x + a2x2 +
· · ·+ at−1xt−1 can be computed in distributed fashion as
f j(x) =
r∑
l=1
f jl (x),
where f jl (x) is computed by shareholder sl ∈ R, for l = 1, . . . , r and R ∈ Γ is an
authorized subset of S, with r =: |R|.
Proof. To compute the derivative of polynomial f(x) each shareholder sl ∈ R first
computes its partial Birkhoff interpolation polynomial fl(x) =
∑t−1
k=0 al,kx
k. Then
it computes the j-th derivative f jl (x) =
∑t−1
k=j
k!
(k−j)!al,kx
k−j. Note that due to the
sum rule for derivatives, i.e. (f(x) + g(x))′ = f(x)′ + g(x)′, and f(x) = ∑rl=1 fl(x)
the j-th derivative f j(x) of polynomial f(x) can be computed by adding all partial
derivatives, i.e. f j(x) = ∑rl=1 f jl (x).
3.2.3 Providing Dynamic and Verifiable Hierarchical Secret
Sharing Scheme
In this section, we provide verifiable and dynamic hierarchical secret sharing. That
is, we provide algorithm Add and algorithm Reset for Tassa’s hierarchical conjunctive
and disjunctive secret sharing schemes that generate audit data to verify the shares
computed. The verification process is described using Feldman commitments pre-
sented in [46]. However, it can easily be adapted to Pedersen commitments presented
in [93] to achieve information-theoretic confidentiality. Like in Section 2.2, we focus
on conjunctive hierarchical secret sharing and show the differences to disjunctive
hierarchical secret sharing in brackets.
Let Γ be an access structure arranged in disjoint levels L0, . . . , L`, where th is the
threshold of level Lh for h = 0, . . . , `. Let us assume a message spaceM, a space
of shares Σ, and a set of shareholders S where the pair (i, j) ∈ I × I is the unique
ID of shareholder si,j ∈ S, such that j = th−1 (j = t` − th) and t−1 = 0. Then the
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algorithms Share, Add, Reset, and Reconstruct for verifiable and dynamic conjunctive
(disjunctive) secret sharing are defined as follows.
Share takes as input a message m ∈M. This algorithm works like the one discussed
in Section 2.2 except that some additional audit data is computed and distributed.
More precisely, the algorithm randomly chooses two large primes p, q, such that
q|(p− 1). Let g be a generator of the q-th order subgroup Fq of F∗p and setM := Fq.
After defining the polynomial f(x) = a0 + a1x + a2x2 + · · · + at−1xt−1, where
a0 := m (at−1 := m) and a1, . . . , at−1 ∈ Fq (a0, . . . , at−2 ∈ Fq) are chosen uniformly
at random, the dealer commits to each coefficient ak by computing ck := gak mod p,
for k = 0, . . . , t − 1. It broadcasts the commitments and sends each share σi,j to
shareholder si,j ∈ Lh, for i = 1, . . . , nh and h = 0, . . . , ` using a private channel.
Shareholder si,j accepts σi,j as its valid share, if and only if
gσi,j ≡
t−1∏
k=j
c
k!
(k−j)! i
k−j
k = gf
j(i).
Add takes as input a set of shares σ1, . . . , σr held by a subset R ⊂ S of shareholders
and the ID (i′, j′) of the new shareholder. If R is unauthorized, i.e. R /∈ Γ, it outputs
⊥. Otherwise, R ∈ Γ and the shareholders compute σi′,j′ := f j′(i′) in distributed
fashion. More precisely, each shareholder sl ∈ R performs the following steps, for
l = 1, . . . , r.
1. It computes the j′-th derivative of its partial Birkhoff interpolation polynomial
at x = i′, i.e.
λl,(i′,j′) := σl
t−1∑
k=j′
k!
(k − j′)!(−1)
l−1+kdet(Al−1,k(E,X, ϕ))
det(A(E,X, ϕ)) i
′k−j′ .
2. It randomly splits the result into r values, i.e. λl,(i′,j′) = δ1,l,(i′,j′) + · · ·+ δr,l,(i′,j′)
and sends δm,l,(i′,j′) to shareholder sm,j ∈ R, for m = 1, . . . , r and m 6= l using a
private channel.
3. It collects all values δl,m,(i′,j′) received and computes δl,(i′,j′) :=
∑r
m=1 δl,m,(i′,j′).
4. It sends δl,(i′,j′) to the new shareholder si′,j′ using a private channel and broadcasts
the audit data c0, . . . , ct−1 received during the share algorithm.
The new shareholder si′,j′ computes its share σi′,j′ by adding all values δl,(i′,j′)
received, i.e. σi′,j′ :=
∑r
l=1 δl,(i′,j′). It can verify the correctness of its share by
checking whether
gσi′,j′ ≡
t−1∏
k=j′
c
k!
(k−j′)! i
′k−j′
k = gf
(j′)(i′),
using the audit data received from the shareholders.
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Reset takes as input a set of shares σ1, . . . , σr held by a subset R ⊂ S of shareholders
a new set of shareholders S ′ = {s′1, . . . , s′n′}, each accompanied with a unique ID
(i′, j′), and an access structure Γ′ ⊂ P(S ′) with maximal threshold t′. If R is
unauthorized, i.e. R /∈ Γ, it outputs ⊥. Otherwise, R ∈ Γ and the subset of old
shareholders jointly computes shares for the new shareholders in S ′. More precisely,
each old shareholder sl ∈ R performs the following steps, for l = 1, . . . , r .
1. It computes its partial Birkhoff interpolation coefficient
al,0 := σl(−1)l−1det(Al−1,0(E,X, ϕ))det(A(E,X, ϕ))(
al,t−1 = σl(−1)l+t−2 det(Al−1,t−1(E,X,ϕ))det(A(E,X,ϕ))
)
.
2. It chooses a polynomial f ′l (x) = a′l,0 + a′l,1x+ a′l,2x2 + · · ·+ a′l,t′−1xt′−1 of degree
t′ − 1, where a′l,0 = al,0 (a′l,t−1 = al,t−1) is the partial Birkhoff interpolation
coefficient and coefficients a′l,1, . . . , a′l,t′−1 ∈ Fq (a′l,0, . . . , a′l,t′−2 ∈ Fq) are chosen
uniformly at random.
3. It computes subshare σl,(i′,j′) for shareholder s′i′,j′ ∈ S ′ as σl,(i′,j′) := f ′j
′
l (i′).
4. It sends subshare σl,(i′,j′) to shareholder s′i′,j′ ∈ S using a private channel and
broadcasts the audit data, composed of commitments to each coefficient of
polynomial f ′l (x), i.e. c′l,k := ga
′
l,k , for k = 0, . . . , t′−1, and commitment c0 = gm
(ct−1 = gm) of the old polynomial f(x).
5. It deletes its share.
Each new shareholder si′,j′ ∈ S ′ computes its share σ′i′,j′ adding all subshares σl,(i′,j′)
received, i.e. σ′i′,j′ :=
∑r
l=1 σl,(i′,j′). To verify the correctness of share σl,(i′,j′), each
new shareholder si′,j′ ∈ S ′ performs the following steps.
1. It checks the function value of each polynomial, i.e.
gσl,(i′,j′) ≡
t′−1∏
k=j′
c′l,k
k!
(k−j′)! i
′k−j′
= gf
′(j′)
l
(i′), for l = 1, . . . , r.
2. It checks whether the free coefficient (last coefficient) of all polynomials f ′l (i′)
leads to the original message m ∈M, i.e.
c0 ≡
r∑
l=1
c′l,0
(ct−1 ≡ ∑rl=1 c′l,t′−1).
3. If both equations are satisfied, it accept σ′i′,j′ as its valid share.
Reconstruct takes as input shares held by a subset R ⊂ S of shareholders. If R ∈ Γ, it
outputs m ∈M reconstructed using Birkhoff interpolation. It outputs ⊥ otherwise.
Having access to the original audit data c0 = ga0 (ct−1 = gat−1) it is possible to
verify whether the reconstructed message m ∈ M is a correct opening value for
commitment c0 (ct−1), i.e. gm ≡ c0 (gm ≡ ct−1).
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3.2.4 Correctness and Security
Conjunctive secret sharing has been introduced by Tassa in [107] and it has been
proven correct and perfectly secure. We argue that the algorithms Add and Reset
we introduced enhance the scheme and do not affect the properties and the security
of the original conjunctive secret sharing scheme. To prove that, we first provide a
high level idea of the proof of perfect security and accessibility of Tassa’s conjunctive
secret sharing scheme. Then, we show that our dynamic hierarchical secret sharing
scheme maintains perfect security and accessibility, according to Definition 2.1.
Furthermore, it is possible to cope with malicious dealers and shareholders including
a verification protocol to the algorithm Share,Add,Reset, and Reconstruct. If Pedersen
commitments are used in the verification protocol, then unconditional hidingness
is maintained while bindingness can only be achieved computationally. Feldmann
commitments instead ensure unconditional bindingness, i.e. the correctness of the
shares can be guaranteed, but at he expenses of providing only computational
hidingness for the shares. Thus, the latter solution is not suitable if data is processed
for which long-term or even everlasting confidentiality is required. Similarly, it can
be proven that Add and Reset maintain also the same properties of disjunctive secret
sharing. However, for readability in the following we focus on conjunctive secret
sharing only.
Roughly speaking, reconstructing a distributed message is equal to finding a
solution of the Birkhoff interpolation problem for a polynomial f(x) = a0 + a1x+
a2x
2 + · · ·+ at−1xt−1. Thus, Tassa proved the security of his approach by showing
that authorized sets of shareholders A ∈ Γ lead to interpolation matrices E for which
the Birkhoff interpolation problem is well posed. Thus, accessibility is provided.
Furthermore, any unauthorized set of shareholders U /∈ Γ leads to an unsolvable
system and perfect security is therefore proven.
The introduction of the protocols Add and Reset making the Birkhoff interpolation
based secret sharing scheme dynamic does not affect these properties. First, we show
that accessibility and perfect security is provided if all shareholders act honestly. This
corresponds to the setup of Tassa’s security proof. Second, we prove that our scheme
even provides verifiability, i.e. can cope with malicious dealers and shareholders.
Theorem 3.4. The dynamic secret sharing scheme composed of the protocols Share,
Add, Reset, and Reconstruct described in Section 3.2.3 is accessible and perfectly
secure according to Definition 2.1.
Proof. The proof for the algorithms Share and Reconstruct follows from Tassa’s
security proof. The algorithms Add and Reset are discussed individually in the
following.
Add If the shareholders follow the protocol correctly, then all shareholders, meaning
the old set of shareholders together with the new shareholder, only hold shares of
the polynomial f(x) = a0 + a1x+ a2x2 + · · ·+ at−1xt−1 or of one of its derivatives.
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This prevents unauthorized subsets from reconstructing the message, meaning that
perfect security is achieved. However, the share σi′,j′ for the new shareholder si′,j′
is generated by old shareholders in distributed fashion. More precisely, each old
shareholder uses its share to generate a piece of information from which the new
shareholder si′,j′ can compute its own share σi′,j′ . Therefore, what is left to show is
that no information about the other shares is leaked during the generation of the
share σi′,j′ . To compute the share of a new shareholder si′,j′ each shareholder sl ∈ A
of an authorized subset A ∈ Γ computes f j′l (i′), where f j
′
l (x) is the j′-th derivative
of the polynomial fl(x). Note that this value leaks information about the share
of sl, since f j
′
l (i′) = σl
∑t−1
k=j′
k!
(k−j′)!
(−1)l−1+k det(Al−1,k(E,X,ϕ))
det(A(E,X,ϕ)) i
′k−j′ and the latter part∑t−1
k=j′
k!
(k−j′)!
(−1)l−1+k det(Al−1,k(E,X,ϕ))
det(A(E,X,ϕ)) i
′k−j′ can be computed from public information.
Thus, it generates shares to this value using an additive secret sharing scheme (see
the work by Doganay et al. in [43]), i.e. computes f j
′
l (i′) =
∑
k,sk∈A δk,l,(i′,j′), and
sends δk,l,(i′,j′) to shareholder sk ∈ A. Each shareholder sl then adds all subshares
received by the other shareholders, i.e. δl,(i′,j′) =
∑
k,sk∈A δl,k,(i′,j′), and forwards only
the result δl,(i′,j′) to the new shareholder. Due to the use of the additive secret sharing
scheme perfect security of all shares remains preserved.
Since ∑l,sl∈A δl,(i′,j′)= ∑l,sl∈A∑k,sk∈A δk,l,(i′,j′)= ∑k,sk∈A f j′l (i′)= f j′(i′) also accessi-
bility is provided. This ensures that the new shareholder holds together with the
other shareholders a point of polynomial f(x) or of one of its derivatives and the
shares of authorized subsets including the new shareholders can reconstruct the
message.
Reset In this algorithm each shareholder sl ∈ A of an authorized subset A ∈ Γ
uses hierarchical secret sharing to distribute its share to a new set of shareholders.
More precisely, it computes its partial Birkhoff interpolation coefficient
al,0 := σl(−1)l−1det(Al−1,0(E,X, ϕ))det(A(E,X, ϕ))
of coefficient a0 and then chooses a polynomial f ′l (x) = a′l,0 + a′l,1x + a′l,2x2 + · · ·+
a′l,t′−1x
t′−1, where a′l,0 = al,0, containing this value in the free coefficient. In this
way, shares of shares are sent to the new shareholders, since only one point of this
polynomial or of one of its derivatives is sent. Therefore, perfect security follows
from the perfect security of conjunctive secret sharing. Furthermore, it computes
the value to be sent to a new shareholder in accordance to the new access structure
and the IDs assigned to each new shareholder. Thus, any unauthorized subset U /∈ Γ
cannot reconstruct the message and perfect security is provided.
Accessibility of this protocol is provided due to the homomorphic property of poly-
nomials. More precisely each new shareholder si,j receives from each old shareholder sl
share f ′jl (i) of polynomial f ′l (x) = a′l,0+a′l,1x+a′l,2x2+· · ·+a′l,t′−1xt′−1, where a′l,0 = al,0
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is the partial Birkhoff interpolation coefficient of a0. Since the new shareholder adds
all shares received to compute its new share it follows that it holds a point of poly-
nomial f ′(x) = ∑l,sl∈A f ′l (x) = ∑l,sl∈A(a′l,0 + a′l,1x+ · · ·+ a′l,t′−1xt′−1) = ∑l,sl∈A a′l,0 +∑
l,sl∈A a
′
l,1 + · · ·+
∑
l,sl∈A a
′
l,t′−1x
t′−1 = a0 +
∑
l,sl∈A a
′
l,1 + · · ·+
∑
l,sl∈A a
′
l,t′−1x
t′−1 or
of one of its derivatives. So the free coefficient of f ′(x) is still a0, meaning that
any authorized subset of the new access structure is still able to retrieve message
a0 = m.
Next we show that our verifiable and dynamic hierarchical secret sharing scheme
provides verifiability. According to Definition 2.3, a honest majority of shareholders
is assumed. This majority can be identified during Add by checking who reports
the same set of commitments to function f(x) and during Reset by checking who
reported the same commitments c0 to the free coefficient of f(x).
Theorem 3.5. In the presence of a majority of trustworthy shareholders within an
authorized subset the verifiable and dynamic secret sharing scheme composed of the
protocols Share, Add, Reset, and Reconstruct described in Section 3.2.3 is a verifiable
secret sharing scheme according to Definition 2.3.
Proof. To prove that each authorized subset of shareholders A ∈ Γ reconstruct
the same message a0 = m each shareholder must hold a point of the to-be-found
polynomial f(x) = a0 + a1x + a2x2 + · · · + at−1xt−1 or of one of its derivatives.
Furthermore, each shareholder must hold the point assigned to its ID (i, j) ∈ I × I,
i.e. must receive share σi,j = f j(i), where f j(x) is the j-th derivative of the polynomial
f(x). In the following, we show for each algorithm that generates shares, i.e. Share,
Add, and Reset, that the shareholders receiving these shares are able to verify these
conditions.
Share During this algorithm the dealer commits to each coefficient ak of f(x) =
a0 + a1x + a2x2 + · · · + at−1xt−1 by computing a commitment ck := gak mod p,
for k = 0, . . . , t − 1. It broadcasts the commitments and sends each share σi,j to
shareholder si,j ∈ Lh, for i = 1, . . . , nh and h = 0, . . . , `. If shareholder si,j accepts
σi,j then the following equation holds
gσi,j ≡
t−1∏
k=j
c
k!
(k−j)! i
k−j
k = gf
j(i).
From this it follows directly that incorrect shares can be detected and rejected.
Add During this algorithm the shareholders sl ∈ A of an authorized subset A ∈ Γ
compute share σi′,j′ for a new shareholder si′,j′ ∈ S in distributed fashion. Further-
more, each shareholder broadcasts the commitments to the coefficients ck := gak
mod p, for k = 0, . . . , t− 1 received from the dealer. Under the assumption that at
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least a majority of these shareholders is honest the new shareholder has access to a
correct set of commitments and can verify whether
gσi′,j′ ≡
t−1∏
k=j′
c
k!
(k−j′)! i
′k−j′
k = gf
j′ (i′).
From this it follows directly that incorrect shares can be detected and rejected.
Reset During this algorithm the shareholders sl ∈ A of an authorized subset A ∈ Γ
compute shares for a set of new shareholders S ′ = {s′1, . . . , s′n′}, each accompanied
with a unique ID (i′, j′) ∈ I × I, and an access structure Γ′ ⊂ P(S ′). Like for the
other algorithms it has to be checked that share σi′,j′ for the shareholder s′i′,j′ ∈ S ′
with ID (i′, j′) ∈ I × I are computed as f ′j′(i′). However, this algorithm has
an additional requirement for correctness. The free coefficient of the to-be-found
polynomial must be equal to the message m distributed by the dealer. To verify the
first condition each shareholder si′,j′ of the new access structure checks
gσl,(i′,j′) ≡
t′−1∏
k=j′
c′l,k
k!
(k−j′)! i
′k−j′
= gf
′j′
l
(i′), for sl ∈ A,
for each share σl,(i′,j′) received from shareholder l of the old set of shareholders.
Finally, it checks that the sum of all shares is a point of a polynomial with free
coefficient a0 = m. This can be verified by multiplying all commitments to the
individual free coefficients, i.e.
c0 ≡
∏
l,sl∈A
c′l,0 =
∏
l,sl∈A
gal,0 = ga0 = gm.
Under the assumption that a majority of the old shareholders sent the correct
commitments incorrect shares can be detected.
Note that our scheme is also ideal, as defined in Section 2.1. This clearly comes
from the fact that each shareholder si ∈ R receives a share σi,j ∈ Fq that is a field
element of the same field as the message m ∈ Fq.
3.3 Performing Computations on Hierarchically
Shared Secrets
We recall that the overall goal of this chapter is to design distributed storage
systems based on hierarchical secret sharing schemes so that the rules to access
the outsourced data mirror the hierarchical organizations in place in companies or
hospitals. Distributed storage systems are normally built on Shamir’s threshold
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secret sharing scheme, which is a linear scheme based on polynomials. Shamir’s
secret sharing scheme-based distributed storage systems come with functionalities
that are desirable in a long-term storage setting. For instance, they allow to modify
the access rules, to change the set of storage servers making up the system, to renew
the shares, and to perform computations over shared data without reconstructing
them first. Tassa’s hierarchical conjunctive and disjunctive secret sharing schemes
are promising candidates for hierarchical secret sharing-based distributed storage
systems, because they are linear and based on polynomials. However, in order to have
viable hierarchical secret sharing-based distributed storage systems, it is necessary
to have the same functionalities that regular distributed storage systems already
offer. In Section 3.2, we have provided algorithms for modifying the access rules, for
changing the set of storage servers making up the storage system, and for renewing
the shares.
In this section, we provide algorithms to perform computations over messages
shared with Tassa’s conjunctive and disjunctive hierarchical secret sharing schemes.
More precisely, a message can be reconstructed which is the result of operations
performed over previously shared messages. The operations supported are the sum
of messages, the multiplication of a message by a scalar, and the product of messages.
After describing in Section 3.3.1 the setting we operate in, in Section 3.3.2 and in
Section 3.3.3 we provide the algorithms to perform, respectively, linear operations
and multiplications over hierarchically shared messages by Tassa’s conjunctive and
disjunctive schemes. The auditing mechanism for both types of computations can be
found in Section 3.3.4.
3.3.1 Setting
Messages m1,m2 ∈ Fq are distributed to a set S of n shareholders according to the
following assumptions.
(A1) The underlying access structure Γ remains the same for both messages m1,m2.
More precisely, both polynomials f(x) and h(x) used to share m1 and m2,
respectively, have the same degree. Furthermore, shareholder si,j with unique
ID (i, j) holds share σi,j(m1) := f j(i) and σi,j(m2) := hj(i).
(A2) The degree t− 1 of polynomials f(x) and h(x) is chosen such that 2t ≤ n, where
n is the total number of shareholders.
(A3) The ID (i, j) of each shareholder si,j ∈ S is chosen such that index i ∈ I
is selected once within the whole hierarchy and such that the corresponding
Birkhoff interpolation problem has a unique solution. Also j < `, i.e. the free
coefficients of polynomials f `(x) and h`(x) are not valid shares. The requirements
to achieve this can be found in [107].
(A4) The user communicates with the shareholders and the shareholders among each
other using private channels.
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(A5) A tamper-proof bulletin board is available to allow exchanging data during the
preprocessing phase of the multiplication procedure. Note that this is a common
assumption for auditable multi-party computation and a more formal definition
can be found in [61].
Let us recall that index j ∈ I of the unique identity ID of shareholder si,j ∈ S
is defined as j := th−1 (j := t` − th), for h = 0, . . . , ` and t−1 := 0. Furthermore,
we assume that algorithm Share (presented in Section 2.2) is run separately to
share and distribute message m1 and message m2 to the n shareholders of set
S. More precisely, to share message m1, algorithm Share selects a polynomial
f(x) = a0 + a1x+ · · ·+ at−1xt−1, where a0 := m1 (at−1 := m1) and a1, . . . , at−1 ∈ Fq
(a0, . . . , at−2 ∈ Fq) are chosen uniformly at random. It distributes to each shareholder
si,j ∈ S share σi,j(m1) = f j(i). To share message m2, algorithm Share generates
a polynomial h(x) = b0 + b1x + · · · + bt−1xt−1, where b0 := m2 (bt−1 := m2) and
b1, . . . , bt−1 ∈ Fq (b0, . . . , bt−2 ∈ Fq) are chosen uniformly at random. It distributes to
each shareholder si,j ∈ S share σi,j(m2) = hj(i). Afterwards, algorithms LinAdd and
Multiply are run by each shareholder individually to perform linear operations and
multiplications on their shares of messages m1 and m2. Finally, the result m ∈ Fq of
these operations on m1,m2 can be reconstructed by running algorithm Reconstruct
defined in Section 2.2 on the shares computed by each shareholder.
3.3.2 Linear Operations
In this section, algorithm LinAdd is presented, which computes share σi,j(m) ∈ Fq
for shareholder si,j ∈ S, to be used as input for algorithm Reconstruct to retrieve
message m = λ1 · m1 + λ2 · m2, for scalars λ1, λ2 ∈ Fq. Correctness and perfect
secrecy of algorithm LinAdd are proven in Theorem 3.6 below.
LinAdd The algorithm takes as input shares σi,j(m1), σi,j(m2) ∈ Fq held by share-
holder si,j ∈ S, and scalars λ1, λ2 ∈ Fq. It outputs share σi,j(m) := λ1 · σi,j(m1) +
λ2 · σi,j(m2) ∈ Fq for shareholder si,j ∈ S.
Theorem 3.6. The algorithm LinAdd for conjunctive (disjunctive) hierarchical se-
cret sharing introduced above satisfies accessibility and perfect security according to
Definition 2.1. More precisely, on input shares σi,j(m1), σi,j(m2) and scalars λ1, λ2,
the shares computed by LinAdd reconstruct to message m, where m = λ1 ·m1 +λ2 ·m2.
Proof. Let σi,j(m) ∈ Fq be the shares computed by shareholders si,j ∈ R using
algorithm LinAdd, where R ∈ Γ is an authorized set. To prove correctness, we
have to show that algorithm Reconstruct outputs message m = λ1 · m1 + λ2 · m2
when it takes as input shares σi,j(m) ∈ Fq. More precisely, we have to show that
the shares interpolate to a polynomial p(x) = c0 + c1x + · · · + ct−1xt−1 of degree
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deg(p(x)) = t− 1, where c0 = λ1 ·m1 + λ2 ·m2(ct−1 = λ1 ·m1 + λ2 ·m2). To prove
perfect secrecy, we have to show, first, that algorithm LinAdd computes shares for
message m = λ1 · m1 + λ2 · m2 without leaking information about the shares for
message m1 and message m2. Second, we have to show that any unauthorized set
U /∈ Γ gets no information about m = λ1 ·m1+λ2 ·m2. In order to do that, we have to
show that polynomial p(x) = c0 + c1x+ · · ·+ ct−1xt−1 can be computed in distributed
fashion by each shareholder si,j ∈ R. That is, correctness and perfect secrecy hold
if each shareholder can compute a term p(i,j),k without leaking information to any
other shareholder and such that:
p(x) =
t−1∑
k=0
ckx
k =
t−1∑
k=0
∑
si,j∈R
p(i,j),kx
k,
where c0 = λ1 ·m1 + λ2 ·m2(ct−1 = λ1 ·m1 + λ2 ·m2).
Let us recall that message m1 ∈ Fq is shared using polynomial f(x) = a0 + a1x+
· · · + at−1xt−1. Due to Birkhoff interpolation resolution formula (see Section 2.2),
coefficient ak of polynomial f(x) can be computed as:
ak =
r∑
l=1
al,k =
r∑
l=1
σl(m1)(−1)l−1+kdet(Al−1,k(E,X, ϕ))det(A(E,X, ϕ)) ,
for k = 0, . . . , t − 1, where σl(m1), for l = 1, . . . , r, are the shares σi,j(m1) in
lexicographic order ((i, j) precedes the pair (i′, j′) if i < i′ or i = i′ and j < j′).
Similarly, message m2 ∈ Fq is shared through polynomial h(x) = b0 + b1x + · · · +
bt−1xt−1. Due to Birkhoff interpolation resolution formula, coefficient bk of polynomial
h(x) can be computed as:
bk =
r∑
l=1
bl,k =
r∑
l=1
σl(m2)(−1)l−1+kdet(Al−1,k(E,X, ϕ))det(A(E,X, ϕ)) ,
for k = 0, . . . , t − 1, where σl(m2), for l = 1, . . . , r, are the shares σi,j(m2) in
lexicographic order. Because of the homomorphic property of polynomials, polynomial
p(x) can be computed as the linear combination of polynomial f(x) and polynomial
h(x) with scalars λ1, λ2 ∈ Fq. That is, p(x) = λ1 · f(x) + λ2 · h(x). Therefore,
p(x) =
t−1∑
k=0
λ1 · ak + λ2 · bk =
t−1∑
k=0
r∑
l=1
λ1 · al,k + λ2 · bl,k.
This shows that the terms pl,k = p(i,j),k := λ1 · al,k + λ2 · bl,k computed by the
shareholders si,j ∈ R interpolate to polynomial p(x) and correctness is provided.
Regarding perfect secrecy, the computation of pl,k is performed solely by shareholder
sl ∈ R using the information it has and without leaking al,k nor bl,k. Thus, no
information about shares σl(m1), σl(m2) is leaked. Moreover, being polynomial p(x) of
degree deg(p(x)) = t−1, the original access structure Γ is maintained: subsets U ⊂ S
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of shareholders such that U /∈ Γ not only cannot reconstruct m = λ1 ·m1 + λ2 ·m2,
but also do not get any information about m1 nor m2. Thus, perfect secrecy of the
underlying conjunctive (disjunctive) hierarchical secret sharing is still maintained
even if algorithm LinAdd is run and the shares computed by this algorithm are used
as input for algorithm Reconstruct.
3.3.3 Multiplication
In this section, it is presented how to perform multiplications on shared messages,
i.e. how to compute share σi,j ∈ Fq for shareholder si,j ∈ S to be used as input
for algorithm Reconstruct to retrieve message m = m1 ·m2. Unlike the counterpart
for linear operations, algorithm Multiply requires more work to be introduced. In
particular, Section 3.3.3.1 shows how to compute preliminary shares to be used as
input of the preprocessing phase presented in Section 3.3.3.2. These two sections
describe operations that can be computed off-line in order to simplify algorithm
Multiply, which is performed on-line and is discussed in Section 3.3.3.3.
3.3.3.1 Computation of shares σi,j(α), σi,j(β)
During the off-line phase a triple (α, β, γ) is generated such that the following
conditions hold.
• α · β = γ.
• Assumption (1) of Section 3.3.1 holds, i.e. each shareholder si,j ∈ S with ID
(i, j) ∈ I × I holds shares σi,j(α) := f jα(i), σi,j(β) := f jβ(i), and σi,j(γ) := f jγ(i),
where fα(x), fβ(x), and fγ(x) are the polynomials of degree t− 1 sharing α, β,
and γ, respectively.
In the following, we present algorithm RandShares, which computes such a triple
for Tassa’s conjunctive (disjunctive) hierarchical secret sharing schemes. More pre-
cisely, algorithm RandShares computes random shares σi,j(α), σi,j(β) reconstructing
to messages α, β, respectively. This algorithm is based on the technique used in
[40] by Damgård and Nielsen to generate such a triple for Shamir’s threshold secret
sharing scheme.
We present RandShares to compute shares σi,j(α) for α, but it can be run analo-
gously to generate shares σi,j(β) for β.
RandShares The algorithm takes as input values αi,j ∈ Fq chosen uniformly at
random by shareholders si,j ∈ S. It outputs shares σi,j(α) of message α ∈ Fq for
shareholders si,j ∈ S. To do that, each shareholder si,j ∈ S has to perform the
following steps.
1. It chooses a secret message αi,j ∈ Fq uniformly at random.
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2. It runs algorithm Share to generate a polynomial fαi,j (x) of degree t− 1 defined
as fαi,j (x) := a0,(i,j) +a1,(i,j)x+ · · ·+at−1,(i,j)xt−1, where a0,(i,j) = αi,j (at−1,(i,j) =
αi,j) and coefficients a1,(i,j), . . . , at−1,(i,j) ∈ Fq (a0,(i,j), . . . , at−2,(i,j) ∈ Fq) are
chosen uniformly at random. Shares σi′,j′(αi,j) for shareholders si′,j′ ∈ S with
ID (i′, j′) 6= (i, j) are computed as σi′,j′(αi,j) := f j′αi,j(i′). Share σi,j(αi,j) for
shareholder si,j itself is computed as σi,j(αi,j) := f jαi,j(i).
3. It sends shares σi′,j′(αi,j) to shareholders si′,j′ ∈ S with ID (i′, j′) 6= (i, j) using
a private channel and keeps share σi,j(αi,j).
4. It runs algorithm LinAdd of Section 3.3.2 to compute share σi,j(α) using share
σi,j(αi,j) and all the shares σi,j(αi′,j′) received from shareholders si′,j′ as σi,j(α) :=∑
(i′,j′)6=(i,j) σi,j(αi′,j′) + σi,j(αi,j).
In the following, we prove correctness of algorithm RandShares and we show that
perfect secrecy is provided.
Theorem 3.7. The algorithm RandShares for conjunctive (disjunctive) hierarchical
secret sharing introduced above satisfies accessibility and perfect security according
to Definition 2.1. More precisely, on input random secret messages αi,j, the shares
computed by algorithm RandShares reconstruct to a common value α.
Proof. Let σi,j(α) ∈ Fq be the shares computed using algorithm RandShares and
held by shareholders si,j ∈ R, where R ∈ Γ is an authorized set. To prove correctness,
we have to show that algorithm Reconstruct outputs a message α when it takes as input
shares σi,j(α) held by shareholders of an authorized setR. This means that correctness
holds provided that algorithm Reconstruct can be successfully run by shareholders of
any authorized set. This is implied by the correctness of algorithm LinAdd, presented
in Section 3.3.2. In fact, each share σi,j(α) is computed as a sum of shares σi,j(αi′,j′)
and share σi,j(αi,j). Thus, for the homomorphic property of polynomials, shares σi,j(α)
is either a point of polynomial fα(x) := a0,α+a1,αx+· · ·+at−1,αxt−1 = ∑(i,j) fαi,j (x) or
a point on one of its derivatives, where a0,α =
∑
(i,j) αi,j(at−1,α =
∑
(i,j) αi,j). Because
of the underlying conjunctive (disjunctive) hierarchical secret sharing scheme, any
authorized set R of shareholders can run algorithm Reconstruct over their shares and
retrieve message α := ∑(i,j) αi,j. This proves correctness. With respect to perfect
secrecy, the underlying conjunctive (disjunctive) hierarchical secret sharing scheme
guarantees that shares σi,j(α) are computed without leaking information about the
secret messages αi,j . Furthermore, this implies that unauthorized sets of shareholders
not only cannot successfully run algorithm Reconstruct to retrieve α, but also no
information about it is gained.
3.3.3.2 Preprocessing
We introduce the preprocessing phase enabling the multiplication between two shared
messages. Preprocessing has been common practice for multi-party computation
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since it has been introduced by Beaver in [9], because it lowers the communication
complexity of the on-line phase where the shares of the result of a product of two
shared messages are computed. The preprocessing algorithm by Beaver was designed
for messages shared with Shamir’s secret sharing scheme. We adapt it here for mes-
sages shares with Tassa’s conjunctive (disjunctive) hierarchical secret sharing schemes.
PreMult This algorithm takes as input shares σi,j(α), σi,j(β) for each shareholder
si,j ∈ S computed by RandShares described in Section 3.3.3.1 and outputs for each
shareholder si,j ∈ S a triple of shares σi,j(α), σi,j(β), σi,j(γ) ∈ Fq, such that for each
triple it holds that σi,j(γ) = σi,j(αβ). More precisely, each shareholder sl ∈ R from
an authorized subset R ∈ Γ performs the following steps.
1. It uses its shares σl(α) and σl(β) and the unique ID (i, j) of shareholder si,j to
compute the values λml,(i,j) and µml,(i,j) defined as:
λml,(i,j) :=σl(α)
j∑
k=m
k!
(k −m)!(−1)
l−1+kdet(Al−1,k(E,X, ϕ))
det(A(E,X, ϕ)) i
k−m,
and
µml,(i,j) :=σl(β)
j∑
k=m
k!
(k −m)!(−1)
l−1+kdet(Al−1,k(E,X, ϕ))
det(A(E,X, ϕ)) i
k−m,
where m = 0, . . . , j and A(E,X, ϕ) and Al−1,k(E,X, ϕ) are the matrices defined
in Section 2.2.
2. It randomly splits λml,(i,j) and µml,(i,j) into r values, i.e. λml,(i,j) = λm1,l,(i,j) + · · · +
λmr,l,(i,j) and µml,(i,j) = µm1,l,(i,j) + · · ·+ µmr,l,(i,j).
3. It sends λmu,l,(i,j) and µmu,l,(i,j) to shareholder su ∈ R, for u = 1, . . . , r and u 6= l,
using a private channel.
4. It collects all values λml,u,(i,j) and µml,u,(i,j) received from shareholder su ∈ R, for
u = 1, . . . , r and u 6= l, and computes δml,(i,j) :=
∑r
u=1 λ
m
l,u,(i,j) and εml,(i,j) :=∑r
u=1 µ
m
l,u,(i,j), for m = 0, . . . , j.
5. It sends δml,(i,j) and εml,(i,j) to shareholder si,j using a private channel.
Then, all shareholders within the set S compute their shares. More precisely, each
shareholder si,j ∈ S performs the following steps.
1. It computes δm(i,j) :=
∑r
l=1 δ
m
l,(i,j) and εm(i,j) :=
∑r
l=1 ε
m
l,(i,j) using the values δml,(i,j)
and εml,(i,j), for m = 0, . . . , j, received from shareholder sl ∈ R, for l = 1, . . . , r.
2. It computes share σi,j(γ) as
σi,j(γ) := σi,j(αβ) =
j∑
m=0
(
j
m
)
δj−m(i,j) · εm(i,j).
Theorem 3.8. The algorithm PreMult for conjunctive (disjunctive) hierarchical
secret sharing introduced above satisfies accessibility and perfect security according
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to Definition 2.1. More precisely, on input the shares σi,j(α) and σi,j(β), the shares
computed by algorithm PreMult reconstructs to γ, where γ = αβ.
Proof. Let σi,j(αβ) be the share computed by shareholder si,j ∈ R using algorithm
PreMult, where R ∈ Γ is an authorized set. Correctness of algorithm PreMult is
provided if the shares held by shareholders in R it outputs interpolate to a polynomial
p(x) = c0 + c1x+ · · ·+ c2(t−1)x2(t−1), where c0 = αβ(c2(t−1) = αβ). Polynomial p(x)
is defined as p(x) = fα(x) · fβ(x), given that α is shared using polynomial fα(x) and
β is shared using polynomial fβ(x). We have to show that, for each share σi,j(γ)
computed by algorithm PreMult, it holds that σi,j(γ) = σi,j(αβ), where σi,j(α) and
σi,j(β) were randomly selected from shareholder si,j. In this case σi,j(γ) can be
written as:
σi,j(αβ) = pj(i) = [fα(i) · fβ(i)]j =
j∑
m=0
(
j
m
)
f j−mα (i) · fmβ (i)
The terms f jα(i) and f
j
β(i) constitute the random values σi,j(α) and σi,j(β) selected
by shareholder si,j ∈ S. It is left to check that δm(i,j) and εm(i,j) correspond to fmα (i)
and fmβ (i), respectively. From the second step, we recall that δml,(i,j) =
∑r
u=1 λl,u,(i,j).
Thus, it follows that:
δm(i,j) =
r∑
l=1
δml,(i,j) =
r∑
l=1
r∑
u=1
λl,u,(i,j) =
r∑
l=1
fmα,l(i) = fmα (i),
where polynomial fmα,l(x) is the m-th derivative of polynomial fα,l(x) =
∑t−1
k=0 αl,kx
k,
where αl,k is the reconstructing term of Birkhoff interpolation formula (see Section
2.2). Note that the last equality of the expression above holds because the coefficients
of fα(x) can be computed in distributed fashion, as shown in Theorem 3.2. The
equality εm(i,j) = fmβ (i) can be shown analogously. Moreover, since polynomial
p(x) = c0 + c1x+ · · ·+ c2(t−1)x2(t−1) is the product of polynomials fα(x) and fβ(x),
then c0 = a0b0 = αβ(c2(t−1) = at−1bt−1 = αβ). Thus, correctness holds. To prove
perfect secrecy, we have to show that no information is leaked when share σi,j(αβ) is
generated for shareholder si,j ∈ S. Regarding the terms δ(i,j) and ε(i,j), we have to
show that they do not leak information about shares σl(α) and σl(β) of shareholder
sl ∈ R, respectively. That is the case because shareholder sl ∈ R uses additive
secret sharing, discussed by Doganay et al. in [43] to split λml,(i,j) and µml,(i,j) into
r random values λu,l,(i,j) and µu,l,(i,j), respectively. Furthermore, perfect secrecy
holds also because index i ∈ I of each identity ID (i, j) ∈ I × I is used once,
as required by Assumption (A3) of Section 3.3.1. Otherwise, points fmα (i) and
fmβ (i) might correspond to already existing shares σi,m(α) and σi,m(β) for α and β,
respectively, already computed for shareholder si,m ∈ S. Also, the fact that j < `
prevents information leakage, because otherwise the shareholders has knowledge
about all the derivatives of fα(i) and fβ(i). Moreover, because each share σi,j(γ) is
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a point on polynomial p(x) or on one of its derivatives, the underlying conjunctive
(disjunctive) hierarchical secret sharing scheme ensures that unauthorized subsets
gain no information about α, β, γ.
3.3.3.3 The Multiplication Algorithm
In this section, algorithm Multiply is presented, which computes share σi,j(m) for
shareholder si,j ∈ S through the shares σi,j(m1) and σi,j(m2) of message m1 and
message m2, respectively. Share σi,j(m) is used as input for algorithm Reconstruct to
retrieve message m = m1 ·m2. Algorithm Multiply uses algorithm LinAdd (see Section
3.3.2) to compute message m as linear combinations of the shares for message m1
and message m2. More precisely, it builds on the preprocessing phase performed
by algorithm PreMult described in Section 3.3.3.1, which in turn builds on algo-
rithm RandShares described in Section 3.3.3.2. Note that, according to Assumption
(A1) in Section 3.3.1, for algorithm Multiply to work the values α, β, and γ have
to be shared according to the same access structure Γ as message m1 and message m2.
Multiply The algorithm takes as input shares σi,j(m1), σi,j(m2) ∈ Fq generated
during algorithm Share and shares σi,j(α), σi,j(β), σi,j(γ) ∈ Fq held by shareholder
si,j ∈ S generated during algorithm PreMult. It outputs share σi,j(m) ∈ Fq for
message m = m1 ·m2, which is computed performing the following steps.
1. Shareholder si,j computes share σi,j(δ) := σi,j(m1)− σi,j(α) and share σi,j(ε) :=
σi,j(m2)− σi,j(β) using algorithm LinAdd.
2. Shareholders from an authorized set R ∈ Γ run algorithm Reconstruct with shares
σi,j(δ), σi,j(ε) as input to publicly reconstruct values δ, ε using the bulletin board.
3. Shareholder si,j ∈ S computes the share σi,j(m) := σi,j(γ) + ε · σi,j(m1) + δ ·
σi,j(m2)− δε using algorithm LinAdd.
Theorem 3.9. The algorithm Multiply for conjunctive (disjunctive) hierarchical
secret sharing introduced above satisfies accessibility and perfect security according to
Definition 2.1. More precisely, on input shares σi,j(m1), σi,j(m2), the shares computed
by Multiply reconstruct to message m, where m = m1 ·m2.
Proof. The correctness relies on the correctness of algorithm LinAdd, presented in
Section 3.3.2. In fact, share σi,j(m) is defined as the linear combination of shares
σi,j(γ), σi,j(m1), σi,j(m2) for messages γ,m1,m2, respectively, and scalars δ, ε. More
precisely, in the first step the scalars δ and ε are computed in distributed fashion using
algorithm LinAdd, such that δ = m1 − α and ε = m2 − β. After those values have
been reconstructed in the second step, in the third step each shareholder computes a
share to message m by computing σi,j(m) = σi,j(γ) + ε · σi,j(m1) + δ · σi,j(m2)− δε
using algorithm LinAdd. Therefore, if algorithm Reconstruct takes as input shares
σi,j(m) ∈ Fq held by shareholders si,j ∈ R, where R ∈ Γ is an authorized set, then it
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retrieves:
m = γ + ε ·m1 + δ ·m2 − δε
= γ + (m2 − β) ·m1 + (m1 − α) ·m2 − (m2 − β)(m1 − α)
= γ +m1 ·m2 − β · α
Since α · β = γ this leads to
m = m1 ·m2,
showing that algorithm Multiply is correct.
Thus, algorithm Reconstruct interpolates to a polynomial p(x) = c0 + c1x+ · · ·+
ct−1xt−1 of degree deg(p(x)) = t− 1 and retrieves message m1 ·m2 as c0(ct−1). The
perfect secrecy of algorithm Multiply is implied by the perfect secrecy of algorithm
LinAdd (proven in Section 3.3.2) and by the perfect secrecy of the preprocessing
phase, which is discussed in Section 3.3.3.2.
3.3.4 Auditing Procedure for Conjunctive (Disjunctive)
Hierarchical Secret Sharing Schemes
In this section, we present auditing procedures for computations on messages shared
hierarchically. More precisely, we adapt the auditing procedure for computations on
messages shared by Shamir’s threshold secret sharing scheme presented in [98] to
computations on messages shared by Tassa’s conjunctive (disjunctive) secret shar-
ing schemes. In Section 3.3.4.1, we present algorithms Audit.Setup and Audit.Share,
which describe the steps to be performed during the setup phase and after algo-
rithm Share, respectively. Then, in Section 3.3.4.2 we present algorithm Audit.LinAdd
which is run to audit algorithm LinAdd presented in Section 3.3.2. Lastly, in Sec-
tion 3.3.4.3, we present algorithm Audit.RandShares, algorithm Audit.PreMult, and
algorithm Audit.Multiply, run to audit, respectively, algorithm RandShares presented
in Section 3.3.3.1, algorithm PreMult presented in Section 3.3.3.2, and algorithm
Multiply presented in Section 3.3.3.3. For consistency with the other algorithms
presented in this chapter, Feldman commitment is used. However, the algorithm
can be easily adapted to Pedersen commitment. Note that the assumptions made in
Section 3.3.1 still hold.
3.3.4.1 Setup and Share
Algorithm Audit.Setup sets up the cryptographic primitives, i.e. commitment schemes
and bilinear maps,2 needed for the auditing procedures. This can be run by any
party. However, the parameters must be made publicly available for the dealer of the
2For a formal definition of bilinear maps we refer to [19].
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input messages and the auditor running the auditing procedures. Then, to allow op-
erations to be audited, the dealer commits to messages shared by running Audit.Share.
Audit.Setup The algorithm takes as input a security parameter λ and it outputs
two large primes p, q such that q|(p− 1). It also outputs a generator g of the q-th
order subgroup Fq of F∗p.
Audit.Share The dealer of messages m1,m2 ∈ Fq calls algorithm Commit.Share
presented in Section 2.1 during algorithm Share and computes commitment c(m1) :=
gm1 mod p to message m1 and commitment c(m2) := gm2 mod p to message m2.
It publishes the commitments on the bulletin board.
3.3.4.2 Linear Operations
In the following, algorithm Audit.LinAdd run by the auditor to verify the result of
linear operations over shared messages is presented. We assume that either the
shareholders or the message dealer published the used scalars λ1, λ2 ∈ Fq on the
bulletin board.
Audit.LinAdd The algorithm takes as input the commitments to the input values
c(m1), c(m2) and the scalars λ1, λ2 ∈ Fq from the bulletin board and the claimed
result m. If gm = c(m1)λ1 · c(m2)λ2 it returns ‘1’ and ‘0’ otherwise.
3.3.4.3 Multiplication
Algorithm Audit.RandShares is run by an auditor together with the shareholders
si,j ∈ S to verify that shares σi,j(α) and σi,j(β) were computed correctly by gener-
ating commitments ck,α, ck,β, for k = 0, . . . , t− 1, to the coefficients of the polyno-
mials sharing messages α, β, respectively. In the following, we present algorithm
Audit.RandShares to compute commitment ck,α, but it can be run analogously to
generate commitment ck,β, for k = 0, . . . , t− 1.
Audit.RandShares The algorithm takes as input shares σi,j(α) and performs the
following steps.
1. Each shareholder si,j ∈ S running algorithm Share to share the secret message
αi,j ∈ Fq among all other shareholders si′,j′ ∈ S for (i′, j′) 6= (i, j) calls algorithm
Commit.Share and computes commitments ck,αi,j := gak,(i,j) mod p, to coefficient
ak,(i,j) of polynomial fαi,j (x), for k = 0, . . . , t− 1. It publishes the commitments
on the bulletin board.
2. Each shareholder si,j ∈ S has valid input σi,j(αi′,j′), for (i′, j′) 6= (i, j), to
compute share σi,j(α) if and only if
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gσi,j(αi′,j′ ) ≡
t−1∏
k=j
ck,αi′,j′
k!
(k−j)! i
k−j
= gf
j
αi′,j′ (i).
If the above equality is not satisfied, then it outputs ‘0’ and aborts. Otherwise,
it publishes ‘1’ on the bulletin board and Step 3) can be performed.
3. The auditor uses commitments ck,αi,j published by shareholders si,j ∈ S on the
bulletin board to compute commitments ck,α :=
∏
(i,j) ck,αi,j , for k = 0, . . . , t− 1.
It publishes the commitments on the bulletin board.
In the following, algorithm Audit.PreMult is run by an auditor together with share-
holders si,j ∈ S to check the validity of terms δl,i,j and εl,i,j for the computation of
shares σi,j(αβ). More precisely, it is explained what audit data have to be generated
such that shareholder si,j can detect inconsistent input sent by other malicious
shareholders during algorithm PreMult performing the preprocessing phase. In fact,
algorithm PreMult is performed in distributed fashion by the shareholders of an
authorized set R ∈ Γ. That is, each shareholder si,j ∈ S receives input from each
shareholder contained in R to compute share σi,j(αβ). If one of the inputs is not
valid, then shareholder si,j cannot compute a valid share for αβ.
Audit.PreMult The algorithm takes as input from the bulletin board commitments
ck,α, ck,β, for k = 0, . . . , t − 1, to the coefficients of the polynomials fα(x), fβ(x)
sharing α and β, respectively, generated during algorithm Audit.RandShares. More
precisely, each shareholder si,j ∈ S performs the following steps.
1. It computes
g
∑r
l=1 δl,i,j ≡
t−1∏
k=j−1
ck,α
k!
(k−j+1)! i
k−j+1
= gf
(j−1)
α (i),
and
g
∑r
l=1 εl,i,j ≡
t−1∏
k=j−1
ck,β
k!
(k−j+1)! i
k−j+1
= gf
(j−1)
β
(i).
2. If one of the above equalities is not satisfied, then it outputs ‘0’ and aborts.
3. Otherwise, if both of the above equations hold, it accepts δl,i,j and εl,i,j, for
l = 1, . . . , r, as valid input.
4. It calls algorithm Commit.PreMult and computes commitments ci,j(α) := gσi,j(α), ci,j(β) :=
gσi,j(β), and ci,j(γ) := gσi,j(γ) for σi,j(α), σi,j(β), and σi,j(γ), respectively.
5. It publishes commitments ci,j(α), ci,j(β), and ci,j(γ) on the bulletin board and
outputs ‘1’.
In the following, algorithm Audit.Multiply run by an auditor to check that shares
si,j(m) of message m = m1 ·m2 have been computed correctly is presented.
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Audit.Multiply The algorithm takes as input the values δ, ε, the commitments to
the shares of the multiplicative triple, i.e. ci,j(α), ci,j(β), and ci,j(γ), for si,j ∈ S,
the commitments to the input values, i.e. c(m1), c(m2), and the claimed result m.
Then, it first audits that the equation αβ = γ was fulfilled and then that m has been
computed correctly. More precisely, an auditor performs by the following steps.
1. It computes the reconstruction vector (w1, . . . , wr) for shareholders s1, . . . , sr ∈
R, with R ∈ Γ authorized set, which computed the input for γ during PreMult.
For conjunctive (disjunctive) hierarchical secret sharing schemes the interpolation
vector (w1, . . . , wr) is composed of the entries wl := (−1)l−1 det(Al−1,0(E,X,ϕ))det(A(E,X,ϕ))
(
wl :=
(−1)l+t−2 det(Al−1,t−1(E,X,ϕ))det(A(E,X,ϕ))
)
according to the notation of Section 2.2.
2. It computes the following commitments:
c(α) :=
r∏
l=1
cl(α)wl ; c(β) :=
r∏
l=1
cl(β)wl ; c(γ) :=
r∏
l=1
cl(γ)wl ,
where cl(α), cl(β), cl(γ), for l = 1, . . . , r, are commitments ci,j(α), ci,j(β), ci,j(γ),
respectively, in lexicographic order.
3. It checks whether multiplicative triple (α, β, γ) is correct by computing e(c(α), c(β)) =
e(c(γ), g)3. If the equation does not hold, then it outputs ‘0’ and aborts the
algorithm.
4. Otherwise, it takes from the bulletin board commitments c(m1), c(m2) and the
values δ, ε reconstructed during algorithm Multiply.
5. it check whether c(α)−1 · c(m1) = gδ and c(β)−1 · c(m1) = gε and gm = c(γ) ·
c(m1)ε · c(m2)δ · g−δε. If all of the equations hold, then it returns ‘1’ and ‘0’
otherwise.
3.3.5 Summary of Security Aspects
In Section 3.3.2 and in Section 3.3.3, we have proven that algorithm LinAdd, algorithm
RandShares, algorithm PreMult, and algorithmMultiply do not compromise the perfect
secrecy and correctness of the underlying conjunctive (disjunctive) hierarchical secret
sharing scheme. Furthermore, the adversary these algorithms can cope with is active,
i.e. not only it knows data private to shareholders (like the passive adversary), but
also it can make them deviate from the protocols. More precisely, assumptions
(A1)-(A4) of Section 3.3.4.1 set requirements for, respectively, the access structure,
the threshold, the identities of the shareholders, and the channels through which
shareholders communicate. These assumptions together with verifiable secret sharing
ensure that a honest majority of shareholders is able to correctly reconstruct the
message, while maintaining the secrecy of their shares, even if all other shareholders
are corrupted by the adversary and cheat. Assumption (A5) prevents the adversary
3Here the definition of bilinear maps is used.
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from tampering with the bulletin board and, together with the auditing procedure,
ensures correctness when operations on data are performed. Moreover, as it is shown
in Section 3.2, conjunctive (disjunctive) hierarchical secret sharing schemes support
proactive secret sharing. This means that, provided that the shares are refreshed
periodically, our protocols can cope with a mobile adversary, which is only bounded
in the amount of shareholders it can corrupt within a certain time interval, but not
over time. Lastly, the auditing procedure presented in Section 3.3.4 enhances the
overall security because it allows to detect misbehaviors. The protocols described
use Feldman commitment, which ensures only computationally hidingness. However,
the auditing procedure can be easily adapted to Pedersen commitment to achieve
unconditionally hidingness, which preserves even perfect secrecy of the underlying
conjunctive (disjunctive) hierarchical secret sharing scheme.
3.4 Evaluation
In this section, we discuss the efficiency of the algorithms to add shares, reset
the access structure, and perform operations for Tassa’s hierarchical secret sharing
schemes with respect to their counterparts for Shamir’s secret sharing scheme. We first
discuss on a high level why the efficiency of those algorithms for Tassa’s hierarchical
secret sharing schemes are comparable to the ones for Shamir’s secret sharing scheme
and then show experimental evaluations supporting our point.
Besides polynomials’ evaluation, algorithm Share of Tassa’s hierarchical conjunctive
(disjunctive) secret sharing schemes requires also to compute up to t− 1 polynomials’
derivatives, which is not required for the sharing algorithm in Shamir’s secret sharing
scheme. However, the additional multiplications due to derivation are balanced by the
fewer multiplications needed when evaluating derivatives of polynomials. Algorithm
Reconstruct is the most expensive algorithm and requires Tassa’s scheme to perform
Gaussian elimination to find a solution to a system of t linear equations. However,
in the secret sharing framework the only coefficient that matters is the free (last)
coefficient for conjunctive (disjunctive) secret sharing. Therefore for message recon-
struction only two determinants have to be computed. This leads to a complexity
of O(t3) for matrix A of dimension t× t in case the LU decomposition technique is
used [3]. Solving a system of t linear equations is the underlying problem also to
reconstruct the message in a Shamir’s secret sharing scheme. Algorithm Add and
algorithm Reset are very similar to the respective counterpart for Shamir’s secret
sharing scheme, as one can see, respectively, in the work by Nojoumian et al. in [90]
in the work by Gupta and Gopinath in [58]. More precisely, for Tassa’s hierarchical
conjunctive (disjunctive) secret sharing schemes the determinants det(A(E,X, ϕ)),
det(Al−1,k(E,X, ϕ)), and det(Al−1,0(E,X, ϕ)) (det(Al−1,0(E,X, ϕ))) have to be com-
puted and these are expensive operations. However, these terms need only public
values to be determined and thus can be computed off-line, making the on-line phase
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of algorithms Add and Reset equivalent to the corresponding algorithms for Shamir’s
secret sharing. In Figure 3.1, a comparison for algorithms Share, Reconstruct, Add,
and Reset is provided.
(a) Run time of algorithm Share. (b) Run time of algorithm Reconstruct.
(c) Run time of algorithm Add. (d) Run time of algorithm Reset.
Figure 3.1: Run time of Share, Reconstruct, Add, and Reset for Shamir’s secret sharing
scheme and Tassa’s conjunctive and disjunctive secret sharing schemes.
Algorithm LinAdd and algorithm Multiply require that the shareholders perform
steps very similar to the corresponding algorithms for Shamir’s secret sharing (see
for instance the work by Ben-Or et al. [12] and by Schabhüser et al. in [98]). In
fact, those algorithms consist of the equivalent linear operations with coefficients
λ1 and λ2 for algorithm LinAdd and with coefficients δ and ε for algorithm Multiply.
Algorithm RandShare is an adaptation of the algorithm proposed by Damgård and
Nielsen proposed in [40] to fit the hierarchical setting. More precisely, they both
consist of running algorithm Share and LinAdd for each shareholder and, as we
have already discussed, these two are equivalent in terms of operations. Algorithm
PreMult requires more work with respect to the preprocessing phase compared to
Shamir’s threshold secret sharing. Algorithm PreMult is computed in distributed
fashion because additional information is needed to compute the shares. Despite
the fact that only additions and polynomials’ evaluation are performed to compute
such additional information, algorithm PreMult increases the communication cost
and requires secure channels. For Shamir’s threshold secret sharing scheme this
additional information needs not to be computed and the communication complexity
is, thus, lower. For the same reasons, the auditing procedure during the on-line phase
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of Tassa’s schemes has computational complexity similar to the one for Shamir’s
scheme while the auditing procedure during the off-line phase is more expensive. In
Figure 3.2, a comparison for algorithms LinAdd, Multiply, RandShares, and PreMult is
provided.
(a) Run time of algorithm LinAdd. (b) Run time of algorithm Multiply.
(c) Run time of algorithm RandShares. (d) Run time of algorithm PreMult.
Figure 3.2: Run time of LinAdd, Multiply, RandShares, and PreMult for Shamir’s secret
sharing scheme and Tassa’s conjunctive and disjunctive secret sharing
schemes.
In the following, we describe in detail the evaluations displayed in Figure 3.1 and
in Figure 3.2. The simulations where performed for the following values of pair
(t, n): (2, 3), (3, 5), (4, 7), (5, 9), and (6, 11). With respect to Tassa’s conjunctive
and disjunctive secret sharing schemes, for every pair (t, n), all possible hierarchical
configurations with up to t levels were tested and the average of the run time is what
is displayed. Thus, the higher the threshold t, the more hierarchical configurations to
be tested. What we have tested is the run times of algorithms Share, Reconstruct, Add,
Reset, LinAdd, Multiply, RandShares, and PreMult when files 100 Byte, 1 Kbyte, 10
Kbyte, and 100 Kbyte are processed with Shamir’s threshold secret sharing, Tassa’s
conjunctive hierarchical secret sharing, and Tassa’s disjunctive hierarchical secret
sharing. Also, for each (t, n)-configuration, for each algorithm and for each secret
sharing primitive we run the experiment 10 times and then plotted the average run
time. We have used a 256-byte encoding, meaning that every 256 characters from the
file were first converted into an integer of the finite field used in the secret sharing
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primitives. The finite field that was selected in F22203−1 because this is the minimal
prime upper bound for the encoding that we have chosen. The simulations have
been performed on an Intel (Quad-Core) i5-8250U CPU clocked at 1.6GHz,with 8
GB of RAM and 64bit Windows 10. As one can see, the run times of the algorithms
instantiated with Tassa’s conjunctive and disjunctive hierarchical secret sharing
schemes are comparable with the run times with Shamir’s threshold secret sharing
scheme, where Note the breaks in the plots are due to the increase in size of the file
to be processed.
More precisely, with respect to algorithm Share, for Shamir’s secret sharing scheme,
that means to compute t − 1 multiplication for each share to be generated for a
polynomial of degree t − 1. Besides polynomials’ evaluation, algorithm Share for
Tassa’s conjunctive and disjunctive hierarchical secret sharing schemes requires also to
compute up to t−1 polynomials’ derivatives. However, the additional multiplications
due to derivation are partially balanced by the fewer multiplications needed when
evaluating derivatives of polynomials and this results into a slightly longer run time.
Algorithms Reconstruct of both Shamir’s secret sharing scheme and Tassa’s conjunc-
tive and disjunctive hierarchical secret sharing schemes require Gaussian elimination
to solve a system of t linear equations in order to reconstruct the polynomial used to
share the message. Then, the message is retrieved through polynomial evaluation.
However, in the secret sharing framework the only coefficient that matters is the free
coefficient for Shamir’s secret sharing scheme and for Tassa’s conjunctive hierarchical
secret sharing scheme and the last coefficient for Tassa’s disjunctive hierarchical secret
sharing scheme. For Tassa’s conjunctive (disjunctive) hierarchical secret sharing
schemes, this implies that only determinants det(A(E,X, ϕ0)) (det(A(E,X, ϕt−1)))
and det(A(E,X, ϕ)) have to be computed, where the latter can be computed in
advance off-line. Also, Tassa’s disjunctive’s Reconstruct algorithm is faster than the
Tassa’s conjunctive counterpart because the matrix A(E,X, ϕt−1) has more zeros
than A(E,X, ϕ0), leading to a faster computation of the determinants (see Chapter
2.2). The Reconstruction algorithm of Shamir’s secret sharing scheme requires t− 1
multiplications. Figure 3.1 shows that the three run times are comparable, especially
those of Shamir’s secret sharing scheme and Tassa’s conjunctive secret sharing scheme.
With respect to algorithms Add and Reset, the run times of Shamir’s secret sharing
scheme and Tassa’s conjunctive and disjunctive hierarchical secret sharing schemes
are similar because the steps to be performed on-line are equivalent. That is because,
the Lagrange interpolation constant for Shamir’s secret sharing schemes can be
computed in advance since it does not involved secret information(see algorithm Add
by Nojoumian et al. in [90] algorithm Reset by Gupta and Gopinath in [58]). The
same thing holds for Tassa’s conjunctive (disjunctive) secret sharing schemes where
term λl,(i′,j′)
σl
for algorithm Add and term al,0
σl
(al,t−1
σl
) can be computed in advance.
With respect to Figure 3.2, algorithms LinAdd and Multiply consist of the on-line
computations to perform, respectively, linear operations and multiplications over
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(hierarchically) shared secrets. Since algorithm LinAdd is entirely on-line and the
operations on the shares are the same, the run times for Shamir’s secret sharing
scheme and for Tassa’s conjunctive and disjunctive hierarchical secret sharing schemes
are similar. With respect to algorithm Multiply, the difference in run time is due to
the difference in run time of algorithm Reconstruct of the corresponding schemes.
The run times of algorithms RandShares and PreMult for Tassa’s conjunctive and
disjunctive hierarcical secret sharing scheme is significantly greater than the ones
for Shamir’s secret sharing scheme due to the derivatives for the different levels.
However, these algorithms are the off-line steps to be computed in advance before
algorithm Multiply. Thus, overall, for the on-line computations of the algorithm, the
run times of Tassa’s conjunctive and disjunctive hierarchical secret sharing schemes
are comparable to that of Shamir’s secret sharing scheme.
To perform algorithms Audit.LinAdd, Audit.Multiply and Audit.RandShares, the
auditor takes steps very similar to the corresponding auditing procedure for Shamir’s
secret sharing schemes, because algorithms LinAdd, Multiply and RandShares are
defined similarly. Instead, algorithm Audit.PreMult requires the computation of
commitments in a distributed fashion, which increases the communication and the
computation cost. However, we recall that the preprocessing phase is off-line and
can be performed in advance. Regarding the on-line phase, which is the time critical
phase, the schemes of both Shamir and Tassa perform equally well. The auditing
algorithms were not tested due to the computationally intensive commitment schemes.
3.5 Summary and Future Work
In this chapter, we showed that Tassa’s hierarchical conjunctive and disjunctive
secret sharing schemes are a promising candidate for distributed storage systems.
They provide the same functionalities that Shamir’s secret sharing scheme provides
and, in addition, they fit scenarios with an underlying hierarchical structure. We
first introduced the definition of dynamic secret sharing as a secret sharing schemes
where additional shares can be computed, the access rules can me modified, and
the shares can be renewed in distributed fashion without the intervention of the
data owner. Then we provided the corresponding algorithms to perform the above
mentioned functionalities when the message is shared using Tassa’s hierarchical
conjunctive and disjunctive secret sharing schemes. Second, we showed how to
practically compute linear operations and multiplications over shared messages when
Tassa’s conjunctive and disjunctive hierarchical secret sharing schemes are used
by providing the algorithms to do that. For all the algorithms that we presented,
we also proved their correctness and showed that they do not lower the security
of the underlying Tassa’s hierarchical conjunctive and disjunctive secret sharing
schemes. For the algorithms to perform operations on hierarchically shared data,
we also provided auditing mechanism to check that those operations were actually
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performed correctly. We also investigated the efficiency of the algorithms we pro-
posed. In general, they are not less efficient than the corresponding algorithms for
Shamir’s secret sharing scheme, given that the most expensive operations for Tassa’s
hierarchical conjunctive and disjunctive secret sharing schemes can be performed
off-line in advance. We provided experimental evaluations to empirically support this.
As future work, we want to implement a distributed storage system built on Tassa’s
hierarchical secret sharing schemes that involes real data centers from different SSPs.
The challenge here is the technology of multi-cloud, which seems not to be ready yet
to support a single point of orchestration across different commercial providers so
that to enable the data owner to outsource, withdraw, and monitor its data. Once
further improvements with respect to the multi-cloud will be achieved, we plan to
implement hierarchical secret sharing-based distributed storage systems.
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4 Preventing Security Threats Through
Adaptive Social Secret Sharing and
Private Third-Party Auditing
Distributed storage systems built on secret sharing schemes are suitable for the long-
term confidentiality protection of stored data due to the information-theoretic nature
of such cryptographic primitives. In particular, this is achieved because the shares of
the stored data are periodically renewed distributedly by performing proactive secret
sharing. This is a viable solution for information-theoretic long-term confidentiality
distributed storage systems from a purely cryptographic perspective. However, long-
term confidentiality relies in practice on high-performing storage servers carrying
out proactive secret sharing, where performance is understood in a broad sense,
including for instance reliability. The performance of storage servers may vary over
time and data owners require guidance to select the individual storage servers making
up the distributed storage system. Social secret sharing (see Section 2.3) offers a
solution: an aggregate performance score is assigned to each storage server and
is periodically updated to provide accurate performance figures. Data owners can
check which storage servers are assigned the best aggregate scores and select them
accordingly. In case the updated aggregate performance scores vary significantly
over time, the distributed storage system has to be adapted accordingly. This means
two things. First, that the access rules of the underlying secret sharing scheme
should exclude low-performing storage servers to include better-performing ones.
Second, that the access rules should be adapted the updated aggregate performance
scores so that proactive secret sharing can always be carried out reliably. However,
state of the art social secret sharing schemes [86,90,92] do not allow for modifying
the underlying secret sharing scheme, nor to include or exclude storage servers
without the intervention of the data owner. This makes the current social secret
sharing solutions unsuitable for long-term protection of the confidentiality of data in
distributed storage systems.
A further requirement for the long-term protection of data, especially when it is
critical data, is to be able to check whether the data stored in the storage servers have
been compromised or not. In the best case, such auditing could itself be outsourced
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to a third party that does not to be trusted by the data owner. That is, also
the auditing mechanism should guarantee privacy, even if the auditor collaborates
with a set of storage servers. However, the privacy preserving third party auditing
mechanisms presented so far only tackle single-server storage solutions or rely on
encryption and no such protocol exists at all for a distributed storage system setting.
Thus, currently, it is not possible to double check the integrity of the outsourced
data while protecting its confidentiality in an information-theoretic way.
Contributions
In this chapter, we provide the first social secret sharing solution that allows to
distributedly modify the access rules of the underlying secret sharing scheme as
well as to modify the set of storage servers according to their aggregate scores.
We do this by first defining a new primitive called adaptive social secret sharing,
which requires that the underlying secret sharing scheme is dynamic, according
to Definition 3.1. Building social secret sharing on dynamic secret sharing allows
to modify the access rules and the set of storage servers making up the storage
system without the intervention of the data owner. We instantiated adaptive social
secret sharing through Shamir’s secret sharing scheme (see section 2.1) and Tassa’s
hierarchical conjunctive and disjunctive secret sharing schemes (see Section 2.2),
which are dynamic, by also setting up alarm triggers when instable states with too
many low-performing storage servers occur. Our solution outperforms state of the
art ones in terms of security because it can respond to the degradation of the storage
servers. Furthermore, the instantiation with Tassa’s conjunctive and disjunctive
hierarchical secret sharing schemes achieves optimal storage consumption because all
shares distributed to the storage servers are of the same length.
In addition, we present an information-theoretically private auditing mechanism
for distributed storage systems which is compatible with proactive secret sharing
and current distributed storage solutions. This means that a third party can audit
the integrity of sensitive data, while still fulfilling the stringent confidentiality re-
quirements they come with. More precisely, we define the syntax and the security
requirements of such mechanisms, in particular by formalizing the notion of privacy
and extractability of such third party auditing mechanism. We then present an
instantiation based on additively homomorphic threshold secret sharing schemes,
specifically with Shamir’s secret sharing scheme. In contrast to state of the art
solutions [20, 37,101,111], our auditing mechanism does not require encryption and
is completely keyless. This is achieved by exploiting the non-collusion assumptions
intrinsic to secret sharing-based distributed storage systems. We introduce also a
batch version of our auditing mechanism, so multiple data from different data owners
can be audited at the same time with constant communication complexity. Moreover,
we show how storage servers can protect themselves against malicious data owners
distributing them incorrect shares.
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Contributions to this chapter come from papers [T3] and [T4]. My contributions
were the definition of the adaptive secret sharing primitive and the comparison
of the instantiation of this primitive through Tassa’s conjunctive and disjunctive
hierarchical secret sharing schemes with state of the art approaches. Furthermore, I
modified the third-party auditing mechanism so that it can cope with malicious data
owners that generate invalid shares when outsourcing their data.
Outline
The contributions of this chapter are organized into two main sections. In Section 4.1,
the adaptive social secret sharing solution for distributed storage system is presented.
More precisely, first we define adaptive social secret sharing as a primitive, then we
provide an instantiation based on Shamir’s secret sharing scheme and an instantiation
based on Tassa’s hierarchical conjunctive and disjunctive secret sharing schemes
and argue how these outperform the state of the art instantiations of social secret
sharing. in Section 4.2, the privacy preserving third party auditing for distributed
storage systems is presented. More precisely, first we define auditable distributed
storage systems as a primitive, specifying the privacy and security requirements
for completeness, privacy, and extractability. Then we instantiate this primitive by
using Shamir’s secret sharing scheme, presenting a simple solution for auditing one
message only and for auditing multiple messages at the same time. Afterwards, we
present how our auditing mechanism can be used instead of verifiable secret sharing
to protect the storage servers against malicious data owner and we survey related
work. Summary and future work can be found in Section 4.3.
We first highlight the drawbacks and open problems of state of the art social
secret sharing-based distributed storage system, both with respect to protection of
confidentiality of data and with respect to storage consumption. Then we introduce
AS3, an adaptive social secret sharing scheme that allows to modify the setup of the
underlying secret sharing primitive to keep up with the ever changing performance
of the storage servers withing the system. It supports data owners not only in first
setting up a distributed storage system, but also in maintaining it over time. Then,
we present the first information-theoretic secure audit mechanism that allows a third
party to audit the integrity of the data stored in a secret sharing-based distributed
storage system. We also introduce a batch version of such mechanism, where multiple
shares from different data can be verified at once.
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4.1 Adaptive Social Secret Sharing for Distributed
Storage Systems
In this section, we present how to instantiate distributed storage systems when the
storage servers involved have different reconstruction capabilities and how to adapt
them to the always changing performance of these storage servers. The distributed
storage systems that we propose are based on dynamic secret sharing (according to
Definition 3.1 introduced in Section 3.2.1) and on social secret sharing, introduced
in Section 2.3. This allows not only to grant more informative shares to the best
performing storage servers, but also to change the distribution of the shares and the
access rules to the outsourced data in case of decrease or increase of the performance
of those storage servers. The rest of the section is organized as follows. In Section
4.1.1, we describe the framework we operate in and formalize the requirements that a
distributed storage system has in order to guarantee the availability of the outsourced
data. In Section 4.1.2, we present the AS3 protocol, based on social and dynamic
secret sharing, and describe in detail the algorithms it is composed of. In Section
4.1.3, we compare AS3 with state of the art solutions for distributed storage systems
based on social secret sharing and show how our solution outperforms them in terms
of security, availability, and storage consumption.
4.1.1 Framework
Social secret sharing, introduced in Section 2.3, is used when data owners want
to outsource their data in distributed fashion so that the storage servers involved
are granted with reconstruction capabilities that mirror their performances. More
precisely, distributed storage systems are composed of storage servers from different
commercial storage service providers whose performance might change over time. The
performance of each storage server is expressed by an aggregate performance score
which determines the weight of a storage server with respect to the reconstruction
of the data. This weight determines how informative the share distributed is. In
addition, the performance of the selected storage servers is monitored such that
the reconstruction power of each storage server can be adapted accordingly. In the
following, we define adaptive social secret sharing schemes as social secret sharing
schemes that in addition of algorithms Share, Tune, and Reconstruct of social secret
sharing schemes (see Definition 2.9) allow to perform algorithm Reset of dynamic
secret sharing schemes of Definition 3.1. That is, an adaptive social secret sharing
scheme is composed of algorithms that fulfill the security properties of accessibility
and perfect security formalized in Definition 2.1. Adaptive social secret sharing is
the primitive based on which we construct our solution AS3 for distributed storage
systems. We also formalize the setup on which such solution is instantiated and
determine the requirements that distributed storage systems have to fulfill in order
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to be viable solutions for long-term storage of data.
Definition 4.1. For a message spaceM, a space of shares Σ, a set of shareholders
S = {s1, . . . , sn} where i ∈ I is the unique ID of shareholder si ∈ S, and an access
structure Γ ⊂ P(S), an adaptive social secret sharing scheme is a social secret
sharing scheme according to Definition 2.9 with an additional PPT algorithm Reset
run by an authorized set of shareholders that also satisfies the security properties of
Definition 2.1. More precisely, an adaptive social secret sharing scheme is a tuple of
PPT algorithms Share, Tune, Reset, and Reconstruct defined as follows.
Share takes as input a message m ∈M and a vector of weights w1, . . . , wn ∈ [0, 1],
where ∑ni=1wi = 1. It outputs n shares σ1, . . . , σn ∈ Σ, where share σi is to be sent
to shareholder si ∈ S and whose reconstruction capability matches weight wi, for
i = 1, . . . , n.
Tune takes as input aggregate performance scores τ1, . . . , τn ∈ [0, 1] for, respectively,
shareholders s1, . . . , sn computed by a performance scoring mechanism. It outputs
weights w1, . . . , wn for shareholders s1, . . . , sn.
Reset takes as input a set of shares σ1, . . . , σr held by a subset R ⊂ S of share-
holders, a vector of weights w1, . . . , wn for shareholders s1, . . . , sn, a new set of
shareholders S ′ = {s′1, . . . , s′n′} (where S ′ needs not be disjoint from S and n′ needs
not to be different from n) with a vector of bootstrapped weights w′1, . . . , w′n, and
an access structure Γ′ ⊂ P(S ′). If R is unauthorized, i.e. R /∈ Γ, it outputs ⊥.
Otherwise, R ∈ Γ and without message reconstruction, it outputs n′ shares σ′1, . . . , σ′n′,
where share σ′i is to be sent to each new shareholder s′i ∈ S ′, for i = 1, . . . , n′. The
shares σ1, . . . , σn ∈ Σ held by the old shareholders are deleted.
Reconstruct takes as input a set of shares σ1, . . . , σr held by a subset R ⊂ S of
shareholders. It outputs m ∈M if R ∈ Γ, and ⊥ otherwise.
For our framework, we assume that the set S = {s1, . . . , sn} of shareholders in
Definition 4.1 are n storage servers owned by different storage service providers.
Like for the original definition of social secret sharing presented in Section 2.2, also
algorithm Share of adaptive social secret sharing allows the data owner to store their
messages either by using weighted secret sharing or hierarchical secret sharing. The
reason is that Shamir’s threshold secret sharing scheme, and therefore its weighted
version, and Tassa’s hierarchical conjunctive and disjunctive scheme are dynamic
and can be equipped with algorithm Reset, as presented in Section 3.2. In both
cases the initial weights w1, . . . , wn for storage servers s1, . . . , sn are determined and
algorithm S.Share of the underlying secret sharing scheme is called with the vector of
weights as input. Afterwards, the storage servers run periodically algorithm Tune to
determine and update the weights of each storage server and to accordingly adjust
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the shares by calling the algorithm S.Reset. More precisely, algorithm Reset allows
the user to add, remove, and replace storage servers by first computing weights for
the newcomers and then calling algorithm S.Reset of the underlying secret sharing
scheme with the new storage servers and weights as input. Finally, at any time
the user can retrieve the message by running algorithm Reconstruct, which calls the
algorithm S.Reconstruct of the underlying secret sharing scheme.
Our scheme is parameterized by the following values. (1) The total number of
storage servers n which is input to algorithm Share and can be changed by calling
algorithm Reset. (2) The weights w1, . . . , wn of storage servers s1, . . . , sn, respectively,
which are initialized by algorithm Share and updated regularly by algorithm Tune. If
we use weighted secret sharing as underlying secret sharing scheme we also use (3a)
threshold t required to reconstruct the message while for hierarchical secret sharing
we have (3b.1) the total number ` of levels and (3b.2) thresholds t1, . . . , t` for levels
L1, . . . , L`, respectively. In addition, d denotes the total number of different subsets
of storage servers that are able to reconstruct the message.
There are two aspects that distributed storage systems should guarantee: con-
fidentiality and availability of the outsourced data. As we have discussed in the
introduction of this chapter, confidentiality and availability rely on the performance
of the storage servers involved. These two properties rely on algorithm Reset and algo-
rithm Reconstruct that can be performed in distributed fashion by authorized subsets
of storage servers. More precisely, a certain threshold of storage servers is needed
to perform algorithms S.Reset and S.Recontruct of the underlying dynamic secret
sharing scheme and correspondingly to run algorithms Tune, Reset, and Recontruct
of the adaptive social secret sharing scheme. Thus, the parameters must be chosen
such that the system can cope with low-performing storage servers. On the other
hand, storage servers with high aggregate performance scores are more likely to
perform well the next time one of the above algorithms is called, but this is not
guaranteed. There is always the possibility that problems occur and they respond
late or not at all. In this worst case scenario, the algorithms still have to be run and
the operations of updated still have to be carried out. In order for this to happen, the
shares must be distributed so that, in case the highest-performing storage servers are
faulty, the other storage servers form at least one authorized set that can correctly
run algorithms Reset and Reconstruct. We present in the next session how algorithm
Tune is instantiated so that this requirement holds.
4.1.2 AS3: An Instantiation of Adaptive Social Secret Sharing
In this section, we present AS3, our solution for distributed storage systems. AS3 is
an adaptive social secret sharing scheme that preserves confidentiality and availability
of the outsourced data. We detail how algorithm Share, algorithm Tune, algorithm
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Reset, and algorithm Reconstruct are instantiated for AS3 in, respectively, Section
4.1.2.1, Section 4.1.2.2, Section 4.1.2.3, and Section 4.1.2.4.
4.1.2.1 Algorithm Share
When algorithm Share is run, a set of n storage servers is selected and their vector of
weights w1, . . . , wn is bootstrapped. For simplicity and without loss of generality we
assume that all storage servers are treated as newcomers and have all the same weight
equal to 1, i.e. w1 = · · · = wn = 1. This means that, for weighted secret sharing, all
storage servers s1, . . . , sn receive one share only. For both conjunctive and disjunctive
hierarchical secret sharing, this means that only one level L0 is spanned and that all
shareholders s1, . . . , sn are assigned to level L0. The threshold t and the threshold
t0 of the underlying weighted secret sharing scheme and hierarchical secret sharing
scheme, respectively, are selected so that n = 2t− 1 to ensure honest majority.
4.1.2.2 Algorithm Tune
Algorithm Tune is responsible for adjusting the weights of the storage servers ac-
cording to the updated aggregate performance scores computed by the performance
scoring mechanism in the distributed storage system, where 0 ≤ x ≤ n is an integer.
More precisely, the algorithm takes as input a vector τ1, . . . , τn of aggregate perfor-
mance scores describing the performance of storage servers s1, . . . , sn, respectively.
This algorithm is composed of the following steps.
1) Estimation of x. It is estimated the amount x of possibly faulty storage servers
given the updated aggregate scores. Given a performance threshold k ∈ [0, 1] selected
by the data owner at the moment of outsourcing the data, where 0 ≤ k ≤ 1, x is
the amount of storage servers si with aggregate score lower than the threshold, i.e.
x = |{si ∈ S|τi < k}|. If x < n, then the weights are computed at step 2). Otherwise
a failure message is transmitted and the protocol is aborted.
2) Computations of the weights. Let the integer γ > 0 denote the granular-
ity parameter with which the aggregate scores τ1, . . . , τn are mapped into weights
w1, . . . , wn. More precisely, interval [0, 1] is divided into γ disjoint subintervals,
I1 = [0, 1γ ), I2 = [
1
γ
, 2
γ
), . . . , Iγ = [1 − 1γ , 1]. If the aggregate score τi lies in interval
Ij, then weight wi set to j, where j = 1, . . . , γ is an integer. Thus, there are γ
possible values that weights w1, . . . , wn can take. For weighted secret sharing, storage
server si receives wi = j shares, for i = 1, . . . , n. For hierarchical secret sharing,
γ corresponds to the amount ` of levels L1, . . . , L` spanned and storage server si
whose aggregate score τi lies in Ij is assigned to level Lj , for i = 1, . . . , n, as initially
proposed for social secret sharing (see Section 2.3).
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3) Thresholds selection. We denote by W the vector of length n containing
all the weights w1, . . . , wn sorted from the smallest value to the highest value, i.e.
W := {W [1], . . . ,W [n]} where W [i] ≤ W [i+ 1], for i = 1, . . . , n. For the weighted
secret sharing, t is set to 1 + ∑
i>n−x
W [i]. For disjunctive secret sharing, t1 is set to
x+ 1 and th+1 to th + 1, for h = 1, . . . , `− 1.
4) Availability check. As we have anticipated in Section 4.1.1, in the worst case
scenario the x faulty storage servers are those with the highest aggregate performance
score, i.e. they store the shares with the highest reconstruction capabilities. In this
case, it must be ensured that there is still at least one subset of non faulty storage
servers able to retrieve the message, i.e. d ≥ 1. We denote by S ′ ⊂ S the subset of
all storage servers where the x most powerful storage servers are discarded (in this
case, the ones corresponding to the last x entries of vector W ).
• For weighted secret sharing, d is defined as d := |{A ⊂ S ′|∑Si∈Awi ≥ t}| and
trivially algorithm Reset and algorithm Reconstruct can be run if d ≥ 1.
• For hierarchical secret sharing, we additionally assume that n′h ≤ nh is the
amount of storage servers from S ′ assigned to level Lh, for h = 1, . . . , `. For
disjunctive secret sharing, algorithm Reset and algorithm Reconstruct can be
run in the worst case scenario if ∃h such that ∑i≤h n′i ≥ th. For conjunctive
secret sharing, if ∀h = 1, . . . , ` it holds that ∑i≥h n′h ≥ th.
If the above constraints are not satisfied, then the new shares are not computed
and distributed, because otherwise the data would be irreversibly lost. Instead, a
warning message is sent to the data owner to make it aware of the possibly dangerous
situation caused by the presence of too many faulty storage servers. The user is
strongly recommended to reboot new storage servers to prevent the loss of the
message.
4.1.2.3 Algorithm Reset
Algorithm Reset takes as input threshold t or thresholds t1, . . . , t` adjusted by algo-
rithm Tune, computes and distributes the shares to the storage servers in the storage
system according to weights w1, . . . , wn, and, eventually, the shares of newcomers.
With weighted secret sharing scheme, if the threshold t has been modified, then algo-
rithm S.Reset discussed in Section 2.1 is run and the shares are distributed according
to w1, . . . , wn. With hierarchical secret sharing scheme, if thresholds t1, . . . , t` have
been modified, then algorithm S.Reset introduced in Section 3.2.3 is run and the
shares are distributed according to weights w1, . . . , wn.
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4.1.2.4 Algorithm Reconstruct
Algorithm Reconstruct is called when the user wants to retrieve the message. De-
pending on the underlying secret sharing scheme, a specific algorithm S.Reconstruct
is run. Specifically, algorithm S.Reconstruct described in Section 2.1 is called for
weighted secret sharing, while algorithm S.Reconstruct described in Section 2.2 is
called for both conjunctive and disjunctive hierarchical secret sharing.
4.1.3 Related Work and Comparison with AS3
In this section, we provide an evaluation of the related work with respect to social
secret sharing, i.e. the weighted social secret sharing by Nojoumian and Stinson [88,90]
(who first introduced the concept of social secret sharing) and the hierarchical social
secret sharing by Pakniat et al. [92]. We briefly describe the approaches and
highlight their shortcomings. Furthermore, we show the countermeasures provided
by our adaptive weighted and adaptive hierarchical social secret sharing scheme AS3
presented in Section 4.1.2.
4.1.3.1 Weighted Social Secret Sharing
In [88, 90, 92], algorithm Share sets the aggregate scores τ1, . . . , τn to zero. The
weights w1, . . . , wn are defined as integers and no bound on their value is provided.
Also, it is claimed that they are selected according to an distribution that was
never specified by the authors. Then, shares are generated and distributed to the
storage servers according to their weights. Algorithm Tune calls the performance
scoring mechanism in place, which updates the aggregate scores τ1, . . . , τn based
on the performance of the storage servers s1, . . . , sn. Then, algorithm Tune adjusts
the weights w1, . . . , wn as follows. The storage servers whose weight increased get
one additional share while one share is taken from those whose weight decreased.
Furthermore, each wi is bounded by a parameter z much smaller than the threshold
t of the scheme. However, this approach has left many issues unsolved.
(1) Initialization of weights and threshold. It is not specified how the weights
w1, . . . , wn are initialized because no detail is given regarding which distribution to
choose. Furthermore, it is not specified how to select threshold t given the weights.
Note that care must be taken when this parameter is selected, because it is of major
importance to ensure both confidentiality and availability. In fact, on the one hand,
threshold t determines the maximum number (t− 1) of colluding storage servers the
scheme can cope with. On the other hand, it determines how many shares held by
different storage servers are needed to reconstruct the data.
(2) Translation of aggregate scores into weights. The final aggregate scores
τ1, . . . , τn should in principle be computed in a deterministically way (proper of
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the specific instantiation of the social secret sharing scheme) given the weights
w1, . . . , wn as input. However, a formula or algorithms to do so is not provided.
More precisely, it is not defined if increase or decrease of weight wi happens because
the aggregate score τi is, respectively, above or below a certain threshold or because
the aggregate score τi itself is, respectively, greater or smaller than the aggregate
score of the previous round. In the former case, it is left open how to choose these
thresholds. In the latter case, storage servers that behave better compared to the
last round would be rewarded even though they have a low aggregate score and can
therefore be considered untrustworthy. Furthermore, it is not clear which ranges of
different aggregate scores are mapped to the same weight. Note that having small
ranges, e.g. such that each single aggregate score is mapped to one weight, leads to
a huge amount of shares, causing a high computational overhead and storage space
consumption.
(3) Selection of upper bound z. No indication is given with respect to the choice
of the upper bound z for the weights w1, . . . , wn. The parameter z is introduced to
prevent the storage servers from having a weight high enough to reconstruct the
message by themselves, violating confidentiality. However, the parameter z must be
chosen such that threshold t is much larger than any single initial weight wi. Thus,
there is no guarantee that all the weights of all the storage servers together can
actually reach threshold t, namely there is no guarantee that the message can be
reconstructed. Another problem is that parameter z makes the performance scoring
mechanism less effective: the weights w1, . . . , wn cannot go beyond z no matter
how high the aggregate scores τ1, . . . , τn are. Thus, approaching z, it is less and
less rewarding for the storage servers to be high-performing. Choosing such a high
threshold t leads to a high computation overhead, which is not necessary when the
weights are small.
(4) Instable states. Wrong choices for threshold t and bound z might lead to
“instable states”. In this framework, we refer to an instable state as a state in which
there is a risk that the data cannot be reconstructed because there are not subsets
of storage servers that have enough reconstruction capability as to successfully run
algorithm Reconstruct. The current solution does not provide any measures to prevent
or detect such states.
(5) Dynamism of parameters. Threshold t and bound z are selected by algorithm
Share and kept unchanged for the entire lifetime of the storage. This has several
drawbacks. If, for instance, the amount of storage servers and/or the amount of
shares generated got increased, then threshold t and bound z must be increased as
well to prevent malicious storage servers from reconstructing the data.
Our weighted AS3 scheme addresses the issues summarized above. With respect to
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(1), algorithm Share specifies how to initialize the weights w1, . . . , wn and threshold t.
Furthermore, algorithm Tune defines how to map the aggregate scores into weights
thereby addressing issue (2). With respect to (3) our scheme employs an accuracy
parameter γ that keeps bounded the total amount of shares generated, instead of
bounding the weights. This approach optimizes the storage space consumption
and leads to a low computation overhead. Furthermore, the fact that there is no
upper bound z encourages the storage servers to always be high-performing. A
very critical part of all social secret sharing schemes is reaching instable states as
described in shortcoming (4). We address this by defining the parameter d and
providing rules to ensure that there are enough subsets of storage servers able to
successfully run algorithm Reconstruct in case some of them are faulty and have a
breakdown. Note that the compliance with these requirements is checked before new
shares are generated and distributed. This prevents that the data is revealed or
lost. In addition, the scheme includes countermeasures to prevent instable states.
For instance, algorithm Share sets the total amount of storage servers n such that
the Byzantine model [50] is satisfied, i.e. such that with the initial estimation of
untrustworthy storage servers the message can be retrieved. Finally (5), our scheme
is the first that provides dynamism with respect to the parameters selected, i.e. n, t,
γ. Algorithm Tune and algorithm Reset increase or decrease threshold t at each point
in time in order to protect confidentiality and to ensure availability. This especially
allows to always choose threshold t tightly thereby optimizing the computational
overhead and the storage space consumption.
4.1.3.2 Hierarchical Social Secret Sharing
Hierarchical social secret sharing has been introduced by Pakniat et al. in [92].
The underlying scheme is the disjunctive secret sharing scheme. Algorithm Share
initializes the aggregate scores τ1, . . . , τn, the weights w1, . . . , wn, and the levels
L1, . . . , L`. The total number ` of levels determines the accuracy for which the
aggregate scores are mapped into levels. Depending on the weights, the storage
servers are assigned to a specific level and shares are generated and distributed
accordingly. Algorithm Tune calls the performance scoring mechanism which updates
the aggregate scores τ1, . . . , τn based on the behavior of the storage servers s1, . . . , sn.
Then algorithm Tune adjusts the weights w1, . . . , wn and reassigns the storage servers
to the corresponding levels.
In this approach, the accuracy with which aggregate scores are mapped into levels
is provided. However, this does not fully address (3), because the total number of
levels ` also bounds how much storage servers can be incentivized or penalized. In
fact, storage servers assigned to level L1 cannot be incentivized any further and
storage servers assigned to level L` cannot be penalized any further, no matter
how, respectively, high-performing or low-performing they are. Besides this partial
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countermeasure to (3), this hierarchical social secret sharing scheme leaves the same
issues open as identified for the weighted social secret sharing scheme. More precisely,
it is not clear how to initialize the weights w1, . . . , wn, how many levels L1, . . . , L` to
span, and how to choose the corresponding thresholds t1, . . . , t` (1). Furthermore, it
is not defined how the aggregate scores are mapped into weights (2), instable states
are not detected nor prevented (4), and the parameter selection is not dynamic (5).
Our AS3 based on hierarchical secret sharing schemes addresses these shortcomings
similarly as described for weighted secret sharing.
4.2 Privacy Preserving Third Party Auditing for a
Distributed Storage System
We recall that in the previous Section 4.1 our goal was to protect the long-term
confidentiality of the outsourced data by adapting the instantiation of the underlying
secret sharing scheme of a distributed storage system according to the evolution
of the storage servers in terms of their performance. We achieved that by first
formalizing these requirements with the definition of adaptive social secret sharing
scheme and by providing an instantiation based on Tassa’s hierarchical conjunctive
and disjunctive secret sharing scheme referred to as AS3.
In this section, we tackle a second aspect regarding the long-term protection of
data in distributed storage systems. That is, to check whether the data stored in the
storage servers have been tampered with or not. Periodically checking that the shares
stored in each storage server are correct ensures the integrity of the outsourced data.
Thus, an auditing mechanism is needed. Because of the information-theoretic nature
of secret sharing-based distributed storage systems, also the auditing mechanism used
should mirror this type of protection. More precisely, the auditing mechanism should
guarantee privacy even if the auditor is an untrusted third party that collaborates
with a subset of storage servers. We provide here the first solution for information-
theoretic private third party auditing for distributed storage systems.
The rest of the section is structured as follows. In Section 4.2.1 we define auditable
distributed storage systems and formalize the security and privacy requirements
needed to protect the outsourced data. In Section 4.2.2, we provide a concrete
instantiation of auditable distributed storage systems based on Shamir’s secret
sharing scheme. In Section 4.2.3, we show how and in what scenarios a variant of
our protocol can be used as a replacement for verifiable secret sharing schemes to
protect against malicious data owners. In Section 4.1.3, we survey related work.
4.2.1 Definition of Auditable Distributed Storage Systems
We formalize the notion of auditable distributed storage systems as well as the
security and privacy properties that such systems have to fulfill. Note that we keep
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this discussion more general than necessary for our concrete instantiation presented
in Section 4.2.2. For instance, all our definitions allow for keyed instantiations of the
audit mechanism too, even though our concrete instantiation is fully keyless. In the
following, the participants involved are the data owner, denoted by D, the auditor,
denoted by A, and a set of storage servers S = {S1, . . . , Sn}. We define auditable
distributed storage systems as schemes consisting of algorithms Setup, KGen, Store,
Reconstruct, and Verify, and an interactive protocol 〈A.Audit;Si.Audit〉 between the
auditor A and the storage servers S1, . . . , Sn.
Definition 4.2. For a data owner D, an auditor A, a message m ∈M, a space of
shares Σ, a set of storage servers S = {S1, . . . , Sn} where i ∈ I is the unique ID of
storage server Si ∈ S, and an access structure Γ ⊂ P(S), an auditable distributed
storage system is a tuple of the PPT algorithms Setup, KGen, Store, Reconstruct, and
Verify, and the interactive protocol 〈A.Audit;Si.Audit〉.
Setup takes as input a security parameter λ in unary and the number of storage
servers n. It outputs system parameters spar.
KGen takes as input the system parameters spar. It outputs a key pair (skD, pkD)
for the data owner D.
Store takes as input a message m ∈M, the system parameters spar, and the data
owner’s secret key skD. It outputs a shares σi ∈ Σ, for i + 1, . . . , n, to be sent to,
respectively, storage server Si ∈ S, for i = 1, . . . , n.
Reconstruct takes as input the system parameters spar, the data owner’s secret
key skD, and a set of shares σ1, . . . , σr held by a subset R ⊂ S of shareholders. It
outputs the reconstructed message m′ ∈M if R ∈ Γ, and ⊥ otherwise.
Verify takes as input the system parameters spar, a message m ∈ M, the data
owner’s secret key skD, and a full set of shares σ1, . . . , σn. It outputs 1 or 0, de-
pending on, respectively, whether or not the shares are valid shares leading to the
reconstruction of message m.
〈A.Audit; {Si.Audit}ni=1〉 with respect to the auditor A, it takes as input the system
parameters spar and the data owner’s public key pkD. With respect to each storage
server Si, it takes as input the system parameters spar, the data owner’s public key
pkD, and its share σi. It outputs 1 if the storage servers passed the audit, and 0
otherwise.
Depending on the concrete instantiation of the auditable distributed storage sys-
tem, the generation of publicly available system parameters with algorithm Setup
can be done by a trusted third party, which in practice can be realized through a
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joint computation of multiple parties. Afterwards, a data owner D who wants to
securely store its data on the selected storage servers S1, . . . , Sn computes its key pair
using KGen. A message can then be outsourced to the distributed storage system
using Store, and later be retrieved using Reconstruct. The received shares from the
different storage servers can be verified using Verify. Finally, the interactive auditing
protocol 〈A.Audit; {Si.Audit}ni=1〉 is executed between a potentially external auditor
A and the storage servers.
We now define the security and privacy properties required for auditable distributed
storage systems. More precisely, besides completeness, an auditable distributed
storage system should guarantee that even if a subset of the storage server in the
distributed storage system colludes, no information about the stored data is leaked.
Furthermore, the auditor should accept an execution of the audit protocol if and
only if all storage servers have access to valid shares for the outsourced message
that was originally stored by the data owner. This property is referred to as the
extractability property. For practical purposes, we do not require here that the
auditor and the data owner are the same entity. Therefore, it is of prime importance
that even a malicious auditor has no chance to learn any information about the data
stored by a data owner. This should hold even if the malicious auditor colludes
with a subset of storage servers, and even in case the storage servers jointly deviate
from the original protocol specification. In the following, we formalize the notion
of completeness in Section 4.2.1.1, the notion of privacy in Section 4.2.1.2, and the
notion of extractability in Section 4.2.1.3.
4.2.1.1 Completeness
The completeness property captures the intuitive requirement that if all parties are
honest and follow the protocol specifications, the auditor should always output 1.
Definition 4.3. An auditable distributed storage system composed on n storage
servers is complete if the auditor outputs 1 with probability 1 and accepts the shares
as valid, given that all the parties involved, i.e. data owner and storage servers,
behaved honestly.
The completeness property of the auditable distributed storage systems presented
in Definition 4.2 implies that algorithm Reconstruct should always return the correct
original message if it receives as input a authorized subset of shares, i.e. that the
underlying secret sharing scheme fulfills the completeness property in the sense of
Definition 2.1. The same holds for algorithm Verify, which should always output 1 if
all shares are consistent with the message, i.e. it should be complete in the sense of
Definition 2.3.
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4.2.1.2 Privacy
Informally, an auditable distributed storage system is said to be private if no adversary
can infer any information about the stored message m from a bounded number of
shares and arbitrary many runs of the auditing protocol. More formally, we define
the privacy game as follows. We let the adversary Adv choose two messages, m0,m1,
one of which is outsourced to a distributed storage system by storing its shares in
the storage servers. Furthermore, the adversary Adv can corrupt at most t− 1 out
of the n storage servers and the auditor A. This message is then audited upon the
adversary Adv’s request. At the end of the privacy game, the adversary Adv should
not be able to tell which of the two messages m0 and m1 was distributed in the first
place. We denote by ε ∈ [0, 1] the probability enforced by the adversary Adv that
the auditor accepts the shares.
Experiment PrivacyAdv(λ, n, t)
b
$← {0, 1}
(spar) $← Setup(1λ, n)
(skD, pkD) $← KGen(spar)
(m0,m1, state) $← Adv(spar, pkD)
(σ1, . . . , σn) $← Store(mb, spar, skD)
b′ $← AdvO(·)(state)
where O(·) = O(spar, pkD, σ1, . . . , σn, ·) behaves as follows:
On input (corrupt, Si):
mark Si as corrupt
return σi to the adversary
On input (corrupt, A):
mark A as corrupt
return ε to the adversary
On input (audit):
simulate all honest parties in an execution of
the auditing protocol
Let t′ be the total number of corruption requests.
return (b ?= b′) ∧ (t− 1 ?≤ t′)
Figure 4.1: Privacy definition game for an auditable distributed storage system.
Definition 4.4. An auditable distributed storage system composed of n storage
servers is t-private, if for every PPT adversary Adv there exists a negligible function
negl such that the following holds:∣∣∣∣Pr [PrivacyAdv(λ, n, t) = 1]− 12
∣∣∣∣ ≤ negl(λ) ,
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where the privacy game PrivacyAdv(λ, n, t) is defined in Figure 4.1.
Note that this definition implies the privacy of the distributed storage system itself.
For instance, the adversary can break into enough storage servers as to collect up
to t− 1 shares and must not be able to tell which message was outsourced to the
distributed storage system.
4.2.1.3 Extractability
Informally, an auditable distributed storage system is said to be extractable if it
can only pass a run of the auditing protocol if every storage server actually stored
the share received from the data owner. This property is formalized in the spirit
of proofs of knowledge discussed by Belgol in [10]. More precisely, we require that
a set of storage nodes can only pass the audit protocol, if the original outsourced
data is still present in the system. That is, there must be an algorithm E that can
extract the messages from the single storage node. Therefore, algorithm E is given
rewindable black-box access [7] to the storage servers. This means that algorithm
E does not have access to the code of the (potentially malicious) storage server Si,
but it can reset and rerun the system arbitrarily and can also control their random
tapes. Also, algorithm E can force the servers to rerun the audit protocol again on
the same random tape. We stress that this approach is in line with a long line of
research on zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge.
Experiment ExtractabilityAdv(λ, n, t)
(spar) $← Setup(1λ, n)
(skD, pkD) $← KGen(spar)
(m, I) $← Adv(spar, pkD)
where |I| ≤ t− 1
(σ1, . . . , σn) $← Store(m, spar, skD)
{ti}`i=1 $← ES1,...,Sn1
where {Si}i∈I are controlled by Adv({σi}i∈I),
and E1 has rewindable black-box access to the system
(σ′1, . . . , σ′n)
$← (E12({ti↓1}`i=1, . . . ,En2 ({ti↓n}`i=1)
where ti↓j is the ith transcript reduced to only the
messages that were exchanged with Sj
return Verify(spar,m, skD, σ′1, . . . , σ′n)
Figure 4.2: Extractability definition game for an auditable distributed storage system.
Definition 4.5. An auditable distributed storage system composed of n storage
servers is t-extractable with retrievability error ρ : N→ [0, 1], if there exists a state
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less algorithm E = (E1, (E12, . . . ,En2 )) such that for every adversary Adv that makes
the auditor accept with probability ε > ρ it holds that:
Pr[ExtractabilityAdv(λ, n, t)] = 1 ,
where the expected running time of E is upper-bounded by poly(λ)/(ε(λ)− ρ(λ)).
Definition 4.5 is similar to the one for distributed proofs of knowledge proposed
by Ben-Or et al. in [11], where multiple provers need to convince a verifier that they
jointly know a secret piece of information and it is not, in general, an information-
theoretically secure property (contrary to its instantiation in the following section).
However, our definition differs in several subtle aspects from this definition, as
discussed in the following.
• First and foremost, in our framework, the definition of distributed proofs of
knowledge of [11] would only have guaranteed that all valid witnesses exist in
the system. That is, it is only guaranteed that the witness (i.e., all shares) can
be extracted from the set of provers (i.e., the storage servers). This would entail
the possibility for malicious storage nodes to delete their shares, as long as these
shares can be recomputed from the remaining ones. However, this contradicts
the intuition of our auditing protocol, as it needs to be guaranteed that every
single node correctly stored its share. For this reason it is necessary to split
the extractor into two phases, where the actual “extraction” may only use the
interaction of the extractor with the respective server.
• Second, in (distributed) proofs of knowledge, the knowledge extractor takes as
input also the value for which knowledge the witness needs to be proven. This
is sensible, as the extractor should in particular be able to play the role of the
verifier. However, in our case the verifier (i.e., the auditor) does not know this
value (i.e., m), and thus it would be unnatural to give m to E.
• Finally, the standard definition of (distributed) proofs of knowledge [11] is fully
independent of valid witnesses, i.e., the σi in our definition. However, in our
definition it is crucial to start from a valid set of shares. In fact, depending
on the instantiation the adversary may only be allowed to corrupt a limited
number of servers (parametrized by the allowed size of I). For the other servers
to be able to honestly play their parts in the protocol it is crucial for them to
receive their valid shares as inputs.
4.2.2 Instantiation Based on Shamir Secret Sharing
In the following, we present an auditable distributed storage system that is based
on an arbitrary additively homomorphic threshold secret sharing scheme. For
clarity of presentation, we instantiate the auditable distributed storage system with
Shamir’s threshold secret sharing scheme presented in Section 2.1. Our Shamir’s
threshold secret sharing-based instantiation of the auditable distributed storage
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system presented in Definition 4.2 is a completely keyless system because of the
nature of secret sharing-based distributed storage systems. Furthermore, since our
system does not require any pre-processing of messages, it can be applied directly to
any data that has already been outsourced to a distributed storage system based on
Shamir’s threshold secret sharing scheme.
The rest of this section is organized as follows. In Section 4.2.2.1, we discuss
two natural auditable distributed storage systems and discuss their shortcoming to
further motivate our solution. Then, in Section 4.2.2.2, our instantiation is presented
and is formally proven secure in Section 4.2.2.3. In Section 4.2.2.4, we show how to
significantly increase the efficiency of our basic protocol using a batch technique. For
instance, the use of a batching technique allows to audit at once multiple messages,
potentially across multiple data owners. In Section 4.2.3, it is discussed how single
storage servers can be blamed in case of failure.
4.2.2.1 Canonical Instantiations
In the following, we briefly discuss two seemingly natural instantiations for auditable
distributed storage systems, and explain their shortcomings.
On the one hand, one might first encrypt the message using an arbitrary encryption
scheme, and then store replicas of it on n storage servers. To audit, each storage
server sends a hash of the ciphertext to the auditor, who accepts if and only if all
storage servers return the same hash value. This scheme would be very efficient
and directly support a batch version (also across different data owners) by simply
hashing an entire batch of ciphertexts. Furthermore, the privacy of the scheme
does not depend on a non-collusion assumption between the servers. However, the
extractability property requires a non-collusion assumption between any 2 (not t)
storage nodes. If this is not the case, it cannot be guaranteed that each storage
server actually stores a full replica of the data, because a storage server could just
send the correct hash value to another one that stores nothing at all but that can
then simply forwards the hash value to the auditor. Moreover, this instantiation
is not keyless and is computationally secure only, which makes it not suitable for
long-term storage of confidential data.
On the other hand, to achieve information-theoretic privacy, one might first share
the data using a secret sharing scheme, then apply standard proof of retrievability
and proof of data possession techniques (see 4.2.4) to the single shares, and then
audit every server independently. On the positive side, the extractability property in
this case does not depend on a non-collusion assumption, while the privacy property
clearly does. However, the scheme is not keyless, and furthermore none of the existing
publicly verifiable private data checking techniques supports batch verification across
multiple data owners. Furthermore, this approach is not compatible with existing
storage solutions, does not (directly) support proactive steps, and also introduces a
storage overhead compared to regular secret sharing schemes.
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Instead, our instantiation based on Shamir’s threshold secret sharing scheme
provides information-theoretic confidentiality , allows for efficient batch audits across
different data owners, does not require any storage overhead, supports proactivity,
and is backward compatible with existing solutions. This is achieved by leveraging
the non-collusion assumption and built in redundancy of the underlying distributed
storage system to also prove privacy and extractability of the resulting scheme.
4.2.2.2 An Audit Protocol for Single Messages
In this section, we present our protocol for auditable distributed storage systems when
these are built on Shamir’s threshold secret sharing scheme. Thus, algorithm Store
and algorithm Reconstruct correspond, respectively, to algorithm Share and algorithm
Reconstruct of Shamir’s threshold secret sharing scheme presented in Section 2.1.
The high-level idea of our auditing mechanism for distributed storage systems is the
following. The storage servers involved in the system jointly compute a distributed
random value. That is, each storage server obtains a share of the randomness used
to blind the actual shares of the message. And the blinding of each share of the
message is done by adding the corresponding share of the randomness to it. If all
those sums are consistent, the auditor accepts the audit, otherwise it rejects.
Setup takes as input a security parameter λ and the number of servers n. It
outputs the system parameters:
spar = (q, t, n, (S1, . . . , Sn)) ,
where q > n is a prime number defining the field Fq as both the message space
and the shares space, t ≤ n−12 is an integer defining the minimum amount of shares
required to reconstruct the secret, and i ∈ I is the unique identifier of storage server
Si, for i = 1, . . . , n.
KGen takes as input the system parameters spar. It outputs a key pair (skD, pkD)
for the data owner D. The key pair is computed setting each key as the probability
ε that the auditor passes the audit:
(skD, pkD) = (ε, ε) .
Store takes as input a message m ∈ Fq, the system parameters spar, and the data
owner’s secret key skD. It outputs a share σi to be sent to storage server Si for
i = 1, . . . , n. The shares σ1, . . . , σn are computed as follows:
(σ1, . . . , σn) $← Shamir.Share(m, q, t, n) ,
where Shamir.Share is Shamir’s secret sharing algorithm (see Section 2.1). Note that
each Si receives the corresponding σi over a secure channel.
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Reconstruct takes as input the system parameters spar, the data owner’s secret key
skD, a set of shares σ1, . . . , σr held by a subset R ⊂ S of shareholders. It outputs ⊥
if r < t. Otherwise, it checks whether there exists a unique interpolation polynomial
f(x) of degree t such that f(i) = σi for all i = 1, . . . , r. If this is the case, it outputs
m′ = f(0); otherwise it outputs ⊥.
Verify takes as input the system parameters spar, a message m ∈ Fq, the data
owner’s secret key skD, and a full set of shares σ1, . . . , σn. It outputs 1, if and only
if:
m
?= Reconstruct(spar, skD, σ1, . . . , σn).
Otherwise, it outputs 0.
〈A.Audit(spar, pkD); {Si.Audit(spar, pkD, σi)}ni=1〉 consists of the following steps.
1. The storage servers S1, . . . , Sn jointly compute a distributed uniformly random
value in Fq by running algorithm RandShares introduced in Section 3.3.3.1 and
adapting it to the access structure of Shamir’s threshold secret sharing scheme.
That is, at the end of this interaction, every server storage server Si has a share
αi of a Shamir-shared random value α with threshold t.
2. The auditor A broadcasts a challenge value c $← Fq to the storage servers
S1, . . . , Sn.
3. Each storage server Si computes locally ηi = cσi + αi by running algorithm
Linear introduced in Section 3.3.2.
4. Each storage server Si returns ηi to the auditor A.
5. The auditor A outputs 1 if and only if the provided η1, . . . , ηn are all consistent,
i.e., if:
Reconstruct(spar, skD, η1, . . . , ηn) 6=⊥ .
We stress that the above auditing mechanism for distributed storage systems is
fully key-less. In particular, the data owner D does not need to store any information,
which relieves it from any complex key management issues when accessing the data
from different devices. Our protocol actually proves that all shares held by the
different storage servers have a valid (degree-t) interpolation polynomial, i.e., that
the shares are consistent. Consistency with the originally shared message (and
therefore integrity of the shares) follows from the assumption that the majority of
the storage servers is honest, and thus their shares are consistent with the original
message.
4.2.2.3 Security Proofs
In the following, we provide detailed proofs that the system described above sat-
isfies the security properties of completeness, privacy, and extractability defined,
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respectively, in Section 4.2.1.1, Section 4.2.1.2, and Section 4.2.1.3.
Theorem 4.6. The above scheme is complete.
Proof. This property follows trivially from the completeness of Shamir’s threshold se-
cret sharing scheme, the completeness of algorithm RandShares, and the completeness
of algorithm Linear for the additivity of shares for the same threshold.
Theorem 4.7. The above scheme is t-private according to Definition 4.4.
Proof. On the one hand, if the auditor A is not corrupted, then privacy follows from
the fact that Shamir’s secret sharing scheme does not reveal any information if at
most t−1 shares are known. On the other hand, if the auditor A is corrupted, still the
responses received from honest storage servers do not contain any information about
their original shares (and thus about the message). That holds because algorithm
RandShares used for computing the shared randomness guarantees that all shares αi
obtained by honest servers are uniformly random.
Theorem 4.8. The above scheme is t-extractable with retrievability error ρ = 1/q
according to Definition 4.5.
Proof. Assume the adversary can make the auditor A accept the audit with proba-
bility more than ρ. First, the extractor E1 uses its rewindable black-box access to
obtain two different sets of transcripts with the same shared randomness but different
challenges c1 and c2. This can be done by rewinding the system of servers to the end
of Step 1 in the auditing protocol, or to the beginning of the protocol. The precise
mode of operation of extractor E1 is identical to the knowledge extractor in the proof
that every Σ-protocol is a proof of knowledge, and can be found, e.g., in Damgård [39].
From there it follows that the running time of extractor E1 is bounded above by
poly(λ)/(ε(λ)− ρ(λ)). Let the transcripts be given by t1 = (c1, (η1,1, . . . , η1,n)) and
t2 = (c2, (η2,1, . . . , η2,n)). We then have t1,i = (c1, η1,i), and t2,i = (c2, η2,i).
Second, the extractor Ei2 outputs
σ′i = (η1,i − η2,i) · (c1 − c2)−1 ∈ Fq,
where this computations can be done in polynomial time.
What now remains to be shown is that these shares are indeed consistent shares for
the original message m. To see this, it holds that ηj,1, . . . , ηj,n are consistent shares
for message Rj by Step 5 for j = {1, 2}. Thus, by the linearity of Shamir’s secret
sharing scheme, σ′1, . . . , σ′n are consistent shares for m′ = (R1 − R2) · (c1 − c2)−1.
Since by construction n ≥ 2t+ 1, it follows that there are at least t storage servers
that replied honestly in both transcripts. Clearly, the corresponding share σ′i is
consistent also with the original message m. This holds because ηj,i = cjσj,i +αi and
thus σ′i = σi. As those (at least) t shares uniquely determine the shared message, we
have that m′ = m.
73
4 Preventing Security Threats Through Adaptive Social Secret Sharing
4.2.2.4 Batch-Auditing of Stored Messages
The main drawback of the auditing mechanism for distributed storage systems
presented in Section 4.2.2.2 is that it requires to compute a fresh distributed random
value α for each message to be audited. We show how to reduce these communication
costs to a practically negligible amount if a large number of data blocks are audited at
the same time. This is particularly interesting in our setting, where no pre-processing
is necessary and where it is possible to simultaneously audit a large batch of messages
across different data owners. For instance, the auditor can audit the storage solution
of a company as a whole without running our auditing mechanism individually for
each employee. This is possible because the employees do not need to use different
private keys during algorithm Store. The only requirement is that all messages to be
batch-audited have been shared for the same system parameters spar, i.e., using the
same threshold t and the same storage servers S1, . . . , Sn.
Let us assume that each of the messages m1, . . . ,m` has been distributed and
stored according to Section 4.2.2.2, resulting in shares σ1,i, . . . , σ`,i on each storage
server Si, for i = 1, . . . , n.
〈A.Audit(spar, pkD); {Si.Audit(spar, pkD, {σj,i}`j=1)}ni=1〉 works just as in the basic
case discussed in Section 4.2.2.2, except that in Step 3 each storage server Si computes
its response ηi as:
ηi =
∑`
j=1
cjσj,i + ρi.
That is, the response is computed as a polynomial hash of the shares stored by
the server. Similarly to the proof of Theorem 4.8, it can be shown that for every
constant ` the resulting protocol is a t-extractable system (see Definition 4.5) with
retrievability error (`−1)/q in two steps. In the first step, rewinding allows to extract
sufficiently many transcripts as in the case of Σm-protocols discussed by Benhamouda
et al. in [13]. The second step essentially corresponds to solving a linear system of `
equations. We stress that the communication complexity is exactly the same as for
the basic auditing protocol for one message, and that, in particular, it is independent
of the batch size `. The computational complexity in the batch setting consists of
the joint computation of a single distributed random value, computing a sum for
each server, and calling Verify once on the auditor’s side.
Note that both the basic auditing protocol presented in Section 4.2.2.2 and the
batch version it is required that n ≥ 2t+1, i.e. that the majority of the storage servers
is honest. In this setting, it is possible for the auditor to only detect inconsistencies
among the shares stored across the storage servers only. However, the auditor cannot
identify which shares (and thus which storage servers) caused the inconsistency.
Instead, this is possible whenever n ≥ 3t + 1. Also, once the malicious storage
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servers are identified, one can either replace them or recompute consistent shares by
adapting algorithm Add presented in Section 3.2.3 to the right access structure.
4.2.3 Protecting Against Malicious Data Owners
So far, in Section 4.2.1 and in Section 4.2.2, we have provided, respectively, a
definition and an instantiation of auditable distributed storage systems. Such
auditable mechanism for distributed storage systems protects the integrity of the
stored data through a third party auditor, which checks periodically that the shares
are stored correctly. The underlying assumption is the the data owner is honest,
i.e. that it does not deviate from algorithm Store and distributes to the storage
servers valid shares. In this section, we do not assume this any longer and, instead,
allow malicious data owners to distribute inconsistent shares of data to the storage
servers, and then try to harm their reputation and trustworthiness by announcing
an unjustified complaint.
As already discussed in Section 2.1, verifiable secret sharing is a countermeasure
against malicious data owners. However, this solution is highly inefficient. For
instance, Shamir’s secret sharing scheme is usually implemented with |q| being
comparatively small for efficiency reason. That is, larger files are first split into
multiple (say: `) blocks of several bytes each before they are actually shared. In
this case, `(t+ 1) commitments (either Feldman or Pedersen’s commitments) need
to be computed and distributed by the data owner for a single file. Furthermore,
each storage server has to compute at least ` full-length and `(t+ 1) non-full-length
exponentiations in a group with ≈ 256-bit order. Given that for files in the range
of several megabytes ` would thus be at least 215 to 220, this makes the existing
verifiable secret sharing schemes impracticable to protect storage servers against
malicious data owners in a distributed storage systems.
We show how our auditing protocol from Section 4.2.2 can be extended to a batch
verification protocol for Shamir’s scheme assuming the following rational behavior of
the storage servers. That is, we assume that each storage server aims at remaining in
the set of storage servers. However, each server may be interested in excluding data
owners from the distributed storage system, or in blaming an honest storage server for
misbehaving (potentially in collaboration with the data owner). We believe that this
assumption is reasonable from an economic point of view, as storage servers do not
profit from being excluded from a system because of misbehavior. Instead, storage
servers may benefit from a reduced reputation of competitors. In the following, we
provide a high-level description of the verification protocol based on the auditing
mechanism of Section 4.2.2.
1. After having received shares σj,i for j = 1, . . . , ` to each storage server Sj for
i = 1, . . . , n, the storage server jointly (randomly or deterministically) agree on
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a set of 2t+ 1 storage servers, say Si1 , . . . , Si2t+1 .
2. The selected storage servers Si1 , . . . , Si2t+1 initiate parallelized instances of the
batch auditing protocol described in Section 4.2.2.4, in which storage server
Siu takes over the roles of both of a storage server and the auditor, for u =
1, . . . , 2t+ 1.
3. Each storage server Si,u broadcasts the result (either 1 or 0) of its audit, for
u = 1, . . . , 2t+ 1.
4. Storage server Si accepts its batch σ1,i, . . . , σ`,i of shares if it received at least t
result messages 1, and rejects its shares otherwise, for i = 1, . . . , n.
Note that as a direct consequence of our assumption and because of the results
from Section 4.2.2, in the above protocol every storage server acts honestly in the
role of a server and might only cheat when acting as an auditor, as otherwise the
misbehavior would be detected. The following result holds.
Theorem 4.9. The protocol above is complete and committing according to Defi-
nition 2.3 of a verification protocol assuming the rational behavior of the storage
servers defined above.
Proof. Completeness follows immediately from the completeness of our auditing
procedure and the fact that by assumption storage servers behave honestly when
playing the role of a storage server in our protocol. Also, it is also easy to see that no
information about the unknown shares is leaked to a set of at most t collaborating
shares.
To see that the protocol is committing, note that because t received 1 messages, at
least one such message was sent from an honest node. Now, by Theorem 4.8, it follows
that with overwhelming probability all shares are consistent for all j = 1, . . . , ` and
i = 1, . . . , n, as otherwise the valid shares could not be extracted from the storage
servers.
Similar to the batch-auditing protocol presented in Section 4.2.2.4, the storage
servers’ communication complexity of this batch verification protocol is independent
of the batch size. In particular, the computational complexity for each storage server
essentially consists on computing 2t+ 1 weighted sums over the shares to be verified,
where this sums can be computed in parallel for efficiency reasons. The data owner
does not have to perform any computations.
Summing up, the above protocol significantly reduces the complexity of verifying
the shares distributed by a data owner compared to currently used solutions with
Pedersen or Feldman commitment, assuming a rational behavior of the storage
servers. This results in the first practically verifiable secret sharing based distributed
storage system.
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4.2.4 Related Work
In the following, we discuss related work for multi server storage verifiable schemes.
Schwarz and Miller [101] propose a scheme that allows a client to verify the
storage of (n,m) erasure-coded data across multiple storage servers even if they
collude. The scheme can also be used to verify storage on a single storage server and
relies on a special construct, called algebraic signatures. The solution was intended
for application in peer to peer networks and allows the creation of very large-
scale verifiable distributed storage systems. The authors also propose performance
optimizations to achieve checking throughputs of hundreds of Mbytes/sec. Their
approach is the first to show that the distributed setting allows for very efficient
solutions for remote data checking with low computational and low storage overhead
and minimal communication requirements. However, the scheme only receives an
informal security analysis and requires secret keys. Moreover, privacy of data is not
considered and therefore third party auditing is not possible.
Other extensions to remote data checking include extending the data possession
guarantee to multiple storage servers based on replication without encoding each
replica separately. For example, the multiple-replica provable data possession scheme
proposed by Curtmola et al. in [37] allows a client that stores t replicas of a file in a
storage system to verify through a challenge-response protocol that (1) each unique
replica can be produced at the time of the challenge and that (2) the storage system
uses t times the storage required to store a single replica. Multiple-replica provable
data possession schemes extend previous work on data possession proofs for a single
copy of a file in a client/server storage system. Using multiple-replica provable data
possession schemes to store t replicas is computationally much more efficient than
using a single-replica provable data possession scheme to store t separate, unrelated
files (e.g., by encrypting each file separately prior to storing it). Another advantage
of multiple-replica provable data possession schemes is that it can generate further
replicas on demand, at little expense, when some of the existing replicas fail.
In [111] and [20] solutions based on erasure coding are introduced which also
include a sound security treatment. The solution of Wang et al. [111] applies a
special encoding scheme to construct a systematic Reed-Solomon (RS) code together
with a challenge-response protocol which not only detects the retrievability state as
a binary value, but also provides the localization of data error in an efficient way.
Additionally, the scheme supports secure and efficient dynamic operations on data
blocks, including: update, delete, and append. Furthermore, an extensive security
and performance analysis shows that the proposed scheme is highly efficient and
resilient against Byzantine failures, malicious data modification attacks, and even
server colluding attacks.
In [20] integrity-protected error correcting codes are introduced together with a
data checking framework called HAIL. Integrity-protected error correcting codes
are cryptographic primitives that act both as a message authentication as well as
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an error-correcting code. Integrity-protected error correcting codes achieve cross
server redundancy through error-correcting codes and represents a corruption resilient
message authentication schemes on the underlying data. The construction of an
integrity-protected error correcting codes in [20] is based on a (n, l, n− l + 1) Reed-
Solomon code and can be adapted for systematic Reed-Solomon codes (l is the
number of elements in the file vector f). To tag a file f , it is encoded under the RS
code, and then a suitable pseudo random function is added to the last s code symbols
(for 1 ≤ s ≤ n being a system parameter), obtaining a message authentication code
on each of those s code symbols. When reconstructing a file, a codeword is considered
valid if at least one of its last s symbols are valid message authentication codes under
universal hashing on the decoded file f .
In summary, only few approaches have been proposed for remote data checking in
a distributed setting comprising multiple servers, and what all these schemes have
in common is that they do not give formal privacy guarantees. The situation is
similar for most single-server instantiations, except for a few protocols, e.g., Gritti
et al. [55, 56]. Note that simply encrypting the data before storing it into the cloud
would mitigate this problem, but could not offer information-theoretic privacy, which
arguably is desirable for long-term archiving of confidential data.
4.3 Summary and Future Work
In this chapter, we have shown how confidentiality and integrity of the data outsourced
to a distributed storage system can be maintained in the long-term.
On the one hand, long-term protection of the confidentiality of the data relies
on high-performing storage servers reliabily carrying out proactive secret sharing
periodically. A performance scoring mechanism must be in place in order to provide
data owner with up to dated performance figures, so that they can select the storage
servers making up the distributed storage system accordingly. Then social secret
sharing can be instantiated to distribute more informative shares to the better
performing storage servers. However, as the performance of the storage servers
changes over time and so the aggregate performance scores assigned to them, current
social secret sharing solutions do not allow to modify the underlying secret sharing
scheme. Thus, it is not possible to modify the access rules nor to discard low-
performing storage servers and include better ones into the system. That is, current
solutions for social secret sharing-based distributed storage systems do not fully use
the performance scoring mechanism in place to enhance the confidentiality protection
of the data. We defined a new primitive, called adaptive social secret sharing, that
demands the usage of a dynamic secret sharing scheme to set up the distributed
storage system. This way, the flexibility needed to modify the access rules and
the set of storage servers is provided. We then instantiated this primitive by using
Shamir’s secret sharing scheme and Tassa’s hierarchical conjnctive and disjunctive
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secret sharing schemes, which are dynamic. In our instantiation, we also included
alarms that are triggered whenever instable states where the performance of the
storage servers is below a certain threshold are reached. This way, it is possible
to control when to reset the underlying secret sharing scheme. We show how our
instantiations outperform state of the art solutions for social secret sharing not only
in terms of the protection of confidentiality, but also in terms of storage consumption.
On the other hand, long-term protection of integrity of the data relies on checking
periodically that the shares stored into the storage servers are consistent with the
outsourced data. When the third party in charge of the auditing mechanism is
not trusted, then such auditing mechanism has to be privacy preserving too. The
third party auditing mechanisms presented so far either relied on encryption or
are suitable for a single-storage server setting. The auditing mechanism needed for
our setting should not only be privacy preserving in an information-theoretic sense,
but also should run for multiple storage servers. We provide the first auditable
mechanism for distributed storage systems that is information-theoretic private.
We first defined the syntax of auditable distributed storage systems and then we
provided two instantiations based on Shamir’s secret sharing scheme. One for a single
message and one for multiple messages from (possibly) multiple data owners. The
non-collusion assumptions and the homomorphic property of Shamir’s secret sharing
schemes allow to perform the auditing without compromising the confidentiality of
the data, provided that the auditor does not collude with more than a threshold
of storage servers. The auditing mechanism for distributed storage servers that
we proposed can also be adapted to a verifiable secret sharing scheme to prevent
malicious data owners from distributing to the storage servers inconsisten shares in
the first place.
As future work, we plan to implement both our instantiation for adaptive social
secret sharing and for auditable distributed storage systems. In particular, regarding
the third party auditing mechanism, we plan to investigate how the non-collusion
assumption of the auditor can be relaxed, while still relying on one third party
auditor and not many of them. In particular, we want to simulate the third party
auditor with a trusted execution environment to see how the auditing mechanism in
place can be simplified.
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5 Coalition-Resistant Performance Scor-
ing Mechanism for Long-Term Con-
fidentiality
As discussed more extensively in Chapter 1, the long-term confidentiality of data
outsourced to distributed storage systems relies in practice on high-performing
storage servers, reliably carrying out proactive secret sharing. The performance of
the storage servers varies over time, and data owners require guidance to select the
individual storage servers making up the distributed storage system. The performance
(understood in a broad sense, notably including reliability) of the individual SSPs
is the main criterion for inclusion in the distributed storage system. However,
data owners do not have access to comprehensive and comparable performance
figures for candidate storage servers. Data owners can be guided in their choice if
a trusted third party measures and publishes performance figures for the storage
servers. However, for a large number of storage servers and frequent measurements,
the workload becomes unwieldy for a single entity. Aggregated peer rating is an
alternative approach that distributes the workload. In this approach, the storage
servers involved in the distributed storage system provide mutual ratings for each
others’ performances based on the interactions they had with each other. However,
SSPs benefit commercially in having the storage servers they own included in the
distributed storage system of a data owner. They might as well benefit commercially
from enforcing the storage servers they own to provide selfish ratings for the other
storage servers to undermine competitors. Moreover, SSPs might even form coalitions
among themselves, making the selfish ratings issued by their storage servers even
more harming for the storage servers owned by other SSPs. Thus, the aggregate
scores computed through mere averaging the ratings are unreliable. Distributed
storage systems based on those aggregate scores might fail to successfully carry out
proactive secret sharing and, thus, put the confidentiality of the data at risk.
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Contribution
In this chapter, we provide the first performance scoring mechanism that outputs
aggregate scores within an accuracy interval, given that the SSPs are interested
in maximizing the amount of shares to store and given that the majority of the
storage servers are honest and submit accurate ratings. We show this by modeling
the performance scoring mechanism as a cooperative game with infinite rounds and
a trust authority as a mediator. The trust authority (from now on referred to as TA)
is responsible for collecting all the mutual ratings and penalizes the submitters of the
inaccurate ones, and proving that it reaches a k-Nash equilibrium. For each storage
server, at each round the performance scoring mechanism is run, its aggregate score
is computed as a combination of three terms. The first term is the weighted average
of the mutual ratings from the other storage servers. The second term is the average
of the penalties and incentives that the storage servers got for rating, respectively,
inaccurately and accurately the other storage servers. The third term of the aggregate
score of the storage server at the previous round the performance scoring mechanism
was run. The term leading to aggregate scores that are within the selected accuracy
interval with high probability is the second one, which exploits the income-driven
nature of commercial SSPs. In order to define how this second term is computed, we
formalize, for the first time, the computation of aggregate scores through mutual
ratings in distributed storage systems as an economic problem and provide a game-
theoretical model of the peer rating strategies of the storage servers and the SSPs.
In the framework of game theory, SSPs and, consequently, storage servers are seen
as rational agents trying to increase their utility by having high aggregate scores.
This second term, which decreases and increases the final aggregate scores, and the
fact that the storage servers do not know how many rounds the performance scoring
mechanism is run (i.e. it is modeled as an infinitely repeated game) are necessary to
output aggregate scores within the accuracy interval. We argue this by showing that,
without, the aggregate scores do not mirror the performance of the storage servers.
Furthermore, we provide an instantiation and an evaluation of the performance
scoring mechanism to show how, in practice, inaccurate ratings are detected and the
second term lowers the aggregate scores of the storage servers submitting inaccurate
ratings. The performance scoring mechanism instantiation uses machine learning
techniques to compute the above mentioned first term.
Contributions to this chapter come from papers [T5], [T6], and [T7]. My contribu-
tions in these works were the problem statement of rationals storage servers and the
confidentiality threats entailed, the formalization of the preferences and strategies of
storage servers through game theory, and the new performance scoring mechanism
modeled as an infinitely-repeated and incentivized game with a mediator.
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Outline
The outline of this chapter is as follows. Section 5.1 and Section 5.2 explain the
game-theoretic background necessary to define and use the second term of which
the aggregate scores computed by the performance scoring mechanism are composed
of. More precisely, in Section 5.1, we provide a formalization based on game-theory
of the strategies that storage servers may adopt when mutually rating each other
in a distributed storage system. In Section 5.2, we prove that performance scoring
mechanisms where accurate ratings are not incentivised and with a finite amount of
rounds output aggregate scores that are inconsistent with the actual performance of
the storage servers. Section 5.3 presents in detail the performance scoring mechanism
and how the three terms each aggregate score is composed of are defined. We prove
that this performance scoring mechanism output accurate aggregate scores even
when coalitions among the SSPs and the corresponding storage servers are formed,
provided an honest majority. In Section 5.4, we instantiate the performance scoring
mechanism by machine learning techniques and experimentally evaluate our findings.
In Section 5.5, we discuss related work with respect to evidence-based performance
scoring mechanisms, in particular the ones in peer-to-peer environments and using
machine learning techniques, and with respect to how rational players are tackled in
secet sharing schemes. Summary and future work can be found in Section 5.6.
5.1 Game Theoretic Model of Rating Strategies
We recall that the performance scoring mechanism presented in Section 5.3 computes
the aggregate scores of the storage servers as a convex combination of three terms.
The second term penalizes the submission of inaccurate ratings and of incentivizing
the submission of accurate ratings by, respectively, lowering and increasing the
value of the final aggregate scores. In this section, we present why lowering and
increasing the value of their aggregate scores is of crucial for the income-driven
storage servers and the SSPs they are owned by. For a storage server having a high
aggregate score compared to the other storage servers increases the chance to not
only be kept as part of the distributed storage system, but also to get multiple shares
distributed. Staying in the distributed storage system with as many storage servers
as possible and getting several shares to store and refresh means a higher utility for
the SSPs. Therefore, having high aggregate scores ultimately leads to a higher income.
In the following, in Section 5.1.1, we argue that the rational adversary model
is actually the one to be considered in this context and we compare it with the
traditional malicious adversary model. In Section 5.1.2, the formalization of the rating
strategies of the storage servers and SSPs according to game theory is presented.
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5.1.1 The Rational Adversary Model
For the computation of aggregate scores in secret sharing-based distributed storage
systems, the rational adversary is the one a performance scoring mechanism has to
cope with and, in the following, we motivate why this is the case.
The performance scoring mechanism that we envision for a secret sharing-based
distributed storage system is one based on peer-rating. That is, each storage server
is a trustor and a trustee at the same time (as defined in Section 2.3.1) as it issues
ratings to rate the other storage servers of the distributed storage system with respect
to a certain performance metric and is also rated in the same way by them. These
ratings are collected by a trusted third-party authority that processes them and
outputs the corresponding aggregate score for each of the storage servers. In this
context, an adversary is someone that prevents the performance scoring mechanism
in place from outputting accurate aggregate scores, i.e. aggregate scores that reflect
the performance of the storage severs according to a certain predetermined metric.
That means, an adversary can be any storage server of the distributed storage system
that issues inconsistent ratings with respect to the performance of the other storage
servers so that their final aggregate scores are inaccurate. We argue that the reason
behind this type of behavior is that the storage servers and the SSPs they are owned
by can benefit economically from issuing inconsistent ratings. More precisely, SSPs
are economical entities whose goal is staying in the marketplace for as long as possible
while maximizing their payoff at the same time. This is provided as long as the
storage servers owned by the SSPs are assigned to comparatively high aggregate
scores with respect to the aggregate scores assigned to the storage servers owned
by the competitors. Thus, for a SSP, attempting at lowering the aggregate scores
of storage servers owned by competitors and at increasing the aggregate scores of
the storage servers it own is a viable strategy to achieve the above mentioned goals.
Because the aggregate scores are computed by a performance scoring mechanism
based on peer-rating, a SSP can easily achieve this by enforcing the storage servers
to always issue very positive ratings when the storage servers to be rated are those it
owns and very negative ratings when the storage servers to be rated are those owned
by the competitors. We believe that this type of adversarial behavior is rational
rather than malicious because it is driven by economical purposes rather than by the
willingness to break the protection of the data outsourced to the secret sharing-based
distributed storage system.
The rational adversary model is similar to the usual malicious adversary model
because they might both jeopardize confidentiality and, more in general, the long-
term protection of the data outsourced to a secret sharing-based distributed storage
system. The difference is that jeopardizing the protection of the data is the primary
goal of a malicious adversary, which acts according to this. Instead, jeopardizing
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the protection of data is not the primary goal of a rational adversary, but can
end up being a byproduct of its strategy to increase its payoff. More precisely,
if a rational adversary is successful with the above mentioned strategy, then the
aggregate scores that the performance scoring mechanism outputs do not match the
performance of the storage servers they are assigned to. Therefore, a data owner
making up a secret sharing-based distributed storage system might select storage
servers that do have high aggregate scores assigned to, but that in reality are low
performing. This might entail a distributed storage systems that is not able to
carry out properly the protocols and algorithms inherent to a secret sharing-based
long-term storage system, such as the share renewal, putting the confidentiality of
the data at risk. However, the rational adversary model differs from the malicious
adversary model because the countermeasures that mitigate the latter do not work
with the former. More precisely, the countermeasures mitigating a malicious attacker
willing to break the protection of data outsourced to secret sharing-based distributed
storage system are of cryptographic nature. One of these is actually periodically
renewing the shares so that the the adversary does not have enough time to corrupt
enough storage servers so that to reconstruct the data by itself. However, this
solution does not work for a rational adversary because it does not prevent it from
submitting inconsistent ratings when the performance scoring mechanism is run.
That is why different countermeasures are needed to prevent a rational adversary to
accidentally jeopardize data protection. Because of the economic motivation driving
the actions of a rational adversary, game theory offers a natural framework where
such countermeasures can be designed.
5.1.2 Formalization
In game theory, the agents involved are referred to as players. In our scenario, the
players are the n SSPs involved in the distributed storage system. From now on,
we refer to those SSPs as players P1, . . . , Pn. Players P1, . . . , Pn are interested in
maximizing their economic return when they offer long-term storage to data owners
via a distributed storage system. This entails preferences with respect to the shares
that data owners may distribute or withdraw from them, depending on the aggregate
scores of players P1, . . . , Pn. In other words, the aim of players P1, . . . , Pn is to
increase over time the number of shares they store because this leads to greater
income.
In the following, we formalize the preferences of players P1, . . . , Pn with respect
to gaining or losing shares by defining relevant utility functions. Afterwards, we
formalize the preferences of these players with respect to their aggregate scores,
because gaining or losing a share depends on the aggregate score assigned to a player.
In particular, it depends on the comparison between the aggregate score of a player
and the aggregate scores of all other players. Further utility functions related to
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aggregate scores are defined for players P1, . . . , Pn.
We first formalize this scenario for non-cooperatives situations, where players
act individually. Then, we formalize this scenario for cooperative situations, where
players form coalitions among each other. Players in a coalition act in coordination
for mutual benefit.
In a non-cooperative setting, we denote by Ui(σ) the utility function of a player
Pi with respect to gaining or losing a share when the joint strategy is σ. The utility
function Ui(σ) is defined as follows.
U1) If player Pi gains a share, then Ui(σ) = 1.
U2) If player Pi neither gains nor loses a share, then Ui(σ) = 0.
U3) If player Pi loses a share, then Ui(σ) = −1.
Utility Ui(σ) is directly related to the economic pay-off of player Pi, because the
amount of shares players store and manage is proportional to their economic return.
However, the amount of shares gained or lost by players ultimately depends on the
given aggregate score. The data owner periodically checks the aggregate scores of
P1, . . . , Pn and accordingly arranges how the shares are distributed among them.
Periodically, the aggregate scores are updated through the aggregation of the
players’ mutual ratings. Let us denote by r the last round where the aggregate scores
are updated before the data owner checks them. We denote the aggregate scores
of players P1, . . . , Pn at round r by τ r1 , . . . , τ rn, where 0 ≤ τ ri ≤ 1, for i = 1, . . . , n.
Player Pi eventually gains a share if its aggregate score τ ri is high enough to convince
the data owner to do so. We formalize this idea of “high enough” as having an
aggregate score that is on average higher than all other aggregate scores. Vice versa,
having an aggregate score “low enough” to convince the data owner to withdraw a
share means that a player Pi is assigned an aggregate score τ ri that is on average
lower than the aggregate scores of all other players. We formalize this by defining the
utility function ui(r) with respect to the aggregate scores (where the joint strategy
σ is omitted for simplicity) of a player Pi as follows, for i = 1, . . . , n.
u1) If τ ri > 1n−1
∑n
j=1,j 6=i τ
r
j , then ui(r) = 1.
u2) If τ ri = 1n−1
∑n
j=1,j 6=i τ
r
j , then ui(r) = 0.
u3) If τ ri < 1n−1
∑n
j=1,j 6=i τ
r
j , then ui(r) = −1.
Utility ui(r) is not directly related to the economic pay-off of player Pi, because
having ui(r) = 1 at round r does not necessarily imply that one share is distributed
to player Pi. Also, even if its aggregate score is higher than all other aggregate scores
at a given round, it does not mean that all other aggregate scores are so low as to
convince the data owner to rearrange the shares’ distribution. However, consistently
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getting high aggregate scores is the only way to obtain additional shares. The output
of aggregate scores τ r1 , . . . , τ rn at round r is the result of a repeated non-cooperative
game among players P1, . . . , Pn of r rounds.
Instead, if players P1, . . . , Pn form coalitions, then the computation of the aggregate
scores τ r1 , . . . , τ rn at round r is the result of a repeated cooperative game of r rounds.
In this case, the pay-off from gaining shares is split among the members of a coalition.
Thus, the goal for player Pi is that at least one of his coalition partners gains a share
and none of them loses any share. We assume that each player belongs at most to
one coalition and that the coalitions are at most as numerous as the players, in which
case there will be no coalition because each player plays alone. For a coalition Ck,
we denote J = {j | Pj ∈ Ck ∧ Uj(σ) = 1}, and J ′ = {j′ | Pj′ ∈ Ck ∧ Uj′(σ) = −1}.
That is, we see the indexes of players in the coalition Ck as the union of two subsets,
J and J ′, where J are the indexes of the subsets of players in Ck that gained a share
and J ′ are the indexes of the subset of players in Ck that lost a share. The utility
function U ′i(σ) of player Pi ∈ Ck with respect to gaining or losing shares within the
coalition is defined as follows.
U1’) If ∑j∈J Uj(σ) > ∑j′∈J ′ Uj′(σ), then U ′i(σ) = 1.
U2’) If ∑j∈J Uj(σ) = ∑j′∈J ′ Uj′(σ), then U ′i(σ) = 0.
U3’) If ∑j∈J Uj(σ) < ∑j′∈J ′ Uj′(σ), then U ′i(σ) = −1.
In other words, utility U ′i(σ) for a player Pi ∈ Ck is positive if the amount of
players within coalition Ck that gained a share is greater than the amount of players
within Ck that lost a share. Vice versa, utility U ′i(σ) is negative if the amount of
players within coalition Ck that gained a share is smaller than the amount of players
within Ck that lost a share. The definition of utility U ′i(σ) with respect to shares
shapes the definition of utility u′i(r) with respect to the aggregate scores, mirroring
what holds for non-cooperative games. The goal of player Pi ∈ Ck is to maximize
the average of the aggregate scores assigned to the players within the same coalition.
That is, having a “high enough”aggregate score for a player Pi ∈ Ck means that
the average of the aggregate scores of the players within coalition Ck is higher than
the average of the aggregate scores of players outside Ck. Vice versa, having a “low
enough”aggregate score means that the average of the aggregate scores of the players
within coalition Ck is lower than the average of the aggregate scores of players outside
Ck. We denote M = {m | Pm ∈ Ck}, and L = {l | Pl /∈ Ck}. The utility function
ui(r) for a player Pi ∈ Ck with respect to aggregate scores, where coalition Ck has
cardinality nk, is defined as follows, for i = 1, . . . , n.
u1’) If 1
nk
∑
m∈M τ
r
m >
1
n−nk
∑
l∈L τ
r
l , then u′i(r) = 1.
u2’) If 1
nk
∑
m∈M τ
r
m = 1n−nk
∑
l∈L τ
r
l , then u′i(r) = 0.
u3’) If 1
nk
∑
m∈M τ
r
m <
1
n−nk
∑
l∈L τ
r
l , then u′i(r) = −1.
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We defined the utility of gaining and losing shares as, respectively, 1 and −1 for
the sake of simplicity. Instead, defining the utility of gaining or losing shares as the
number of, respectively, gained or lost shares is also possible but entails additional
formalism. In the remainder of this chapter, for simplicity, we use shorthand notation
such as i ∈ Ck to denote i ∈ {j | Pj ∈ Ck} (and similarly for i /∈ Ck).
As we have just discussed, a way to obtain more shares is to obtain a comparatively
high aggregate score. This can be achieved by behaving rationally (i.e., selfishly)
during the performance scoring mechanism. SSPs send potentially selfish mutual
ratings to the TA. The TA collects these ratings and computes the aggregate scores.
Based on them, the data owner distributes the shares to high-performing SSPs.
As mentioned earlier, we use performance in a broad sense, including qualities
such as reliability. The performance metric used in practice is independent of our
model and results. We formalize this distributed storage system scenario through a
game-theoretic perspective modelling the rating strategies of the SSPs.
5.2 Score Inaccuracy of Unincentivised Ratings
In this section, we show why a naive approach with finite amount of rounds and
where accurate ratings are not incentivised and inaccurate ratings are not penalized
leads to the computations of aggregate scores that do not match the actual perfor-
mance of the storage servers. As we have already anticipated, by taking into account
the rationality of the players formalized in Section 5.1, the performance scoring
mechanism presented in Section 5.3 is modelled as an incentivised and infinitely
repeated game. We recall that the incentives and penalties are given to the storage
servers through the second term which each aggregate score is composed of.
We now show that an unincentivised performance scoring mechanism (which does
not reward accuracy) with a finite number of rounds does not yield accurate aggregate
scores. In an unincentivised performance scoring mechanism, the TA computes the
aggregate score of player Pi by simply taking into account the rating that each player
Pj 6=i gives for player Pi, for i = 1, . . . , n. The TA computes the aggregate scores
through these ratings (usually by averaging them) and outputs them to the data
owner upon request. On the basis of those aggregate scores, the data owner decides
whether to rearrange the distribution of the shares and whether to exclude players
from the distributed storage system. However, the unincentivised aggregation and
average of these ratings do not lead to accurate aggregate scores. In the following,
we show this both when single players issue selfish ratings (Section 5.2.1) and when
they form coalitions (Section 5.2.2).
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5.2.1 Score Inaccuracy in Non-Cooperative Games
If the aggregate scores are computed through repeated non-cooperative games, the
players P1, . . . , Pn do not form coalitions. Thus, here, selfish ratings means that
players are giving low ratings even to high-performing players. The data owner
checks the aggregate scores τ r1 , . . . , τ rn, at round, say, r. It is known to all players that
r is the last round the performance scoring mechanism is run before the data owner
eventually reallocates the shares. We denote by τ r′1 , . . . , τ r
′
n the aggregate scores of
players P1, . . . , Pn at round r′, which occurs strictly earlier than round r, and assume
without loss of generality that τ r′1 ≥ · · · ≥ τ r′n . We assume that the aggregate score
τ r
′
i of player Pi is the tth highest score. Player Pi can choose one among the following
(mixed) strategies:
σ1) At all rounds, give low ratings to all other players Pj 6=i.
σ2) At all rounds, give low ratings to the players P1, . . . , Pt−1 with the 1st, 2nd, . . . ,
(t− 1)th highest aggregate scores τ r′1 ≥ · · · ≥ τ r′t−1.
σ3) From round r′ on, give low ratings to all other players Pj 6=i.
σ4) From round r′ on, give low ratings to players P1, . . . , Pt−1 with the 1st, 2nd, . . . ,
(t− 1)th highest aggregate scores τ r′1 ≥ · · · ≥ τ r′t−1.
σ5) Always give ratings reflecting the actual measured performance of all other
players Pj 6=i.
Theorem 5.1 shows that strategy σ1 weakly dominates all other strategies for each
player Pi when the goal is to maximize its aggregate score τ ri at round r.
Theorem 5.1. Let u1, . . . , un be the utilities of, respectively, players P1, . . . , Pn
satisfying u1)–u3) when the aggregate scores τ r1 , . . . , τ rn at last round r are computed.
Then, σ1 weakly dominates all other available strategies, i.e. ui(σ′i,σ−i) ≤ ui(σ1,σ−i),
for σ′i 6= σ1 and i = 1, . . . , n.
We first outline the structure of the proof. In short, we first show that strategy σ1
is weakly dominant for player Pi with the t-th highest aggregate score τ r
′
i . This is
due to the fact that each other player Pj 6=i is assumed to be rational as well and
strategy σ1 has to be played by player Pi to contrast the undermining effect of all
other players. Second, it is proven that this holds even for the case where player Pi
has the lowest aggregate score or the highest aggregate score.
We now formally prove Theorem 5.1 by showing that strategy σ1 always dominates
a less selfish strategy in the following three steps.
If Pi is given the tth highest aggregate score τ r
′
i by the TA at round r′ < r,
then we have τ r′i ≤ τ r′j , for j = 1, . . . , t − 1. Depending on the aggregate scores
τ r
′
1 , . . . , τ
r′
t−1 and on t, u1), u2), u3) can all occur. In particular, if either u2) or u3)
occurs, then utility ui(r′) 6= 1. A way for player Pi to prevent this is to attempt to
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lower the aggregate scores of players P1, . . . , Pt−1 from round r′ + 1 on to increase
the chances that u1) occurs at the final round r. That is, strategy σ4 is for player
Pi weakly dominant with respect to σ5, assuming player Pj 6=i plays strategy σ5.
Furthermore, the more rounds player Pi gives low ratings for players P1, . . . , Pt−1,
the more their aggregate scores decrease over time and, thus, the higher the chance
that u1) occurs at round r. A weakly dominant strategy for player Pi is to start
giving low ratings as early as possible and thus σ2 weakly dominates σ4, assuming
player Pj 6=i plays σ5. Getting the tth highest aggregate score means that player Pi
is the tth best-performing player and that player Pj 6=i played σ5. In case player
Pj 6=i plays a strategy other than σ5, then player Pi might be given by the TA an
aggregate score lower than the tth highest aggregate score τ r′i , which increases the
chances that u3) occurs. Strategy σ5 is weakly dominated by σ2 and σ4 for players
Pt+1, . . . , Pn, which are, respectively, given the lowest aggregate scores τ r
′
t+1, . . . , τ
r′
n .
Hence players Pt+1, . . . , Pn give low ratings for players P1, . . . , Pt, including player
Pi itself. In order to compensate low ratings from worse-performing players, player
Pi has to give low ratings for players Pt+1, . . . , Pn as well. However, because player
Pi already plays σ2, it eventually assigns low ratings to each player Pj 6=i. In case
players Pt+1, . . . , Pn play σ4, then player Pi can respond by playing σ3. However,
to maximize the desired effect, it is more effective for player Pi to give low ratings
as soon as possible. Thus, it plays σ1. In conclusion, player Pi plays σ1 because
this increases the chances that, at round r, u1) occurs and ui(r) = 1. Therefore, σ1
weakly dominates σ2− σ5.
If Pi is given the lowest aggregate score τ r
′
i by the TA at round r′ < r, then
τ r
′
i < τ
r′
j , for each player Pj 6=i. Thus, u3) occurs for player Pi. In order to avoid
this, a possible option for player Pi is to try to lower the aggregate scores of all the
players that are given higher aggregate scores, which means to give low ratings for
player Pj 6=i from round r′ + 1 on. Thus, σ3, which in this case is identical to σ4,
weakly dominates σ5. However, in order to decrease the probability of u3) to occur,
it is better for player Pi to give low ratings to all other players as early as possible.
Thus σ1 weakly dominates σ3. Since σ1 is here identical to σ2, σ1 weakly dominates
σ2 (by Definition 2.12). Due to the transitivity of weak strategy dominance, σ1 also
weakly dominates σ5. In conclusion, player Pi plays σ1 regardless of what each other
player Pj 6=i plays because σ1 weakly dominates σ2− σ5. This case where player Pi is
the worst-performing player can be obtained by induction from 1) where Pi is given
the tth highest aggregate score, with t increasing towards n.
If Pi is given the highest aggregate score τ r
′
i by the TA at round r′ < r, then
τ r
′
i > τ
r′
j , where player Pj 6=i played σ5. So for player Pi, sticking to σ5 is sufficient for
u1) to occur at round r. However, for the same reasons discussed in 1), player Pj 6=i
is rational and gives low ratings to the players given higher aggregate scores, which
always includes player Pi. Thus, u1) is unlikely to occur. To balance out this effect,
player Pi’s can give low ratings to the lower performing players, which in this case
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means to give low ratings to all other players. Thus, player Pi plays σ3. However,
for reasons discussed in 1), σ1 weakly dominates σ3 in case each other player Pj 6=i
plays σ2 rather than σ4. In conclusion, if player Pi is given the highest aggregate
score, then σ1 weakly dominates σ2− σ5.
Because the above analysis can be applied to each player Pi, for i = 1, . . . , n, we
conclude that strategy σ1 weakly dominates strategy σ2−σ5 for all players P1, . . . , Pn.
Thus, ui(σ′i,σ−i) ≤ ui(σ1,σ−i), for σ′i 6= σ1 and i = 1, . . . , n. 
Since each player Pi plays strategy σ1, and thus gives low ratings to each other
player Pj 6=i at all rounds, the following corollary ensues.
Theorem 5.2. When computed through unincentivised ratings, the aggregate scores
τ r1 , . . . , τ
r
n the data owner checks at last round r are inaccurate, i.e. they do not
describe the actual performance of, respectively, players P1, . . . , Pn.
In particular, in this case where no coalitions are formed, all aggregate scores
τ r1 , . . . , τ
r
n are low. In terms of SSPs and shares, the data owner might believe that
all SSPs are underperforming and eventually withdraw all shares from all SSPs. This
implies that Ui(r) = −1, for i = 1, . . . , n, which is the worst possible situation for an
SSP.
5.2.2 Score Inaccuracy in Cooperative Games
In a performance scoring mechanism modelled as a cooperative game, players can
form coalitions to cooperatively obtain high aggregate scores and coordinate on
players to undermine. Here, selfish rating means that players give high ratings
to coalition partners and low ratings to all other players, regardless of the actual
witnessed performance. The strategies a player Pi can adopt combine the strategies
listed in Section 5.2.1 with the possibility of increasing the aggregate scores of fellow
coalition members by giving them high ratings. As for Theorem 5.1, one can show
that the weakly dominant strategy (adapted from σ1) is the one where each player
simultaneously gives high ratings to fellow coalition members and low ratings to all
other players at all rounds. The proof, omitted here due to space constraints, is
similar to the one of Theorem 5.1. Thus, Corollary 5.2 holds also for the case where
coalitions among players are formed.
Theorem 5.1 and Corollary 5.2 state the impossibility of getting accurate aggregate
scores in unincentivised and finitely repeated games. They mirror the impossibil-
ity result for rational secret sharing presented in [59]. The performance scoring
mechanism described in this section is a finitely repeated game because all players
know that round r is the last one. However, the same impossibility result holds for
infinitely repeated games, where it is unknown to the players that round r is the last
one. The proof of Theorem 5.1 is not tied to round r because it is weakly dominant
for the players to play strategy σ1 as soon as possible. This is true in particular when
players do not know which round is the final one, because they possibly have even
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less chances to cope with undermining ratings of the other players. This problem
is solved in the next section, where it is shown that in order to obtain accurate
aggregate scores, the performance scoring mechanism has to be modelled both as an
incentivised and infinitely repeated game.
5.3 Score Accuracy for Incentivized Ratings: A
Performance Scoring Mechanism Resilient to
Coalitions
In this section, we present in details the main contribution of this chapter. That is a
performance scoring mechanism that outputs aggregate scores within an accuracy
interval with high probability, given that the players involved are rational agents
interested in maximizing their payoff by maximizig their aggregate scores and
assuming that half of them behave honestly. We have already anticipated that the
aggregate scores are computed as the convex combination of three terms. It is the
second of these terms that exploits the rationality of the players (formalized through
the definitions of their utilities and preferences in Section 5.1) and encourages the
players to submit accurate ratings by incentivizing them and penalizing the inaccurate
ones. The performance scoring is modelled as a game that is incentivized because of
the presence of this second term. Furthermore, the performance scoring mechanism
can be seen as an infinitely repeated game for the storage servers. This is due to the
fact that the storage servers do not know after how many rounds the performance
scoring mechanism is run before issuing the updated aggregate scores. Otherwise,
they could rate inaccurately without consequence, as shown in Section 5.2.
The following assumptions hold:
Assumption 1. A coalition can be formed by the storage servers owned by one
or multiple SSPs and when these SSPs collude then all the storage servers they own
are part of that coalition.
Assumption 2. A storage server can belong to at most one coalition.
Assumption 3. The behavior of storage servers is assumed to be consistent
among all storage servers. That is, a storage server does not choose to behave
differently according to the provenance of the storage servers it is interacting with.
On the contrary, a storage server may submit dishonest evidence for other storage
servers according to their provenance.
Assumption 4. All evidence is submitted to a central TA responsible for com-
puting the aggregate performance scores from the ratings. The TA is always honest
and does not tamper with the evidence.
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Assumptionw 1-3 emphasize the fact that what we focus on here is coping with the
possibility of unreliable evidence (i.e. unreliable ratings) submitted by storage servers
with the aim of maximizing the overall trustworthiness of the SSP they belong to.
5.3.1 A New Performance Scoring Mechanism
We design a performance scoring mechanism modelled as an incentivised, infinitely
repeated, and cooperative4 game with a mediator (the TA). Each round of the repeated
game consists of running a performance scoring mechanism distributedly. The TA
runs the performance scoring mechanism at random intervals, independently of
the intervals in which share renewal for proactive secret sharing is performed. We
emphasise that the performance scoring mechanism is entirely separate from the
proactive secret sharing operations (such as share renewal), which are performed
as usual. The players do not know how many rounds the performance scoring
mechanism is run before the data owner checks the aggregate scores. Thus, even if
the performance scoring mechanism is run a finite amount of times, it can be modelled
as an infinitely repeated game. This enables the TA to not only collect and processes
ratings, but also encourages the submission of accurate ratings and penalizes the
players submitting selfish ratings. This allows the definition of a strategy leading
to a k-Nash equilibrium and pushes the players to follow it, because incentives and
penalties, respectively, positively and negative influence the final aggregate score of
the players.
We now provide a high-level description of our performance scoring mechanism.
Each aggregate score τ ri at round r is computed by the performance scoring mechanism
as a convex combination of a first component τ ′i , a second component τ
′′
i , and a third
component τ r−1i , for i = 1, . . . , n. The first component τ ′i is computed through steps
1)–3) of the mechanism and is the aggregate score of all ratings submitted by all
players for the player being rated for the current round r. The second component τ ′′i
is computed through steps 4)–6) of the mechanism and is the aggregate score of all
incentives and penalties given to player Pi by the TA for, respectively, the accurate
and selfish ratings submitted for the current round r. For the first and the second
component, the round r is omitted to simplify notation. The third component τ r−1i is
the aggregate score of player Pi at the previous round r − 1. Thus, it was previously
computed and is an input of the performance scoring mechanism run at the current
round r. The third component keeps track of the evolution of the performance of
a player over time and increasingly rewards good performance and penalizes poor
performance. The final aggregate score τ ri at round r is computed during step 7) of
the mechanism.
We now show how to compute the aggregate scores τ r1 , . . . , τ rn at round r for players
4It is sufficient to model the mechanism as a cooperative game, because non-cooperative games
are a particular case where coalitions have only one player each.
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P1, . . . , Pn, where round r is not necessarily the round where the data owner checks
the aggregate scores. We defined each aggregate score τ ri as a real number between
0 and 1, i.e. 0 ≤ τ ri ≤ 1 for i = 1, . . . , n. The same holds for the first and the
second component denoted by, respectively, τ ′i and τ
′′
i , and for the aggregate score
τ r−1i of player Pi at round r − 1. The rating submitted by player Pi to evaluate
player Pj for the computation of its aggregate score τ rj is denoted by ρri,j, where
0 ≤ ρri,j ≤ 1. We denote by τ ′1, . . . , τ ′n the targeted first components, i.e. they are the
first components τ ′1, . . . , τ ′n when computed through ratings that perfectly match the
actual performance of players P1, . . . , Pn, respectively. We now provide a definition
of accurate ratings.
Definition 5.3. Let τ ′1, . . . , τ ′n be the targeted first components of the aggregate
scores of players P1, . . . , Pn and let tε > 0. A rating ρri,j submitted by player Pi to
evaluate player Pj is called tε-accurate if τ ′i − tε ≤ ρri,j ≤ τ ′i + tε. We refer to tε as
the accuracy threshold. In cases where tε is clear from the context, we simply write
accurate.
The accuracy of the ratings leads to accurate first components τ ′1, . . . , τ ′n, which
in turn (as we discuss in detail later) leads to accurate aggregate scores τ1, . . . , τn.
Clearly, the accuracy of the first component τ ′j depends on how many accurate ratings
ρri,j were submitted from all the other players Pi 6=i. In other words, the accuracy of
the first component depends on the ratio between the accurate ratings submitted
by honest players and inaccurate ratings submitted by colluding rational players.
Supposing that all colluding players form a unique coalition in order to maximize
their effect, then what is the biggest coalition tolerated? This is what we investigate
in the following, starting from the definition of weight.
Definition 5.4. Let us denote by Pj a player whose first component τ ′j has to be
computed. The weight wri,j with respect to this computation that a player Pi 6=j has by
submitting rating ρri,j is defined as:
wri,j :=
τ r−1i∑
l 6=j τ
r−1
l
, (5.1)
where ∑i 6=j wri,j = 1. Note that weight wri,i is implicitly undefined because player Pi
cannot rate itself.Let us denote by Ck a coalition of cardinality k of players P1, . . . , Pk
(relabelling the players if necessary, without loss of generality). Denoted by wrj,Ck , the
weight of a coalition Ck with respect to the computation of the first component τ ′j of
player Pj is defined as:
wrj,Ck :=
∑
i∈Ck
wi,j, (5.2)
if player Pj /∈ Ck. Instead, if player Pj ∈ Ck, then wrj,Ck is defined as:
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wrj,Ck :=
∑
i∈Ck,i 6=j
wi,j. (5.3)
The weight wrj,Ck of a coalition Ck determines how much this coalition affects the
final trust value τ rj of player Pj. What we want to determine here is the biggest
weight that a coalition can have with respect to all the other players so that the final
trust value τ rj of player Pj is still accurate. To formalize this we introduce Definition
5.5 and Definition 5.6.
Definition 5.5. Let wrj,Ck be the weight of a coalition Ck with respect to the compu-
tation of the first component τ ′j of a player Pj at round r. The maximal weight of
coalition Ck is denoted by wrCk and defined as:
wrCk := max1≤j≤nw
r
j,Ck
. (5.4)
Definition 5.6. A coalition Ck is called admissible with respect to the computation
of the aggregate score τ rj of player Pj if the inaccurate ratings ρr1,j, . . . , ρrk,j submitted
by players P1, . . . , Pk ∈ Ck do not affect the accuracy of the aggregate score τ rj , i.e.
τ ′i − tε ≤ τ rj ≤ τ ′j + tε.
We now present the performance scoring mechanism with the TA as a mediator for
the computation of the aggregate scores τ r1 , . . . , τ rn of players P1, . . . , Pn at round r.
1) The TA selects integers a, b, c > 0 such that a+ b+ c = 1. These are the weights
associated to τ ′i , τ
′′
i , τ
r−1
i , respectively, for the computation of the aggregate score
τi at round r. These weights are chosen by the TA depending on whether it is
considered more important to be high-performing at the current round or to
have a consistent performance over time. They will be used in the computation
of the aggregate score in step 7).
2) The TA receives ratings ρrj,i from each player Pj 6=i to evaluate player Pi. In
case the TA does not receive all the expected ratings, it broadcasts a complaint
message and aborts the protocol. This is to make sure that all players participate
at each round and that no player can benefit from not submitting a rating.
3) The TA computes the first component τ ′i for player Pi as follows:
τ ′i =
∑
j 6=i
wrj,i · ρrj,i. (5.5)
It computes all first components τ ′1, . . . , τ ′n before continuing.
4) The TA selects the incentive α, with 1
η
tε < α ≤ tε and the penalty β, with
−tε ≤ β < − 1η tε, where η > 0 is a scalar. Incentive α and penalty β are defined
in this way to, respectively, raise and lower the aggregate score of a player as
much as possible while remaining within the accuracy interval (Definition 5.3).
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This way, α and β shift the aggregate score, respectively, above and below the
score corresponding to the performance while still providing a description of the
performance itself.
5) The TA computes the second partial score τ ′′i for player Pi as τ
′′
i = 1n−1
∑n−1
j=1 oi,j ,
where oi,j is defined as follows:
oi,j =

α, if |τ ′j − ρri,j| ≤ tε
0, if tε < |τ ′j − ρri,j| ≤ 2tε
β if |τ ′j − ρri,j| > 2tε
(5.6)
According to Definition 5.3, a tε-accurate rating ρri,j varies around the targeted
first partial score τ ′j, which is only a reference point. A tε-accurate first compo-
nent τ ′j may shift the centre of the accuracy interval above or below τ ′j . A rating
accurate with respect to the targeted first component τ ′j has to be compared to
the computed first component τ ′j now. Thus, rating ρri,j might be at distance
greater than tε from τ ′j, while still being accurate. Hence we considered above
three cases instead of two, where in the second case the rating is considered
neutral. The performance scoring mechanism is run multiple times before the
data owner checks the aggregate scores. When this is iterated several times, as
in a repeated game, the penalties and incentives based on a misleading accuracy
interval are balanced out and mitigate the eventual misrepresentation of τ ′′.
6) The TA computes the aggregate score τ ri of player Pi at round r as τ ri =
a · τ ′i + b · τ ′′i + c · τ r−1i .
We have seen in Step 6) of the performance scoring mechanism presented above
that the aggregate score τ ri of player Pi computed at round r depends on the aggregate
score τ r−1i at round r − 1. That means, recursively, that the aggregate score of a
player at the current round r depends on all the aggregate scores that that player was
assigned to in all the previous rounds. We chose to defined the aggregate score τ ri at
round r like that because in our use case we have to store data safely for lengthy
periods of time and so we are interested in a steady and consistent behavior of the
players involved. This way of defining the aggregate scores gives us a hint of the
value of the targeted first component τ ′i. The targeted first component τ ′i represents
the value that matches exactly the performance of player Pi at round r, which is of
course unknown. However, assuming that at the previous rounds r − 1, r − 2, . . . , 1
the aggregate scores τ r−1i , τ r−2, . . . , 1 were accurate, i.e. the there were no coalitions
of rational players that were not admissible, it is possible to compute an estimation
of the targeted first component τ ′i at round r. We refer to this estimated value as τ˜ ′i
and we define it as follows:
τ˜ ′i :=
r−1∑
`=1
cr−`τ r−`i , (5.7)
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where c < 1 is the weight used in Step 6) of the performance scoring mechanism to
compute the aggregate score τ ri at round r. The definition of the estimated targeted
first component τ˜ ′i is aligned with how the aggregate score τ ri is computed, because
it takes into account all the aggregate scores at the previous rounds where the latest
rounds are the most prominent ones. Given the estimated targeted first component,
we defined the weight bound εr as follows.
Definition 5.7. Given the estimated targeted first components τ˜ ′1, . . . , τ˜ ′n at round
r of player P1, . . . , Pn and the accuracy threshold tε, the weight bound with respect
to the computation of the aggregate scores τ r1 , . . . , τ rn to be computed at round r is
denoted by εr and defined as:
εr :=

min1≤j≤n tετ˜ ′j , if τ˜
′
j ≥ 0.5
min1≤j≤n tε1−τ˜ ′j , if τ˜
′
j < 0.5
(5.8)
We present a strategy σi for player Pi ∈ Ck to use when the performance scoring
mechanism is run to compute the aggregate scores τ r1 , . . . , τ rn of players P1, . . . , Pn at
round r. This strategy takes into account the weight bound εr and provides criteria
for player Pi to decide whether to submit an accurate rating ρri,j for player Pj 6=i, and
it holds for any formed coalition Ck.
a) Player Pi ∈ Ck submits to the TA an accurate rating ρri,j for player Pj if
wj,Ck ≤ εr.
b) Otherwise, it submits a selfish rating ρri,j to the TA.
5.3.2 Resilience Against Coalitions
Let us denote by Γ(Pi, σi, u′i), for i = 1, . . . , n, the repeated game, where at every
round the performance scoring mechanism described in Section 5.3.1 is run and
where player Pi has utility u′(r) (see Section 5.1) and plays strategy σi defined
in Section 5.3.1, for i = 1, . . . , n. We now prove that game Γ(Pi, σi, u′i) can cope
with any coalition Ck whose weight is bounded by the weight bound εr. That is, it
computes accurate aggregate scores even if a coalition Ck of players P1, . . . , Pk with
wj,Ck ≤ εr submits selfish ratings ρ1,j, . . . , ρk,j to rate player Pj. We assume that
there is only one coalition Ck and that the players that are outside this coalition are
therefore honest and submit accurate ratings. This assumption does not weaken our
result. In fact, it strengthens it because one can assume that multiple coalitions are
formed that in order to maximise their effect collude altogether to form Ck. We also
assume that the majority of the players is honest.
Theorem 5.8. Let the infinitely repeated cooperative game Γ(Pi, σi, u′i), for i =
1, . . . , n be run at round r to compute aggregate scores τ r1 , . . . , τ rn, where u1’)–u3’)
are satisfied. Furthermore, let tε > 0 be the accuracy threshold and εr the weight
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bound. Let Ck with cardinality k be the largest coalition that is formed among the
players P1, . . . , Pn. If wCk ≤ εr, then the game reaches a k-resilient equilibrium with
respect to the computation of the aggregate scores τ r1 , . . . , τ rn. That is, coalition Ck is
admissible for each aggregate score τ rj to be computed, for j = 1, . . . , n.
Proof. What we need to show is that above condition on the maximum weight
wCk of coalition Ck implies the accuracy of the first component τ ′j of player Pj, for
j = 1′ . . . , n. The accuracy of the aggregate score τ rj follows from the accuracy of
the first component. The second component τ”j boosts or lowers by definition the
aggregate score to be computed so that to encourage that the first component is
computed accurately. Also, we assume that the aggregate score τ r−1j is accurate (see
Definition 5.7).
First of all, the assumption that wCk ≤ εr holds for every player Pj that the players
in coalition Ck evaluate. More precisely, by definition of maximum weight wCk we
have that:
εr ≥ wCk ≥ wj,Ck , ∀Pj. (5.9)
This means that option a) of strategy σi is always verified and, thus, that player
Pi 6=j chooses to submit accurate ratings ρri,j to the TA. Now we need to prove that
the weight bound εr allows to compute accurate aggregate scores and we want to
prove that regardless of the ratings submitted to be as general as possible. That is,
we do not prove the accuracy of the aggregate scores as dependent of the ratings
submitted and so we investigate the wost case scenario.
Let us assume that the first component τ ′j of player Pj /∈ Ck has to be computed and
that the estimated targeted first component τ˜ ′j is 1, i.e. it is assumed that player Pj is
high-performing, and that coalition Ck of players P1, . . . , Pk with weight, respectively,
wr1,j, . . . , w
r
k,j works against player Pj. In the worst case scenario, players P1, . . . , Pk
submit the lowest possible ratings for player Pj, that is ρr1,j = ρr2,j = · · · = ρrk,j = 0.
Instead, each player P` /∈ Ck behaves honestly and submits rating ρ`,j = τ˜ ′j = 1.
According to Definition 5.7, this means that εr = tε
τ˜ ′j
and that the following holds.
|τ ′j − τ˜ ′j| = |
∑
i∈Ck
wri,jρ
r
i,j +
∑
`/∈Ck
wr`,jρ
r
`,j − τ˜ ′j|
= |wj,Ck
∑
i∈Ck
ρri,j + (1− wj,Ck)
∑
`/∈Ck
ρr`,j − τ˜ ′j|
= |(1− wj,Ck)τ˜ ′j − τ˜ ′j|
= wj,Ck τ˜ ′j
≤ wCk τ˜ ′j
≤ εrτ˜ ′j
= tε.
(5.10)
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This means that the weight bound εr on wCk implies that |τ ′j − τ˜ ′j| ≤ tε. Thus,
with high probability, that τ ′j − tε ≤ τ rj ≤ τ ′j + tε, i.e. that the aggregate score τ rj
computed is accurate with respect to the targeted first component τ˜ ′j, i.e. with the
actual performance of the storage server. Similarly, one can prove that Equation
(5.10) holds for εr = tε
τ˜ ′j
for the opposite worst case scenario, where τ˜ ′j is 0 and the
players within coalition Ck work in favor of player Pj and submit rating ρri,j = 1.
We considered the two worst case scenarios where the rating ρri,j submitted by a
player Pi ∈ Ck can be the most distant from the estimated targeted first component
τ˜ ′j (or the targeted first component τ ′j). Rating ρri,j maximizes the weight of the
coalition with respect the computation of the first component τ ′j and thus the accuracy
of the aggregate score of all the other intermediate cases where 0 < τ˜ ′j < 1 holds
automatically.
This concludes our proof because by assumption it holds that coalition Ck is
admissible with respect to the computation of all aggregate scores τ r1 , . . . , τ rn and,
thus, player Pi ∈ Ck never deviates from strategy σi, otherwise it will be detected
and penalized according to the performance scoring mechanism described as the
infinitely repeated cooperative game Γ(Pi, σi, u′i), for i = 1, . . . , n. 
5.4 Machine Learning-Based Instantiation of the
Performance Scoring Mechanism
In this section, we present an instantiation of the performance scoring mechanism
described in Section 5.3.1 followed by extensive evaluations that experimentally
validate that the performance scoring mechanism tolerates coalitions of players
submitting inaccurate ratings. We recall that the aggregate score τ ri of player Pi
at round r is computed as the convex combination of a first component τ ′i that
averages the rating ρri,j submitted by player Pj 6=i, a second component τ ′′i evaluating
how accurate are the ratings ρrj,i submitted by player Pi to evaluate player Pj 6=i,
and the aggregate score τ r−1i of player Pi at round r − 1. While the computation of
the second component τ ′′i is standard, devising what is the first component τ ′i from
the ratings submitted by player Pj 6=i is less obvious. To do that we use machine
learning techniques that allow distinguish so called classes of accuracy among the
ratings submitted so that these can be weighted accordingly for the computation
of the first component. This section is organized as follows. In Section 5.4.1 we
survey the machine learning techniques that we use to compute the first component
τ ′i of the aggregate score τ ri for player Pi. In Section 5.4.2, we present how the
aforementioned machine learning techniques are used to compute the first component
τ ′i . In Section 5.4.3, we show how the second component τ ′′i is computed, focusing on
how incentives and penalties for, respectively, accurate and inaccurate ratings are
selected. Extensive evaluations of the performance scoring mechanism using machine
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learning techniques to compute the first component τ ′i can be found in Section 5.4.4.
We recall that both the instantiation of the performance scoring mechanism and the
evaluation relies on Assumption 1, Assumption 2, Assumption 3, and Assumption 4
described in Section 5.3.
5.4.1 Used Machine Learning Techniques Description
In this section, we review the machine learning technique of K-means clustering.
Note that for the definition of this technique, as well as for the definition of the
technique of mixture of Gaussians in the next section, we refer to [16].
5.4.1.1 K-Means Clustering
Let us define a data set S = {S1, . . . , Sn} of n points in a D-dimensional Euclidean
space, with Si = (x1i , . . . , xDi), for i = 1, . . . , n. The K-means clustering is the
problem of grouping these points into K clusters C1, . . . , CK . These clusters are
identified such that the distances of points within the same cluster are smaller
than the distances to points outside the cluster. This means that together with
the clusters C1, . . . , CK , so called center points M1, . . . ,MK are identified, where
Mj = (x1j , . . . , xDj), for j = 1, . . . , K. Each center point Mj satisfies the property
that the sum of the squares of the distances of each data point Pi to the closest
point Mj is a minimum. This concept can be formalized by the so called distortion
measure J , an objective function defined as follows:
J =
n∑
i=1
K∑
j=1
ri,j||Pi −Mj||2,
where ||Pi−Mj|| is the distance between points Pi,Mj and where ri,j = 1 if point Pi
is assigned to cluster Cj and ri,l = 0 for l 6= j. Thus, the K-means clustering problem
consists of finding values ri,j and centers Mj, for i = 1, . . . , n and j = 1, . . . , K,
such that the distortion measure J is minimized. This is achieved by means of so
called EM algorithms, consisting of an expectation step E, where the values ri,j are
adjusted, and a maximization step M, where, instead, the points Mj are adjusted. In
fact, the distortion measure J can be minimized through multiple iterations, where
after each iteration an expectation step and a maximization step are performed. A
concrete instantiation of the above strategy can be found in [16] and [79]. Details
about how to make this K-means clustering more efficient can be found in [94] and
[82].
5.4.1.2 Mixture of Gaussians
We review the machine learning technique of mixture of Gaussians. This technique
is meant to model real data set S = {S1, . . . , Sn} of points, which otherwise could
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not be fully described by a single Gaussian distribution. Consider K Gaussian
distributionsN1(µ1, σ21), . . . ,NK(µK , σ2K), where µi is the mean and σ2i is the variance,
for i = 1, . . . , K. Denoted by p(PS), a mixture of Gaussians with respect to data
set S is defined as a linear combinations of the given Gaussian distributions:
p(S) =
K∑
j=1
pijN (µj, σ2j ),
where each GaussianN (µj, σ2j ) is said a component of the mixture and each parameter
pij is the respective mixing coefficient. In addition, if
∑K
j=1 pij = 1, then also
p(S) is a probability distribution. It is possible to find a Gaussian distribution
NS(µ, σ2) computed as the approximation of the mixture of Gaussians p(S). That
is, distribution NS(µ, σ2) is the closest distribution to p(S) that is not a mixture of
Gaussians, according to the Kullback-Leibler distance (see [74]). The mean µ and
the variance σ2 of NS(µ, σ2) can be easily computed as:
µ =
K∑
j=1
pijµj and σ2 =
K∑
j=1
pij(σ2j + µ2j)− µ2,
where pi1, . . . , piK correspond to the mixing coefficients of the mixture of Gaussians
p(S), as described in [108].
For the sake of readability, we summarize in Table 5.1 the notations that follow
throughout the rest of the section.
5.4.2 Computation of the First Component τ ′i
This section describes how the first component τ ′i of the aggregate score τ ri of player
Pi at round r is computed, which takes into account the ratings submitted by all
players Pj 6=i. The computation of the first component τ ′i is performed in an Euclidean
space of dimension D = 2. For readability, we divide this computation into steps.
5.4.2.1 Collection of the evidence
Each player Pj submits point Sj,i = (xSj,i , ySj,i) to rate player Pi to the TA. The first
coordinate of point Sj,i is xSj,i = τ r−1j , where 0 ≤ τ r−1j ≤ 1 is the aggregate score of
player Pj at round r − 1. The second coordinate of point Sj,i is ySj,i = ρj,i, where
0 ≤ ρj,i ≤ 1 is the rating submitted by player Pj to rate player Pi.
5.4.2.2 Representation of τ ′i
Since the ratings with respect to the performance of player Pi is represented as a value
between 0 and 1, the first component τ ′i is also a value between 0 and 1. The idea
is to define the data set S(i) = {S1,i, . . . , Si−1,i, Si+1,i, . . . , Sn,i} of points submitted
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Table 5.1: Summary of the notation used to instantiate the accurate performance
scoring mechanism through machine learning techniques.
Pi, Pj players
n total number of players
τ ri aggregate score of player Pi at round r
τ ′i/τ
′′
i first/second component of player Pi at round r
τ
(r−1)
i aggregate score of player Pi at round r − 1
Sj,i data point describing how player Pj rates player Pi
xPj,i/yPj,i x/y-coordinate of data point Sj,i
ρj,i evidence submitted by player Pj with respect to player Pi
C1, . . . , CK clusters/classes of credibility
M1, . . . ,MK center points of clusters C1, . . . , CK
yM1 , . . . , yMK y-coordinate of M1, . . . ,MK
wj,i weight of player Pj when rating player Pi
pi1, . . . , piK mixing coefficients of M1, . . . ,MK
α, β incentive, penalty for, respectively, accurate and inaccurate ratings
oj,i score gained or loss by player Pj when rating player Pi
a, b, c coefficients for τ ′i , τ ′′i , and τ r−1i respectively
by player Pj 6=i. Then, the machine learning techniques of K-means clustering (see
Section 5.4.1.1) and mixture of Gaussians (see Section 5.4.1.2) are used to extract
the first component τ ′i from coordinate ySj,i of each point in the data set S(i).
5.4.2.3 Classes of credibility
K classes of evidence are distinguished with respect to their credibility by the K-
means clustering algorithm. Informally, we use the term credibility to underline the
fact that these classes are distinguished based on the reputation already gained by
the raters, whose ratings are believed to be more accurate, thus, credible. The points
in the data set S(i) are grouped into K clusters C1, . . . , CK . In fact, each point in
the data set S(i) is a tuple corresponding to the values “aggregate score of the rater"
and the values “the submitted rating". Therefore, the clustering algorithm finds
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classes which take into account both values. The center pointsM1, . . . ,MK of clusters
C1, . . . , CK simplify these classes of credibility with fewer, yet more informative points.
5.4.2.4 Assigning a weight wj,i to point Sj,i
Each point Sj,i is submitted by player Pj, which has aggregate score at round r − 1
τ r−1j . We use this aggregate score to weight point Sj,i. We define weight wj,i as:
wj,i =
F (τ r−1j )∑n−1
j=1 F (τ r−1j )
,
where F : [0, 1]→ R is a positive and increasing step function over subintervals of
interval [0, 1], which assigns higher scores to larger aggregate scores τ r−1j at round
r − 1. The meaning of such definition for function F (x) is to simplify the weights
that a point Sj,i can have into fewer possible values. Thus, two aggregate scores
τ r−1j < τ
r−1
k at round r− 1 are considered equivalent with respect to the weights wj,i
and wk,i for the points Sj,i and Sk,i if they lie on the same subinterval.
5.4.2.5 Computation of the first component τ ′i
The first component τ ′i is computed as a weighted combination of coordinates
yM1 , . . . , yMK of the center pointsM1, . . . , MK , respectively. Center pointsM1, . . . ,MK
are not equivalent: together with the classes of credibility they distinguish, they
depend on the cardinality of the respective clusters. The idea is to associate val-
ues pi1, . . . , piK to center points M1, . . . ,MK in quantitative and qualitative manner.
Values pi1, . . . , piK are regarded as the mixing coefficients of a mixture p(S(i)) of
K Gaussian distributions N1(µ1, σ21), . . . ,NK(µK , σ2K). More precisely, the points
within each cluster Cl can be seen as following a Gaussian distribution with µl = Ml,
for l = 1, . . . , K. That is because the mean and the variance of a Gaussian distribu-
tion convey information about where the points are mostly concentrated and how
they are spread, which is comparable to the information conveyed by the clusters.
Weights wj,i are used to compute the mixing coefficients pi1, . . . , piK . In more de-
tail, pil =
∑nl
j=1wlj ,i, where nl is the cardinality of cluster Cl and wlj ,i is the weight
assigned to point Slj ,i ∈ Cl, for l = 1, . . . , K. Note that
∑K
l=1 pil = 1 and thus the
mixture p(S(i)) is a probability distribution. The weighted sum of means µ1, . . . , µK
represents the mean µ of the closets Gaussian distribution N (µ, σ2) approximating
mixture p(S(i)) (see Section 5.4.1.2). And this is exactly what we aim at: since
the means µ1, . . . , µK are the center points M1, . . . ,MK , we can now compute the
first component τ ′i as the weighted sum of coordinates yM1 , . . . , yMK according to the
mixing coefficients pi1, . . . , piK . That is,
τ ′i =
K∑
l=1
pil · yMl ∈ [0, 1].
103
5 Coalition-Resistant Performance Scoring Mechanism for Long-Term Confidentiality
Basically, the first component is computed as coordinate yµ of the mean µ of the
fitting Gaussian distribution N (µ, σ2). One can argue that the first component τ ′i
could be computed directly after clusters C1, . . . , CK were distinguished, without
passing through the step of computing the mixture of Gaussians. This is, in fact,
what one would practically do when computing τ ′i . However, we highlight that this
computation is possible because the center points of the clusters model are the means
of Gaussian distributions.
We recall that the technique proposed to compute the first partial trust value τ (1)i
for storage server Si assumes an honest majority among the storage servers within
S. Otherwise, the cluster with the highest weight is the one with a high density of
untrustworthy storage servers. Note that this is a common assumption within the
framework of distributed storage.
5.4.3 Computation of the Second Component τ ′′i
To make more evident the effect of incentives and penalties in the evaluation presented
in Section 5.4.4, the second component τ ′′ is computed slightly differently than how
it was originally defined in Section 5.3. More precisely, the second component τ ′′ for
a storage server Si is still defined as τ
′′
i = 1n−1
∑n−1
j=1 oi,j, but the reliability score oi,j
assigned to |τ ′j − ρri,j| is now a value in the set.
O = {x : x = α1 + (−α1 ×m),m ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . . , (α2 − 1)}},
where α1 ∈ {0, 1} specifies, both, a maximum reward and a series of penalty values;
and α2 ∈ Z+ specifies the total number of elements, or steps, in O. Intuitively, the
first value of O is α1, the second value is 0 and subsequent values are multiples of
−α1, with a total of α2 elements. The element oi,j ∈ O is assigned to |τ ′j − ρri,j| at
index b|τ ′j − ρri,j| · α2c. With such an interpretation, if |τ ′j − ρri,j| is between the range[
0, 1
α2
]
, the first element of O, namely α1, is assigned as oi,j.
5.4.4 Evaluation
The performance scoring mechanism described in Section 5.3.1 instantiated using
the machine learning techniques of K-means clustering algorithm and of mixture of
Gaussians as discussed in Section 5.4.2 is capable of detecting coalitions of rational
players and penalizing them.
We recall that, according to what a weakly dominant strategy for a rational
behavior is (see Section 5.2) and to the assumptions stated in Section 5.3, the players
either behave honestly by submitting always accurate ratings or behave rationally
(or dishonestly) by submitting always inaccurate ratings. More precisely, an accurate
rating is in accordance with the actual performance observed (the targeted first
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component τ ′i of a player Pi). An inaccurate ratings boosts or lowers the actual
performance observed depending on whether the player in colludes or not in the
same coalition as the submitter of the rating.
In our experiments, rational players submit inaccurate ratings where they try to
boost or lower the targeted first component of the player to be rated according to
a Beta distribution. We choose the Beta distribution as it models rational players
that alter the ratings conservatively most of the time and aggressively a few times
with low probability. In the description of the performance scoring mechanism in
Section 5.3, this behavior was not assumed specifically but totally possible because
Theorem 5.8 was proven by taking into account only the worst case scenarios where
ratings where totally diverged from the targeted first component. For this evaluation,
we have chosen to model the ratings through the Beta distribution to probe the
detection capabilities of our mechanism because it is harder to detect a rational
player when its ratings are not completely opposite to the actual performance. In
particular, given a random sample ∆r ∼ Beta(a, b), a rational player Pi submits
rating ρri,j to compute the first component τ ′j of player Pj as:
ρri,j = τ ′j ±∆r, (5.11)
where a and b are chosen parameters for a Beta distribution according to one of the
combinations shown in Figure 5.1. In Equation (5.11), a sample ∆r of the chosen
Beta distribution is added to the targeted first component τ ′j if player Pj belongs to
the same coalition as player Pi and it is subtracted otherwise.
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4
0
5
10
15
a = 2, b = 50
a = 2, b = 40
a = 2, b = 30
a = 2, b = 20
a = 3, b = 20
a = 4, b = 20
Figure 5.1: Family of Beta distributions that specifies how much ratings are boosted
or lowered by rational players.
For the generation of ratings by rational players, we choose the parameters a = 3,
b = 20 for the Beta distribution in Equation (5.11). These parameters model a
distribution with an expected value of E[Beta(3, 20)] = 0.13. This implies that, most
of the time rational players increase or decrease the rating of others by 0.13 points.
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In other words, the increase or decrease can range from small values close to 0.0
up to the high value 0.35 (with low probability), modeling the mostly conservative
behavior of rational players discussed above.
An honest players Pi submits rating ρri,j to compute the first component τ ′j of
player Pj according to a Gaussian distribution. In particular, given a random sample
∆h ∼ N (0, tε), rating ρri,j submitted by a honest player Pi to rate Pj is computed as:
ρri,j = τ ′j + ∆h, (5.12)
where the sample ∆h from a Gaussian distribution is added to the targeted first
component τ ′j to account for the potential inaccuracies in the empirical observations
player Pj might have had. In order to prevent the samples of the Gaussian distribution
used by honest players from greatly overlapping with the samples of the Beta
distribution used by rational players, thus making honest and dishonest behaviors
almost indistinguishable, in all experiments, tε is chosen such that tε < E[Beta(a, b)].
For the generation of ratings by honest players, we choose the parameter tε = 0.05
for the Gaussian distribution in Equation (5.12).
Furthermore, the function F (x) used in Section 5.4.2.4 to compute the weight wri,j
of a point Si,j submitted by player Pi to rate player Pj used in the experiments is
defined as follows:
F (x) =

1 if 0.00 ≤ τ r−1i ≤ 0.25
2 if 0.25 < τ r−1i < 0.50
3 if 0.50 < τ r−1i ≤ 0.75
4 if 0.75 < τ r−1i ≤ 1.00.
,
For the remaining parameters, we chose incentive and penalty α = 0.05 andβ = 15
and the coefficients of the convex combination as a = b = c = 13 (these a, b shall
not be confused with the parameters of the Beta distribution). The number of
clusters to individuate is K = 3. Once these parameters are selected, the algorithm
is deterministic except for how rational players alter ratings and for how honest
players diverge from the targeted first component. Furthermore, the players are
bootstrapped with an initial aggregate score that follow the Gaussian distribution
N (0.50, 0.40), so that they can take any value between 0 and 1. All experiments
are repeated 50 times. Instead of showing aggregated graphs of all experiments, we
choose to show one descriptive scenario that represents the experiments well.
As shown in Figure 5.2, the x-axis of each plot is the number of rounds (or, the
number of times) our performance scoring mechanism is run and the aggregate scores
are updated, which are represented by the y-axis. Note that the initial aggregate
scores at round 0 are the ones bootstrapped according to the above mentioned
Gaussian distribution. The aggregate scores computed by our performance scoring
mechanism are the ones from round 1 on. In each of the four plots of Figure 5.2,
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setups of different rational and honest players are tested. Figure 5.2a shows that it
is easy to detect a single coalition where 10 out of the total 40 players are rational.
This corresponds to a tolerance of 25.0% of rational players. Figures 5.2b and Figure
5.2c show what happens when, respectively, 15 and 19 players out of 40 are rational
and collude. Although there is some negative influence from the coalition for a
few rounds, the rational players are still detected and their aggregate scores drop
eventually to zero. This corresponds to a tolerance of, respectively, 37.5% and 47.5%
of rational players. Instead, if 20 out of 40 players are rational and collude, then the
performance scoring mechanism does not detect and punish inaccurate ratings and
the aggregate scores of the honest players drop to zero, as shown in Figure 5.2d.
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
rounds
0.00
0.25
0.50
0.75
1.00
τ
Coalition 1 Honest Group
(a) 40 players, 25% are rational.
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16
rounds
0.00
0.25
0.50
0.75
1.00
τ
Coalition 1 Honest Group
(b) 40 players, 37.5% are rational.
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Coalition 1 Honest Group
(c) 40 players, 47.5% are rational.
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rounds
0.00
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1.00
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Coalition 1 Honest Group
(d) 40 players, 50% are rational.
Figure 5.2: Change of aggregate scores for our performance scoring mechanism when
25%, 37.5%, 47.7% and 50.0% of the players form a rational coalition.
5.5 Related Work
Our approach bridges two research fields. For one, it is an evidence-based reputation
mechanism where aggregate scores are computed by peers. It also formalises the
interaction of rational players, which enable data protection through secret sharing.
We survey both angles in turn in, respectively, Section 5.5.1 and Section 5.5.2.
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5.5.1 Evidence-based Reputation Mechanisms
We have already introduced in Section 2.3 the concept if performance scoring mech-
anism, which in literature are also often referred to as reputation mechanism. We
have already said that this thesis focuses on evidence-based reputation mechanisms,
where the aggregate scores are the output of ratings issued after that a trustor has
had an interaction with the trustee. In particular, we are interested in computational
mechanisms that consider past evidence (via direct or indirect interactions) about
trustee’s behavior to estimate the trustworthiness of that trustee in the future. In
the following, evidence-based reputation mechanisms based on various statistical
techniques (especially the Beta probability) and machine learning techniques are sur-
veyed in, respectively, Section 5.5.1.1 and Section 5.5.1.2, and peer-to-peer reputation
mechanisms are discussed in Section 5.5.1.3.
5.5.1.1 Bayesian Evidence-based Reputation Mechanisms
Bayesian trust models [65] [28], [83], [60], [95] leverage Bayesian probabilities [18] to
estimate the future behavior (i.e. the trust value) of the trustee. In particular, the
Beta probability density function is used to estimate the future behavior based on
the evidence collected from the past interactions. For instance, the reputation system
proposed in [65] calculates trust values following the Beta distribution. However,
the system is not able to filter out unfair evidence, making the system ineffective
when evidence is not genuine. A robust reputation system is introduced in [28],
which deals with honest behavior of the participants. The idea is to learn from
the observation of others before having to learn by direct interaction. In other
words, reputation ratings are incorporated into the view of others. An extension
of the Bayesian probabilistic model is the event-based trust mechanism proposed
in [83], which handle so called event-structure frameworks [84]. More precisely,
the work provides a formal framework based on information divergence to measure
the quality of probabilistic trust mechanisms. Furthermore, the so called trust-
aware model introduced in [60] addressing service-oriented environments formalizes a
Bayesian service selection model focusing on monitoring and exploring desired service
composition. Specifically, the work shows how one can reward/punish the services
dynamically with incomplete knowledge of the composition. CertainTrust [95], an
extended Bayesian trust model considering context-dependent parameters.
5.5.1.2 Evidence-based Performance Scoring Mechanisms using Machine
Learning Techniques
Machine learning plays an important role in the area of trust research. In fact,
nowadays, an increasing amount of evidence (or data) is generated by large-scale web
applications, e.g. social media, e-commerce, recommender systems. Machine learning
techniques are used by researchers to model more and more complex scenarios by
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answering two fundamental questions in trust research. The first question is about
the initial trustworthiness estimation of a target entity in the absence of past behavior.
The second question is about capturing and detecting dynamic behavior of the target
entity in different interactions.
In order to address the first question, stereotyping models (e.g. [76]) use the
trustor’s past experience with other similar entities. These models harness trust-
relevant features using machine learning techniques [77] (e.g. Linear Discriminant
Analysis (LDA), Decision Tree (DT), and M5 model tree) to extract connections
between potential interactions and past interactions. In large-scale open systems
like social networks, behavior of an entity may vary in different interactions with
different entities to maximize their profits. Approaches based on Hidden Markov
Model [81] are essential to effectively capture and detect dynamic behavior patterns.
In order to address the second question, Tang et al. [106] address the issue of
dynamic behavior. The authors analyze the trust evolution by investigating the
dynamics of the preference of the users on line in review sites like Epinions5. It turns
out that trust is strongly correlated to the similarity of the preference of the users.
In order to capture their preference evolution, hence dynamic trust, the authors
use machine learning approaches like the latent factor model [16]. Moreover, in
evidence-based trust mechanisms, evidence is often provided by different sources.
Honesty of the information source is key for reliable trust estimation and, thus, it
is essential to know whether the information source is unbiased or biased. Existing
evidence-based trust models use unsupervised approaches, like statistical deviation
[75], to identify feedbacks that are very different from others. The assumption here
is that the biased feedback is a small subset of all feedbacks.
In this chapter, we address the second question by using machine learning tech-
niques to design our evidence-based trust mechanism. The unsupervised clustering
algorithms are able to identify evidence created by dishonest participants. Further-
more, in contrast to related work, with the techniques of fitting mixture of Gaussians
to clusters, we identify unreliable evidence submitted by colluding participants. This
confers our trust mechanism the capability to downgrade the trustworthiness of
groups of participants that have chosen to collaborate in a dishonest manner.
5.5.1.3 Peer-to-Peer Reputation Mechanisms
We review mechanisms promoting accurate ratings in peer-to-peer systems, where
accurate/inaccurate ratings are rewarded/penalized. In particular, we focus on
mechanisms where agents interact with one or multiple external third parties, either
to learn the reputation of their peers or to aggregate their ratings. These are referred
to as third-party-aided peer reputation mechanisms and our mechanism falls into this
category. Jurca et al. [67] consider a scenario involving peers as well as broker agents
5http://epinions.com/
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where incentives are issued through payment for reputation information. Afterwards,
an agent decides whether to engage with peers. This model uses a game-theoretic
approach, but addresses peer interaction and not how the reputation information of
peers is aggregated and computed. The same authors also investigate how the lack of
incentives leads to biased recommendations and ratings on online reviews platforms
such as TripAdvisor [68]. The scoring system discussed by Miller et al. [80] is referred
to as a peer-prediction model and is most suitable for rating commercial items in
online platforms. It involves a centre common to all peers that processes the ratings
forwarded by the peers themselves and has no independent information. The model
uses a peer’s rating to update a probability distribution for the rating of a different
peer. Based on these ratings, the centre rewards or penalizes the targeted peer. The
problem of coalitions is mentioned but not solved. Our work differs from the ones
listed above in the following ways. Our performance scoring mechanism is the first to
be provably resilient against peer coalitions. Moreover, it provides a relation between
the admissible variations of the performance scores and the size of coalitions. This
way, incentives and penalties are implemented before the performance scores are
computed (and not later), leading to performance scores that match the desired
accuracy level.
5.5.2 Protection Against Rational Parties in Secret Sharing
We review mechanisms for coping with rational players in secret sharing schemes.
The notion of rational secret sharing was first introduced by Halpern and Teague [59].
Here, the utility of the players is tied to their goal of being the only ones to know the
secret, while rationality captures their unwillingness to collaborate with other players
to reconstruct the secret. The paradox of rational secret sharing is that the secret
is lost because players will never actively collaborate by providing their own share
during reconstruction. Halpern and Teague solve this problem by using game theory
to incentivise the players to collaborate and they show how their solution reaches a
Nash equilibrium if the players are not allowed to form coalitions. Later, Gordon
and Katz proposed [54] a protocol also supporting two players only, which was not
possible before. Abraham et al. introduced [2] the notion of a k-resilient Nash
equilibrium and a secret sharing scheme reaching this equilibrium is designed. As
in [2], we consider only players that act rationally according to their ultimate goal and
arbitrarily behaving players with unknown utilities are not considered. Instead, this
type of players are discussed by Lysyanskaya and Triandopoulos [78] and by Asharov
and Lindell [5]. All so far mentioned protocols for rational secret sharing assume
that communication happens simultaneously, either through a broadcast channel or
through secure private channels. Kol and Naor proposed [71] a rational secret sharing
scheme with a non-simultaneous broadcast channel that is also coalition-resistant.
In all preceding cases, rational secret sharing protocols are treated as infinitely
repeated games, as in our approach. This allows a reward mechanism that forces
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the players to not behave selfishly and reach a social optimum. Nojoumian and
Stinson proposed [89] a model where players are associated with a score recording
the number of times they provided their shares during the reconstruction of the
secret. A high score means that players might be included in future secret sharing
schemes. Our model differs from the approaches discussed in this paragraph because
we consider rationality in terms of economic return for SSPs, which in our scenario
boils down to maximising share storage. We do not focus on the performance of the
players during the reconstruction of the secret shared data. Instead, we focus on the
general performance of the players, with measurements uncoupled from share renewal
operations. Our performance scoring mechanism helps the data owner to select high
performing storage servers in the first place. All approaches discussed above tackle
the threats of private secret acquisition and uncooperative behaviour during secret
reconstruction. In contrast, uniquely, we counter the threat of inaccurate peer rating
to undermine storage competitors.
5.6 Summary and Future Work
The long-term confidential storage of sensitive data can be realised through proactive
secret sharing, performed in a distributed storage system consisting of several storage
servers owned by multiple commercial SSPs. Data owners can be guided in the
selection of high-performing SSPs through performance scoring mechanisms based
on mutual peer ratings.
In this chapter, we addressed the problem of modelling performance scoring
mechanisms such that they are resilient against coalitions of rational storage servers,
which for the most part of this chapter were referred to as players. We first modelled
storage servers as rational agents aiming at maximizing their shares storage and
formalized their rating strategies. Second, we showed that performance scoring
mechanisms output aggregate scores that do not reflect actual performance if the
players are not incentivized to submit accurate ratings. Third, we introduced a novel
performance scoring mechanism modelled as an infinitely repeated and cooperative
game with a TA as a mediator. The TA incentivizes accurate ratings and detects and
penalizes inaccurate ratings with respect to a margin that depends on coalition sizes.
Using our game-theoretic formalism, we proved that such a performance scoring
mechanism outputs accurate aggregate scores. It thus provides viable guidance for the
selection of high-performing storage servers in distributed storage systems. Fourth, we
instantiated the performance scoring mechanism by using machine learning techniques
to process the ratings submitted by the players and distinguish the accurate ones
from the inaccurate ones. Experimental evaluations show empirically that when
the rational players collude into a single large coalition so that the majority of the
players is still honest then the performance scoring mechanism detects and penalizes
the colluders, as expected.
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Our framework formalizes the accuracy of the aggregate scores when there is one
large coalition only and does not consider multiple smaller coalitions at the same
time. Also, it does not take into account the fact that rational players may decide to
submit inaccurate ratings with a certain probability only, so that to lower the chance
to be detected. Although some experiments we run show that our performance
scoring mechanism is still resilient in both above situations, we have not formalized
yet these two frameworks yet and we plan to do that as future work. Furthermore, as
another future work, we plan to investigate annd formalize the number the number
of rounds it takes to output accurate aggregate scores depending on how large the
cardinality of the coalitions formed is.
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Long-term secure storage of sensitive data must protect the confidentiality and
integrity of such data for decades. For instance, electronic health records must be
protected for at least the entire lifetime of the patient, or even longer to protect
the privacy of descendants. Confidentiality of a health record is crucial to prevent
discrimination, while integrity of the record is crucial to ensure the right treatment
for the patient.
State of the art secret sharing-based distributed storage systems rely on proactive
secret sharing and on commitment schemes (see Chapter 2) to protect, respectively,
the confidentiality and the integrity of the outsourced data. Proactive secret sharing
ensures confidentiality because, at regular time intervals, fresh new shares that are
completely unlinked to the previous ones are generated so that they still reconstruct
to the original data. The integrity of the outsourced data can be protected in the
long-term when proactive secret sharing is equipped with commitment schemes. This
way, it can be verified the validity of the original shares generated by the data owner
when first outsourcing the data (like originally verifiable secret sharing was meant to
be). In addition, this enables to check the validity of the updated shares every time
these are computed.
However, building such an infrastructure turns out to be costly and still hard to
achieve in practice, both in terms of confidentiality and integrity. On the one hand,
proactive secret sharing requires that each pair of storage servers are linked by an
information-theoretically secure channel, which remains very difficult and expensive
to build. So far, only NICT in Japan have provided such infrastructure [24], where
quantum key distribution [97] is used to build point-to-point information-theoretically
secure channel between any two nodes. This is, however, one of the rare examples
of information-theoretically secure channels that have been established in practice
with QKD, since this technology is still very expensive and comes with scalability
limitations. On the other hand, commitment schemes are computationally intensive,
and are in practice never used for large files (e.g., CT scans or genomic data).
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Contributions
In this chapter, we investigate more efficient protection of confidentiality and integrity
in long-term secure distributed storage systems. We propose LSTee, the first proac-
tive solution for long-term secure storage systems that relies on a trusted execution
environment (TEE) (which is an integrity-protected and isolated environment with
respect to both hardware and software) for the generation, renewal and reconstruc-
tion of valid shares. More precisely, in LSTee, the shares are generated in the TEE
and then securely distributed and provisioned to the storage servers. The shares
are not stored into the TEE, but they are brought back into it only for periodic
renewal and reconstruction when the data is requested by the data owner. This
approach leads to significantly optimized secret sharing protocols for generating and
renewing the shares, where commitment schemes are replaced with more practical
public-key cryptography for verifying the integrity of the shares. Furthermore, the
amount of information-theoretically secure channel needed is significantly reduced.
The amount of information-theoretically secure channel needed by LSTee is linear
in the number of storage servers as opposed to quadratic for the state of the art
approaches discussed above. Despite enabling more practical computations and lower
communication costs of the infrastructure, assuming a trusted TEE, LSTee provides
the same security (long-term confidentiality and integrity) guarantees as state of the
art long-term secure distributed storage systems. LSTee is TEE-agnostic, i.e. it is
not tied to a specific TEE, and supports seamless migration from a compromised or
unavailable TEE to another trustworthy. Moreover, we prototype our protocols on a
TEE, instantiated with Intel SGX and show that LSTee is practical, even for large
files We present runtimes for secret sharing and reconstructing a file with varying
file sizes and parameters, as well as for renewing the shares for long-term security.
Contributions to this chapter come from paper [T8]. Due to the collaborative
nature of this work, all co-authors contributed to the main contribution of this
chapter. Besides, my most explicit role in this work was to systematically pointing
out the limitations and constraints of state of the art secret sharing-distributed
storage systems so as to develop at the end a viable solution that needs fewer
information-theoretically secure channel that is also complaint with the original
framework. Moreover, the security analysis of LSTee and the comparison of LSTee
with related work with respect to number of information-theoretically secure channel
and communication traffic were solely my input.
Outline
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In Section 6.1, relevant preliminaries
are described. In Section 6.2, a detailed description of state-of-the-art long-term
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secure storage systems based on secret sharing primitives and commitment schemes
is provided. In Section 6.3, we present our solution LSTee. In Section 6.4, we present
the security analysis of LSTee. We compare with related work with respect to
communication and computation complexities in Section 6.5, and instantiate LSTee
with a specific TEE (Intel SGX) and evaluate its performance in Section 6.6. We
conclude with directions for future work in Section 6.7.
6.1 Trusted Executions Environments
Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) are increasingly recognized as a key compo-
nent for the deployment of security-sensitive and privacy-preserving applications such
as digital content protection [22] or financial services [15]. A TEE is an execution
environment with its own hardware and software components, running in a totally
isolated manner alongside the operating system of a computing server, which is
referred to as the TEE operator. It guarantees that the code and the data inside the
TEE itself are protected with respect to confidentiality and integrity. A TEE has its
proprietary assets and communicates with the external environment through TEE
APIs. Commercial TEE solutions include Intel SGX [64] and ARM TrustZone [4].
Because this is TEE on which the instantiation of LSTee of Section 6.6 is based, in
the following, we only present how Intel SGX works.
Intel Software Guard Extensions (SGX) is Intel’s widely available TEE where
confidential data can be processed securely on untrusted systems [64]. To do this,
SGX introduces the concept of enclaves, which are software components executed in
isolation from all software running on the system, including the untrusted operating
system or hypervisor. SGX assumes the CPU hardware to be the only trustworthy
hardware component of the system. While data is stored and processed unencrypted
in the CPU’s caches and registers, it is encrypted and integrity-protected once it
is moved out of the CPU, e.g., into DRAM. A host process (usually the OS) loads
an enclave from its virtual memory and manages its creation which means that the
enclave’s initial data and code content may be manipulated. Therefore, to ensure
that confidential data is not sent to a malicious or corrupted enclave, the authenticity
and integrity of an enclave are verified through remote attestation (see more details
below). An external party verifies whether an enclave was created correctly by
checking the cryptographic hash of the enclave’s initial memory that is signed by
the platform’s secret key. It then communicates the confidential data to the enclave
over a secure channel only after the enclave has been attested. Once inside the
enclave, data can be securely processed in isolation and later on encrypted with an
enclave-specific secret key before it is written to untrusted storage, e.g., DRAM.
In the following, we briefly describe what remote attestation protocols are in
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order to better understand how SGX works and our LSTee solution in Section 6.3.
Remote attestation is a security service that is realized by means of an interactive
challenge-response protocol to allow a verifier to capture the state of a potentially
untrusted remote prover. The verifier initiates the attestation protocol by sending a
request/challenge to the prover. Upon receiving the request, the prover computes a
digest, e.g., a cryptographic hash, of its memory, signs it, and sends it back to the
verifier. Based on that, the verifier then decides whether the prover is in a trustworthy
state or not. However, if the prover is compromised it may evade detection by sending
the verifier the expected benign measurement. Therefore, a trusted component or
trust anchor at the prover, that is trusted to faithfully measure the software state of
the prover and send the measurement back to the verifier, is required.
6.2 State of the Art Proactive Secret Sharing-Based
Distributed Storage Systems
We recall that long-term secure storage systems based on secret sharing utilize several
storage servers owned by different commercial SSPs where each of the storage servers
receives a share of the data from the data owner. The main goal of such infrastructure
is to proactively protect the confidentiality and the integrity of the outsourced data
in the long term. We describe in Section 6.2.1 the requirements and assumptions
underlying state of the art long-term secure distributed storage systems. We present
in Section 6.2.2 the well-established proactive secret sharing scheme by Herzberg et
al. [62] and discuss its shortcomings in Section 6.2.3 (other, more recent solutions, are
rather incremental with respect to the solution by Herzberg et al. and are discussed
and compared to our solution in Section 6.5).
6.2.1 Requirements and Assumptions
In the following, in Section 6.2.1.1 and Section 6.2.1.2 we detail, respectively, the
network requirements and the adversary model that state of the art approach for
long-term secure distributed storage systems can cope with.
6.2.1.1 Network Requirements
The communication between the nodes and the data owner is characterized by the
following requirements.
1. There is an information-theoretically secure channel between any two storage
servers and between any data owner and each storage server.
2. There exists a reliable broadcast channel including all the nodes of the long-term
secure storage system.
3. The messages sent are reliably delivered.
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4. Authentication measures are in place (no spoofing possible).
Thus, a synchronous network with access to a common global clock is assumed.
6.2.1.2 Adversary Model
The threat model in long-term secure storage systems is that of a mobile, active and
computationally bounded adversary. A mobile adversary can, over time, break into as
many storage servers as it wants, and thus can collect enough shares to reconstruct
the data on its own. However, a mobile adversary is limited in the number of storage
servers it can corrupt (and thus the number of shares it can collect) within a certain
period of time. In particular, within any time period we assume it cannot break
into more than t − 1 storage servers, which means that n ≥ 2t − 1 for preserving
confidentiality and integrity with honest majority (i.e., we require at least t honest
servers), where n is the total amount of storage servers included in the system.
That is why periodically refreshing the shares of the storage servers by performing
proactive secret sharing is an effective countermeasure against this type of attacker.
It is also assumed that the attacker leaves the storage servers it broke into when
these are performing proactive secret sharing, so that the protocol can actually be
used effectively to derive fresh new shares unlinked to the old ones.
An active adversary is an adversary that does not remain a passive eavesdropper.
Instead, it deliberately tries to gain unwarranted access to information about the
data by making the corrupted storage servers deviate from the protocols they are
supposed to run, modifying the data stored on them or disconnecting them, etc.
Note that, for simplicity, storage servers subjected to accidental crashes or power
failures are considered corrupted and under the control of the adversary.
A computationally bounded adversary, in the context of long-term secure storage
systems, does not have enough computational power to break cryptographic schemes
instantiated with state-of-the-art choices of security parameters at a given point in
time.
Furthermore, the adversary can connect to the broadcast channel mentioned above
in the network requirements, observe and corrupt all messages that the storage servers
or the data owner broadcast and can also inject its own. However, the adversary
cannot prevent a benign storage server from receiving any of the messages sent
through the broadcast channel. A malicious data owner can also be assumed, who
can intentionally distribute corrupted shares to storage servers to blame them later
for not preserving the integrity of the document shares. Finally, it is assumed that,
as soon as attacks or deviations from the regular protocols are detected, a reboot
mechanism is performed so that the adversary is removed from the storage servers it
corrupted. This allows, for instance, to perform the share renewal effectively without
leaking information.
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6.2.2 The Existing Solution
A countermeasure against the mobile adversary is to periodically refresh the shares.
More precisely, the shares are renewed at regular intervals of time so that the updated
shares are completely independent of the old ones. At any point in time, i.e., between
two share renewal phases, the mobile adversary is limited to corrupt t− 1 storage
servers as described in Section 6.2.1.2. After the next share renewal phase, the
updated shares are entirely independent from the old shares, meaning the attacker
has to start over and corrupt the storage servers again. This process will always leave
the adversary with no information about the outsourced data and confidentiality is
therefore maintained. Share renewal is also referred to as proactive secret sharing, as
introduced by Herzberg et al. in [62]. At a high level, storage servers distributedly
compute some randomness values (also refereed to as subshares) and add them to
the old shares to generate the updated shares. These subshares are computed by
using the underlying Shamir’s secret sharing scheme.
To thwart an active adversary, verifiable secret sharing is used, where commitments
to the coefficients of the polynomial used to compute the shares are broadcasted
to all storage servers, and are used to detect deviations from the regular protocols.
During the first share generation phase Share, commitments are used by the storage
servers to check whether the data owner distributed consistent shares or not. During
share renewal Renew, each storage server acts simultaneously as a receiver and a
dealer of subshares. Commitments are used to check whether the subshares received
are consistent with the outsourced document and, therefore, can be used to compute
valid updated shares. In this way, integrity of the outsourced document is also
preserved because valid shares reconstruct to the original document. Proactive
secret sharing supports both Feldman’s and Pedersen’s commitment schemes used in
verifiable secret sharing (see Section 2.1 for more details).
In the following, we present the proactive secret sharing protocol by Herzberg
et al. [62] to periodically renew the shares of the outsourced data. It is presented
in its verifiable version, where Pedersen’s commitment is used to cope against
malicious storage servers sending invalid subshares during the protocol. Pedersen’s
commitment scheme is unconditionally hiding. This means that, contrary to the
computationally hiding Feldman’s commitment scheme, it does not allow an adversary
to store the broadcasted commitments until the underlying mathematical problem
(in Feldman’s case, the Discrete Logarithm Problem) becomes easily solvable due to
cryptanalytic advances or the construction of a sufficiently large quantum computer.
Thus, commitments computed using Pedersen’s scheme cannot be broken to retrieve
the coefficients of the polynomial used to compute the shares and, thus, to retrieve
the outsourced data.
In order to use a commitment scheme during Renew, it has to be in place also
during Share and Reconstruct. Thus, in the following, we also show how Share
and Reconstruct described in Section 2.1 are modified with Pedersen’s commitment
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scheme.
Share chooses two large primes p, q, are randomly chosen, such that q|(p− 1).
Then it takes as input a message m ∈ Fq to be outsourced to the long-term secure
storage system composed of storage servers S1, . . . , Sn, where i ∈ I is the unique
identifier ID of storage server Si by performing the following steps. Let g, h be
distinct generators of the q-th order subgroup Fq of F∗p and set Fq as both the
message space and the share space. The reconstructing threshold t is chosen so that
n ≥ 2t− 1, so that there is an honest majority among the storage servers making up
the long-term secure storage system. Polynomials f(x) = a0+a1x+· · ·+at−1xt−1 and
ϕ(x) = b0 + b1x+ · · ·+ bt−1xt−1 are defined, where a0 := m and a1, . . . , at−1 ∈ Fq and
b0, b1, . . . , bt−1 ∈ Fq are chosen uniformly at random. In the following, b0 is denoted
as s to distinguish it from the other coefficients. The data owner computes share σi
for storage server Si as σi := (f(i), ϕ(i)), for i = 1, . . . , n. The data owner commits to
each coefficient pair (ak, bk) by computing ck := gakhbk mod p, for k = 0, 1, . . . , t−1.
It broadcasts the commitments and sends share σi to storage server Si through an
information-theoretically secure channel. Each storage server Si accepts σi as its
valid share if and only if
gf(i)hϕ(i) ≡
t−1∏
k=0
ci
k
k = gmhs
t−1∏
k=1
(gakhbk)ik .
Renew takes as input a subset of t valid shares σ1, . . . , σt and outputs updated
shares σ′i for storage server Si, for i = 1, . . . , n. Each storage server Si performs the
following steps.
1. It select polynomials fi(x) = ai,0+ai,1x+ · · ·+ai,t−1xt−1 and ϕi(x) = bi,0+bi,1x+
· · ·+ bi,t−1xt−1, where ai,0 = bi,0 = 0 and both coefficients ai,1, . . . , ai,t−1 ∈ Fq as
well as bi,1, . . . , bi,t−1 ∈ Fq are chosen uniformly at random.
2. It computes subshare σj,i := (fi(j), ϕi(j)) for storage server Sj with identity
j 6= i, and subshare σi,i := (fi(i), ϕi(i)).
3. It computes commitment ci,k to coefficients ai,k and bi,k as ci,k := gai,khbi,k , for
k = 0, 1, . . . , t− 1.
4. It sends subshare σj,i to storage server Sj through an information-theoretically
secure channel for j 6= i, keeps subshare σi,i private, and broadcasts the commit-
ments ci,0, ci,1, . . . , ci,t−1.
5. It receives subshare σi,j = (fj(i), ϕj(i)) and commitments cj,0, cj,1, . . . , cj,t−1
from storage server Sj, for j 6= i.
6. It accepts σi,j as a valid subshare if and only if
gfj(i)hϕj(i) ≡
t−1∏
k=0
ci
k
k = gmhs
t−1∏
k=1
(gakhbk)ik .
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7. If all subshares are valid, then it computes its updated share σ′i as σ′i :=
(f(i) + ∑nj=1 fj(i), ϕ(i) + ∑nj=1 ϕi(j)). Otherwise, it broadcasts a complaint
message against the sender(s) Sj of the invalid subshare σi,j and aborts the
protocol.
8. It deletes old share σi.
Reconstruct takes as input t valid shares σ1, σ2, . . . , σt to reconstruct polynomial
f(x) and polynomial ϕ(x) by using Lagrange interpolation. Message m is retrieved
as f(0) = m and value s is retrieved as ϕ(0) = s. Having access to the commitments
originally broadcasted by the data owner, it is possible to check the validity of the
reconstructed message m and value s by verifying that it is a correct opening value
for commitment c0, i.e., gmhs ≡ c0.
The above proactive secret sharing scheme is a secret sharing scheme according to
Definition 2.2 that provides the security guarantees of accessibility and perfect security
formalized in Definition 2.1, equipped with an additional algorithm Renew run by
the storage servers in distributed fashion that still satisfy the security properties
of Definition 2.1. Note that, for simplicity, we have shown the above protocols for
only a message chunk m of a larger message M to be outsourced. Thus, the sharing,
renewing and reconstructing protocols have to be performed for each of chunk m
that message M was divided into. We formalize this in Section 6.3.2 when presenting
LSTee.
6.2.3 Shortcomings of the Existing Solution
The protocols Share, Renew, and Reconstruct described above suffer from two major
shortcomings that hinder their deployment in practice. On the one hand, all shares
and subshares must be sent through information-theoretically secure channel. This
means that n information-theoretically secure channel from each data owner to all
storage servers S1, S2, . . . , Sn are needed during Share and that n(n−1)2 information-
theoretically secure channel between each pair of storage servers are needed to
run Renew once. These can be reduced to t(t−1)2 + t(n− t), since the reconstructing
threshold is t, then protocol Renew (as well as protocol Reconstruct) can be successfully
carried out when a subset of at least t storage servers perform steps 1.-4. However,
the establishment of these information-theoretically secure channel remains very
expensive. They require the usage of quantum key distribution (QKD) protocols,
such as BB84 [14] or E91 [44], which are very costly to implement, or they require
off-line one-time pad (OTP) key material exchange, which is difficult to achieve in
practice. For more details, we refer to the security analysis in Section 6.4.
On the other hand, commitment schemes are also highly impractical to be computed
for the size of data that is normally outsourced and, thus, are never implemented,
leaving the integrity unverified. Commitments cannot be computed over the hashes
of data because the homomorphic property needed to perform operations in the
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exponent would be lost, and thus, the commitment cannot be verified. To share large
files with Shamir’s secret sharing scheme, these are first split into multiple chunks,
say `, and then for each chunk m Shamir’s secret sharing scheme is applied. This
implies that, just for protocol Share, on the data owner’s side `(t− 1) commitments
have to be computed and broadcasted, where ` normally ranges between 215 and
220 for a large file of several megabytes. Furthermore, in order to check the validity
of the share, each storage server has to compute at least ` full-length and `(t+ 1)
non-full-length exponentiations in a group with order around 256 bits. This is
computationally very expensive and makes this approach hard to be adopted in
practice. With LSTee, we attempt to mitigate these shortcomings and reduce the
described requirements by relying on trusted execution environments (TEEs) in our
solution, which we present next.
6.3 LSTee: Our Solution
LSTee leverages TEEs for the generation, renewal and reconstruction of consistent
shares in an integrity-protected and isolated environment. This guarantees that
the shares are instantiated, updated and reconstructed as mandated by the under-
lying protocols and that the consistency of the shares with the original document
is preserved. The integrity of the shares at the storage servers is protected by
means of computationally secure integrity proofs, i.e., signatures, that are issued
and distributed to the storage servers by the TEE together with the respective
shares. In this way, the TEE attests the shares before performing share renewal
or the reconstruction of the original document, and identifies which storage server
is compromised by its corrupted share by means of signature verification. LSTee
involves several parties: the data owner(s), the TEE operator, i.e. a computing server
equipped with the TEE and its hardware-based trust anchor, and storage servers. We
first present our network requirements and adversary model in Section 6.3.1, then a
high-level overview of LSTee’s optimized secret sharing protocols in Section 6.3.2 and
outline our optimizations with respect to the existing Share, Renew and Reconstruct
described in Section 6.2.2. Thereafter, we detail the protocols in Section 6.3.3 and
elaborate on TEE migration in Section 6.3.5.
6.3.1 Requirements and Assumptions
In this section, we detail network requirements (Section 6.3.1.1) and security assump-
tions with respect to the adversary (Section 6.3.1.2) needed for LSTee.
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6.3.1.1 Network Requirements
As shown in Figure 6.1b, network requirements for LSTee differ from that of the state-
of-the-art long-term secure storage systems (see Section 6.2.1) because a broadcast
channel is no longer needed, thus, we can disregard all assumptions regarding this.
Note that LSTee does not require a synchronous network with access to a common
global clock, since Renew is initiated and performed by the TEE. Our network
assumptions are as follows.
1. There is an information-theoretically secure channel between every storage server
and the TEE.
2. There is an information-theoretically secure channel between any data owner
and the TEE.
3. The messages sent are reliably delivered.
4. Authentication measures are in place.
Only data owners and the storage servers are directly connected to the TEE operator,
while we eliminate the need for a direct information-theoretically secure channel
between any two storage servers or between data owners and storage servers. The
architecture of our system is depicted in Figure 6.1b, where S1, S2, . . . , Sn denote n
storage servers, DO1,DO2, . . . ,DOd denote d data owners, TEE denotes the trusted
execution environment, and lines are information-theoretically secure channel.
𝑆1 𝑆2
𝑆𝑛 𝑆𝑛−1DO𝑑
DO1
⋮
(a) Architecture of existing solutions.
TEE
DO2
DO𝑑
DO1
⋮
𝑆1
𝑆2
𝑆𝑛
⋮
(b) Architecture of our solution.
Figure 6.1: Architecture of the state of the art protocols for long-term secure dis-
tributed storage systems and our protocol based on a trusted execution
environment.
6.3.1.2 Adversary Model
We assume an adversary model with identical capabilities to that described in
Section 6.2.1 for state of the art long-term secure storage systems. Furthermore, we
assume an untrusted TEE operator, that has full control over the machine deploying
a trusted TEE and can execute arbitrary code with supervisor privileges. In face of
memory corruption vulnerabilities, we assume deployment of common code-reuse
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defenses, such as control-flow integrity [1,30], or fine-grained code randomization [41,
73]. A number of architectural side-channel attacks [23, 33,110] leaking confidential
data from TEE-based solutions have been recently shown and several defenses [21,
35, 103] have been proposed to thwart them. We consider mitigating TEE-based
side-channel leakage as an orthogonal problem and out of scope for this chapter.
6.3.2 LSTee Optimized Protocols: Overview
In LSTee, the TEE performs the Share, Renew, and Reconstruct protocols in a
privacy-preserving manner.
The data owner is not required to be online after sending its data to the TEE,
and only communicates with the TEE operator at the beginning of the Share and
Reconstruct. Note that LSTee’s protocols require that the trust anchor at the
untrusted TEE operator attests the TEE’s integrity first and then initiates it. Then,
the TEE establishes information-theoretically secure channel with the other parties
and runs the protocols. For simplicity, we do not describe the TEE initiation steps
below.
6.3.2.1 Protocol Share
Our share initialization protocol is initiated by the data owner and runs between the
data owner, the TEE, and the storage servers. The data owner sends the pertinent
document to the TEE via an information-theoretically secure channel. The data
owner also selects the storage servers making up the storage system as well as
the threshold number t of shares necessary to reconstruct the document. For all
storage servers, the TEE generates the document shares along with their integrity
proofs and distributes them to each of the selected storage servers individually
via information-theoretically secure channel. At this point, each storage server
holds its document share and an integrity proof ready for the first round of share
renewal Renew. Contrary to state of the art Share of Section 6.2.2, where each
data owner establishes an information-theoretically secure channel with each of the
storage servers, we optimize this by requiring that data owners establish information-
theoretically secure channel with the TEE only. The TEE, in turn, establishes an
information-theoretically secure channel with each of the storage servers.
6.3.2.2 Protocol Renew
Our share renewal protocol is performed periodically as in the state of the art (see
Section 6.2.2). However, our protocol is initiated by the TEE sending an update
request to each storage server. Upon receiving the document share and its integrity
proof, the TEE verifies the integrity of the share. If the share is valid, the TEE
generates a subshare required to update the share, otherwise reports malicious
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behavior to the service provider. The updated share is computed by adding the
subshare to the old share and sending the result to the corresponding storage
server along with a new proof of integrity. This is performed by the TEE for each
storage server Si, for i = 1, . . . , n individually. Therefore, this eliminates the need
for information-theoretically secure channel between every two storage servers and
significantly reduces the number of information-theoretically secure channel compared
with Renew protocol from Section 6.2.2.
6.3.2.3 Protocol Reconstruct
Our document reconstruction protocol is initiated by the data owner sending a
request to the TEE, which, in turn, collects t shares from t storage servers to
reconstruct the document. Upon receiving the shares, the TEE verifies their integrity,
then reconstructs the document. Similar to our Share, we eliminate the need for
information-theoretically secure channel between data owners and each of the storage
servers. Instead, our Reconstruct only requires that each data owner establishes
a single information-theoretically secure channel with the TEE while the TEE
establishes the channels with the storage servers.
6.3.3 LSTee Optimized Protocols: Detailed
In LSTee, the TEE, encompassed in the TEE operator, performs the secret sharing
protocols, while public-key signatures are used to verify the integrity of the provisioned
shares before share renewal and document reconstruction protocols are performed.
Therefore, commitment schemes are no longer required. In Table 6.1, we present the
commonly used symbols throughout the paper with their description.
A document M can be expressed as the concatenation of multiple chunks of size
B, i.e. M = m1||m2|| . . . ||mN , such that the number of chunks is N = |M |B . Let n
be the total number of storage servers S1, S2, . . . , Sn selected by the data owner, id
be the unique identifier ID of storage server Si for i = 1, 2, . . . , n, t be the threshold
number of shares necessary to reconstruct the document, σi,` be a share of chunk m`,
for ` = 1, 2, . . . , N . Shi = σi,1||σi,2|| . . . ||σi,N , document share, is a concatenation of
the shares σi,`, for ` = 1, 2, . . . , N distributed to storage server Si for i = 1, 2, . . . , n.
The TEE T1 owns a pair (pkT1 , skT1) of public and secret keys. All communication
between the data owner, the TEE and the storage servers described in the protocols
below occurs through information-theoretically secure channels.
Share involves the data owner, the TEE, and storage servers S1, S2, . . . , Sn. It is
initiated by the data owner, who sends documentM , the number of storage servers n,
their IDs and the reconstructing threshold t to the TEE through a information-
theoretically secure channel. The TEE executes the following steps.
1. It receives M , n, t and storage servers’ identifiers IDs from the data owner.
2. It splits M into ` chunks, M = m1||m2|| . . . ||mN .
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3. For each document chunk m` ∈ Fq, where Fq is a finite field with q > n elements,
for ` = 1, 2, . . . N :
a. it selects a polynomial f`(x) = a0,` + a1,`x + · · · + at−1,`xt−1 such that
a0,` := m` and a1,`, . . . , at−1,` ∈ Fq are chosen uniformly at random;
b. it compute n document chunk shares such that σi,` := f`(i) for storage
server Si, for i = 1, . . . n.
4. It aggregates N document chunk shares into a unique document share Shi as
Shi := σi,1|| . . . ||σi,N .
5. It computes signature Pi of document share Shi with the private key skT1 as
Pi = sign(skT1 , Shi), for i = 1, . . . , n.
6. It distributes document share Shi along with its signature Pi to storage server
Si through a information-theoretically secure channel, for i = 1, . . . , n.
Storage servers trust that the TEE generates consistent shares. Therefore, document
share Shi and its signature Pi are securely provisioned to storage server Si until the
first round of the share renewal protocol Renew.
Renew involves the TEE and the storage servers S1, . . . , Sn and is periodically
initiated by the TEE that performs the following steps.
1. It sends update requests to storage servers S1, . . . , Sn.
2. It receives n document share Shi and its signatures Pi sent by storage server Si
through a information-theoretically secure channel, for i = 1, . . . , n.
3. It attests the integrity of document share Shi by verifying its signature Pi
as follows: ver(pkT1 , Pi, Shi)
?= true for i = 1, . . . , n. If the document share
Shi is valid, then it proceeds with step 4. Otherwise, it recovers the original
document M from t valid shares, notifies the service provider of the corruption
of storage server Si and executes protocol Share to recompute document share
Shi.
4. For each document chunk m`, for ` = 1, . . . , N :
a. it selects a polynomial g`(x) = b0,` + b1,`x+ · · ·+ bt−1,`xt−1, where b0,` = 0
and coefficients b1,`, . . . , bt−1,` ∈ Fq are chosen uniformly at random;
b. it computes subshare ri,` for storage server Si as ri,` := g`(id), for i =
1, . . . , n;
c. it computes the updated share σ′i,` of message chunk m` for storage server
Si as σ′i,` := σi,` + ri,`, for i = 1, . . . , n.
5. It aggregates N document chunk shares into a unique document share Shi as
Sh′i = σ′i,1||σ′i,2|| . . . ||σ′i,N .
6. It computes signature P ′i for document share Sh′i with the private key skT1 as
follows: P ′i = sign(skT1 , Sh′i), for i = 1, . . . , n.
7. It distributes document share Sh′i along with its signature P ′i to storage server
Si through a information-theoretically secure channel, for i = 1, . . . , n.
Storage server Si stores the new document share Sh′i and its signature P ′i and deletes
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the old Shi and Pi, for i = 1, . . . , n.
Table 6.1: Summary of the notation used to define distributed storage systems based
on a trusted execution environment.
n total number of storage servers
Si storage server, for i = 1, . . . , n
d number of data owners
DOj data owner for j = 1, . . . , d
id The unique identifier ID of storage server Si
t reconstructing threshold of shares
M document to be outsourced
m` document chunk
B size of document chunk m`
N = |M |
B
number of chunks per document
σi,` share of chunk m`, held by storage server Si
document share, is a
concatenation of the
shares σi,`, for
` = 1, 2, . . . , N held by
storage server Si for
i = 1, 2, . . . , n
Shi = σi,1||
σi,2|| . . . ||σi,N
Pi proof of integrity of share Shi held by storage server Si
f(x) = a0+ polynomial of degree t− 1
a1x+ · · ·+ at−1xt−1
a0, a1, . . . , at−1 coefficients of the polynomial from Fq
ck commitment to coefficient ak for k = 0, 1, . . . , t− 1
(pkT1 , skT1) Pair of public and secret keys owned by TEE T1
sign(sk,m) signature generation with secret key sk on message m
ver(pk, P, Sh) ?= true verification of signature P on share Sh with public key pk
Reconstruct involves the data owner, the TEE, and the storage servers S1, . . . , Sn
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and is initiated by the data owner, who requests document M from the TEE. The
TEE performs the following steps.
1. It receives reconstruction request from the data owner.
2. It requests t document shares Shi from t storage servers, i.e., i = 1, . . . , t.
3. It receives document share Shi and its signature Pi through an information-
theoretically secure channel, for i = 1, . . . , t.
4. It attests the integrity of document share Shi by verifying signature Pi as
follows: ver(pkT1 , Pi, Shi)
?= true. If share Shi is valid, it proceeds with step
5. Otherwise, it requests another document share Shj from a different storage
server Sj 6=i to reconstruct the original document, and notifies the service provider
of the corruption of storage server Si.
5. It uses shares σ1,`, . . . , σt,` to reconstruct polynomial f ∗` (x) using Lagrange
interpolation, where f ∗` (x) is the polynomial obtained by the sum of polynomial
f`(x) used in share initialization Share and the polynomials g`(x) used for every
round the share renewal protocol Renew was run. The `-th document chunk m`
is retrieved as f ∗` (0) = m`, for ` = 1, . . . N .
6. It retrieves document M by concatenating the N document chunks m` as
M = m1||m2|| . . . ||mN .
7. It sends M to data owner over an information-theoretically secure channel.
6.3.4 Alternative Renew Protocol
An alternative for protocol Renew presented in Section 6.3.3 would be to perform a
combination of protocol Reconstruct and protocol Share (without the participation
of the data owner). In this section, we describe this alternative and discuss its
advantages and disadvantages. The protocol is initiated by the TEE, which performs
the following steps.
1. It requests t document shares Shi from t storage servers Si for i = 1, . . . , t.
2. It receives document share Shi and its signature Pi through an information-
theoretically secure channel, for i = 1, . . . , t.
3. It attests the integrity of document share Shi by verifying its signature Pi as
follows: ver(pkT1 , Pi, Shi)
?= true. If share Shi is valid, then it proceeds with
step 4. Otherwise, it requests another document share Shj from a different
storage server Sj 6=i to reconstruct the original document, and notifies the service
provider of the corruption of storage server Si.
4. For every ` = 1, 2, . . . N :
a. it uses shares σ1,`, . . . , σt,` to reconstruct polynomial f ∗` (x) using Lagrange
interpolation. The `-th document chunk m` is retrieved as f ∗` (0) = m`;
b. it selects a polynomial f ′`(x) = a′0,`+a′1,`x+ · · ·+a′t−1,`xt−1 where a′0,` := m`
and a′1,`, . . . , a′t−1,` ∈ Fq are chosen uniformly at random;
c. it computes share σ′i,` := f ′`(i) for storage server Si.
127
6 Efficient Distributed Storage Systems Based on Trusted Execution Environment
5. It aggregates N document chunk shares into a unique document share Sh′i as
Sh′i = σ′i,1||σ′i,2|| . . . ||σ′i,N .
6. It computes signature P ′i of document share Sh′i with the private key skT1 as
follows: P ′i = sign(skT1 , Sh′i), for i = 1, . . . , n.
7. It distributes document share Sh′i along with its signature P ′i to storage server
Si through an information-theoretically secure channel, for i = 1, . . . , n.
The advantage of this protocol is that, in the best case scenario, when the stor-
age servers are honest, t information-theoretically secure channel are sufficient to
reconstruct the message, while in our original protocol, we require all shares to be
sent from S1, S2, . . . , Sn. However, we note that in the worst case scenario when
t− 1 servers are corrupted, the TEE might request all n storage servers through n
information-theoretically secure channel. Moreover, our original protocol Renew
requires less computation effort, since it does not rely on Lagrange interpolation
for each message chunk for reconstructing the message. On the other hand, this
alternative protocol requires in the best case (when the chosen t servers are honest),
verification of n− t less signatures, since the update is performed with the actual
reconstruction of the secret. Moreover, in our original protocol, we detect servers
trying to compromise the integrity of the shares by verifying all n signatures on the
shares, while in this alternative protocol, we only verify t signatures and leave the
other n− t corruptions potentially undetected.
6.3.5 TEE Migration Protocol
Our share renewal protocol Renew allows for TEE migration, which is crucial for
long-term secure storage systems. Besides, TEE migration is also required to mitigate
Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks or other attacks compromising the currently used
TEE T1 or its private key, in which case the storage service has to migrate to another
TEE T2. Moreover, migration allows for updating the security parameters of the
signature scheme used, e.g., according to NIST recommendations [49]. In long-term
secure storage systems, it has to be taken into account that signatures might be
broken later. However, by keeping the security parameters up-to-date, the adversary
does not gain advantage by forging signatures for an outdated security parameter.
Protocol Renew can be modified to support seamless TEE migration in LSTee as
follows. TEE T2 requires its own public and private keys pkT2 and skT2 , respectively,
and the public key of TEE T1, pkT1 to verify the integrity of the shares integrity
of step 3. To compute the new signatures, TEE T2 uses its own private key and
proceeds in the next update phase with its own public key.
The protocol augmented with TEE migration is initiated by TEE T2, which
performs the following steps.
1. It requests document share Shi from storage server Si, for i = 1, . . . , n.
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2. It receives n document shares Shi and their signatures Pi sent by storage servers
Si through a information-theoretically secure channel, for i = 1, . . . , n.
3. It attests the integrity document share Shi by verifying its signatures Pi as
follows: ver(pkT1 , Pi, Shi)
?= true, for i = 1, . . . , n. If share Shi is valid, then
it proceeds with step 4. Otherwise, it recovers the original document M from
other t valid shares, notifies the service provider of the corruption of storage
server Si and executes Share to recompute the document share Shi.
4. For every ` = 1, . . . N :
a. it selects a polynomial g`(x) = b0,` + b1,`x+ · · ·+ bt−1,`xt−1, where b0,` = 0
and coefficients b1,`, . . . , bt−1,` ∈ Fq are chosen uniformly at random;
b. it computes subshare ri,` for storage server Si as ri,` := g`(id), for i =
1, 2, . . . , n;
c. it computes the updated share σ′i,` := σi,` + ri,`, for i = 1, 2, . . . , n.
5. It aggregates N document chunk shares into a unique document share Sh′i as
Sh′i = σ′i,1||σ′i,2|| . . . ||σ′i,N .
6. It computes signature P ′i of document share Sh′i with the private key skT2 as
follows: P ′i = sign(skT2 , Sh′i), for i = 1, . . . , n.
7. It distributes document share Sh′i along with signature P ′i to storage server Si
through a information-theoretically secure channel, for i = 1, . . . , n.
Storage server Si stores the new document share Sh′i and its signature P ′i and
deletes the old share Shi and signature Pi.
6.4 Security Analysis
We discuss next the security guarantees of LSTee with respect to our trust assump-
tions and the overall scenario in which LSTee is embedded as a service. More precisely,
in Section 6.4.1 we argue why LSTee provides the same confidentiality and integrity
protection guarantees as state of the art secret sharing-based distributed storage
systems. In Section 6.4.2, we explain our assumptions with respect to the trustwor-
thiness of the used TEE. In Section 6.4.3 and in Section 6.4.4, we discuss the security
of, respectively, the signatures used for attestation and of the information-theoretic
channels to be established. In Section 6.4.5, we discuss the overall service in which
we envision LSTee to be embedded.
6.4.1 Security Guarantees
LSTee provides the same long-term confidentiality and integrity guarantees as state
of the art secret sharing-based long-term secure storage systems with Pedersen’s
commitment, while significantly optimizing the computation overhead and the num-
ber of information-theoretically secure channel required. Long-term confidentiality
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is provided by the deployment of proactive secret sharing, where shares are dis-
tributed to multiple storage servers and periodically renewed, thus mitigating a
mobile but computationally bounded adversary. The shares’ confidentiality during
the execution of the Share, Renew, and Reconstruct is preserved because they are
processed inside a TEE and communicated over information-theoretically secure
channel (see Section 6.3.3). Long-term integrity is provided because shares computed
during protocols Share and Renew are created and signed by the TEE. More precisely,
(public-key) signature schemes are deployed to verify the integrity of these shares
prior to protocols Renew and Reconstruct in the TEE. Share renewal allows LSTee to
update the security parameters of the signature scheme according to NIST recom-
mendations, thus providing long-term security guarantees. Furthermore, if up to t−1
shares are found to be corrupted, the TEE can still recover the original document,
or recompute correct shares and redistribute them, thus preserving message integrity
and providing robustness. In short, the main primitives LSTee deploys to provide
the above guarantees for our optimized long-term secure storage system are: a TEE,
(public-key) signature schemes, and information-theoretically secure channel, which
we discuss in more detail next.
6.4.2 Trustworthiness of the TEE
As explained in Section 6.3.3, protocols Share, Renew, and Reconstruct are performed
in LSTee by a TEE deployed in a remote computing server. For LSTee to cope with
the same cryptographic adversary as the state of the art solution discussed in Section
6.2.1.2, further assumptions are made with respect to the trustworthiness of the TEE.
More precisely, we made standard assumptions with respect to the trustworthiness
of the TEE to guarantee that it provides the desirable state-of-the-art security guar-
antees described above. In particular, this ensures that algorithms Share, Renew, and
Reconstruct are accessible and provide perfect security according to Definition 2.1.
Before processing any confidential data in the TEE, the hardware-based trust anchor
in the TEE operator attests the integrity of the TEE, by computing a cryptographic
hash of its content (code and data) using the secret key of the trust anchor. If
the TEE is in a trustworthy state (verified by the communicating entity), the TEE
is initiated and information-theoretically secure channel are established with the
other parties to run the protocols. LSTee relies on the TEE behaving honestly and
performing the computations as mandated by our protocols. While leveraging the
TEE allows us to achieve significant gains in terms of efficiency, the TEE, however,
becomes a single point of failure in LSTee. If it is compromised or unavailable due to
a deny of service attack for example, neither the confidentiality nor the integrity of
the outsourced data can be guaranteed. To mitigate this, LSTee allows for a smooth
migration to another trustworthy TEE while requiring only the public key of the
originally used TEE (see Section 6.3.5). We stress that the TEE, in and of itself,
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does not provide long-term security guarantees since TEEs are intended for isolated
execution where the TEE memory and disk storage still require standard memory
encryption. Therefore, naively storing the encrypted data without secret sharing
in a TEE does not provide the desirable long-term security guarantees and would
quickly outgrow the constrained TEE memory capacity.
6.4.3 Security of the Signature Scheme
In compliance with the NIST recommendation [49], LSTee uses computationally
secure signature schemes to protect the integrity of the outsourced data and to detect
compromised storage servers. Replacing (expensive) computationally secure commit-
ment schemes with (affordable) computationally secure signature schemes does not
lower the security guarantees. Furthermore, LSTee is not tied to a specific signature
scheme. This means that when the signature scheme used becomes vulnerable to
attacks run on quantum computers, LSTee can easily switch to a post-quantum
signature scheme. The private key used for the signatures in LSTee is sealed in the
TEE operator, i.e., encrypted with the TEE’s secret key. However, it is also possible
to avoid this sealing mechanism by generating a fresh pair of private-public keys
at every occurrence of Renew as follows: the shares that the Renew outputs at a
certain round are signed with the currently used private key. These signed shares are
provisioned to the storage servers. On the next round of Renew, the signature of each
share is first verified by the TEE with the counterpart public key before proceeding
with the share update. However, the updated shares are then signed by the TEE
using a new fresh private-public key pair generated at the beginning of Renew. In this
case, only the public key needs to be sealed, while the private key is never stored or
sealed in the TEE operator. To prevent replay attacks where a compromised storage
server may send the TEE an old benign share and its signature, timestamps or version
numbers are included in the signatures computed by the TEE at every round of Renew.
6.4.4 Information-Theoretic Secure Channels
Security of LSTee relies on information-theoretically secure point-to-point channels
in the network (see Section 6.3), which is aligned with the state of the art solution
discussed in Section 6.2.1.1. Such information-theoretically secure channel can be
constructed by using QKD protocols, which require quantum channels between any
two nodes or, alternatively, by using one-time pad with pre-distributed key material.
Long-term secure distributed storage systems with information-theoretically secure
channel have been realized recently in Japan [25]. However, they are still impractical
and expensive to establish, especially because the nodes cannot be more than 100 km
far from each other. The difficulty in establishing such channels remains a general
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and fundamental limitation that long-term secure distributed storage systems face
to provide their stringent security guarantees, is not specific to LSTee, and is out of
scope for this work. Nevertheless, the merit of LSTee lies in significantly reducing the
required number of such information-theoretically secure channel while still achieving
the same security guarantees as state of the art approaches.
6.4.5 LSTee as Part of a Larger Service
We envision LSTee as a larger service whose aim is to help data owners safely store
their outsourced data. Thus, no bugs are intentionally injected or undetected, and
continuous TEE upgrades are assumed. Furthermore, reports providing precise
analytics about how often the storage servers got corrupted or broke down are
periodically issued to help data owners make informed decisions about which storage
servers to include in their long-term secure storage system. The need for such a
service providing guidance to data owners through rigorously-derived performance
figures about storage serves in the cloud was also pointed out by NIST [63]. In
case the data owner decides to replace corrupted or low-performance servers with
newer storage servers, LSTee enables this seamlessly by simply computing the new
shares in the TEE during Renew. Again, we neither need distributed computation of
commitments nor a broadcast channel due to the trustworthiness of the TEE.
6.5 Comparison with Related Work
We first present related work relevant to the contributions of this chapter. Next,
we compare the communication and computation of LSTee with that of existing
proactive secret sharing protocols in synchronous networks in Sections 6.5.1 and
6.5.2, respectively.
Besides Shamir’s secret sharing scheme (see Chapter 2.1), distributed storage
systems can also be built over Tassa’s hierarchical secret sharing schemes (see
Chapter 2.2) where shares with different reconstruction capabilities are generated. In
a distributed storage scenario, the more informative shares generated by polynomial
evaluation (vs. less informative shares generated by polynomial derivative evaluation)
are ideally distributed to the more reliable storage servers [90]. We recall from
Chapter 3 that Tassa’s hierarchical secret sharing schemes are suitable for the long-
term protection of the confidentiality of outsourced data because shares can be
renewed periodically, similar to Shamir’s scheme.
Two main approaches exist for share renewal: those with synchronous networks
and those with asynchronous networks. For synchronous networks, besides the
seminal approach by Herzberg et al. [62] (see Section 6.2.2), Desmedt and Jajoda [42]
proposed protocols that enable dynamically adding and removing storage servers.
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However, verification was not possible, and thus inconsistent shares from corrupted
storage servers could not be detected. Wong et al. [113] mitigated this by enabling the
storage servers in their protocols to verify their new shares once they got distributed.
However, it is assumed that all the storage servers are honest during the redistribution
phase. Gupta and Gopinath improved on the work by Wong et al. in [57] by allowing
a honest majority among the storage servers during the redistribution phase, by using
Feldman’s commitment scheme in their protocol. They proposed a revised protocol
in [58] using Pedersen’s commitment to achieve information-theoretic confidentiality
of the outsourced data. Brendel and Demirel in [26] optimized the number of
information-theoretically secure channel needed in [58] by clustering the storage
servers into groups that can communicate securely only within the cluster.
In contrast to synchronous networks, proactive secret sharing in asynchronous
networks does not have access to a common global clock. Hence, the initiation of
share renewal cannot be synchronized among all nodes, as pointed out by Cachin
et al. in [31]. They proposed a formal model for cryptosystems in asynchronous
proactive networks by providing an abstract timer accessible to all storage servers,
while assuming a mobile adversary that can corrupt up to less than a threshold of
storage servers that are in the same local time. In [99], the time intervals in which the
share renewal is performed are defined by the events of the protocol itself. Instead,
Zhou et al. [114] proposed a conservative estimation of the time in which the share
renewal is executed.
6.5.1 Communication
One of the most significant challenges in deploying long-term secure storage systems in
practice is establishing information-theoretically secure channel between all relevant
nodes. LSTee makes a considerable advancement in this direction by reducing the
number of information-theoretically secure channel needed to carry out the long-
term secure storage of outsourced data. We compare LSTee with state of the art
approaches [57, 58, 62] plus Tassa’s hierarchical secret sharing-based distributed
storage systems presented in Chapter 3 that provide the same security guarantees, i.e.
they assume an honest majority (n ≥ 2t− 1), protect the integrity of the outsourced
document (not only its confidentiality), and do not relax the security requirements
of the point-to-point channels between nodes.
As shown in Table 6.2, LSTee significantly outperforms all previous protocols in
terms of the number of information-theoretically secure channel needed within the
long-term secure storage system. When d data owners use the same long-term secure
storage system composed of n storage servers, for Share and Reconstruct, LSTee needs,
respectively, n+ d and t+ d information-theoretically secure channel compared with
the nd information-theoretically secure channel needed in state-of-the art approaches.
That is because in LSTee the data owners do not communicate directly with the
storage servers and, instead, they establish a information-theoretically secure channel
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Protocol Share Renew Reconstruct
[57, 58,62] Ch. 3 nd t(t−1)2 + t(n− t) td
LSTee n+ d n t+ d
Table 6.2: Amount of information-theoretically secure channel needed to establish a
long-term secure storage system for d data owners, where n is the total
number of storage servers and t is the reconstructing threshold.
Protocol Share Renew Reconstruct
[57, 58,62] Ch. 3 2nN shares, tN comm. 2tN shares, t2N comm. 2tN shares
LSTee M,nN shares, n sign. 2nN shares, 2n sign. tN shares, t sign., M
Table 6.3: Comparison of the communication during Share, Renew, and Reconstruct,
where M is the message to be outsourced, n is the total number of storage
servers, N is the number of message chunks, t is the reconstructing thresh-
old, “comm.”stands for “commitments”and “sign.”stands for “signatures”.
with the TEE, which works as a mediator node. Only the TEE is connected to all the
storage servers through n information-theoretically secure channel and this number
clearly does not depend on the number of data owners (see Figure 6.1b). Furthermore,
in LSTee, the n information-theoretically secure channel already established to run
Share are sufficient to carry out the Renew.
In contrast to LSTee, all other approaches require additional channels between
the storage servers to perform share renewal distributedly. Renew and Reconstruct
are compared assuming the optimized version of the protocols, where only t storage
servers are, respectively, actively generating and distributing randomness values and
provisioning the data owner with the necessary number of reconstructing shares. The
quantity t(t−1)2 + t(n− t) is always larger than n, assuming a reasonable threshold
t ≥ 2 (otherwise secret sharing becomes useless). In case n t, then t(n− t) ≥ n,
and in case t ∼ n, then t(t−1)2 ≥ n.
Besides the number of channels, the volume of traffic communicated during Share,
Renew, and Reconstruct is compared in Table 6.3. More precisely, to protect integrity,
the state of the art approaches require a broadcast channel where commitments to
the coefficients of polynomials of degree t−1 are communicated. A broadcast channel
is not needed in LSTee, instead, to protect integrity, only signatures on the generated
document share for each of the n shares are sent through the information-theoretically
secure channel. For large files, where the number of chunks N is larger than the
number of storage servers n, fewer signatures than commitments are communicated
to protect integrity. To protect confidentiality, in LSTee fewer shares than the state
of the art approaches are sent through the information-theoretically secure channel
during Share and Reconstruct. This is because Pedersen’s commitment used by the
state of the art approaches uses two polynomials instead of one. However, for LSTee
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the document M must also be communicated because the data owner outsources the
generation of the shares and the document retrieval to the TEE. During Renew, LSTee
needs to communicate more shares than the state of the art approaches because
first the old shares have to be sent to the TEE by all storage servers and then the
renewed shares have to be distributed.
6.5.2 Computation
LSTee achieves a lower computation overhead compared to [57,58,62] and Chapter
3. More precisely, during Renew, LSTee requires that the TEE computes only one
polynomial of degree t− 1 from which the n randomness values are generated and
summed to the corresponding old shares. Instead, t (or 2t for [58] due to the usage
of Pedersen’s commitment scheme) polynomial evaluations for the computation of tn
(or 2tn) randomness values have to be performed in [57,58,62] and Chapter 3 even
for the optimized protocol where t servers generate randomness values. Furthermore,
in LSTee only a signature P ′i = sign(skT1 , Sh′i) for each of the n renewed document
shares Sh′1, Sh′2, . . . , Sh′n are computed for integrity check, as opposed to the t2N (or
2t2N for [58]) commitments that are computed for each chunk in which the document
is divided. We highlight that signatures are computationally feasible to compute and
are commonly adopted, while it is still an open problem how commitment schemes
can be efficiently implemented. Similarly for Share, LSTee requires nN shares to
be computed through polynomial evaluations and n signatures P1, P2, . . . , Pn for
integrity check. Instead, in all other approaches, nN (or 2nN for [58]) shares and
additionally tnN (or 2tnN for [58]) commitments have to be computed.
6.6 Instantiation and Evaluation
In this section, we describe our instantiation of the TEE using Intel SGX, which is
the only TEE implementation that can be used with common Intel processors and
hardware and does not require a certificate from the manufacturer.
In our implementation, we used an open-source implementation of Shamir’s se-
cret sharing protocol by Penney6 and used F28+1 as finite field. It implements the
standard Share and Reconstruct and allows for specifying the number of servers n
and the threshold t. We have modified this implementation to include the Renew
for proactive secret sharing as described in Section 6.3.3. We also modified the code
such that it uses the CPU’s hardware random generator as its randomness source
through the rdrand instruction. For the public-key signatures, we used the RSA
implementation of OpenSSL 1.0.2g with 3072-bit keys. We embedded this program
in an SGX enclave using the Graphene-SGX framework [109]. We highlight that,
6https://github.com/fletcher/c-sss
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despite the RSA signature is not resistant to quantum attacks, LSTee is not tied to a
specific signature scheme. Thus, when the RSA signature will become vulnerable, it
can easily be replaced by a post-quantum signature scheme.
Performance. We measure the performance of all three protocols on Intel SGX, i.e.,
of Share, Renew and Reconstruct as described in Section 6.3.3. In our experiments,
we vary the number of shares n and the reconstructing threshold t and report
performance results for documents containing between 100 bytes and 30 MBytes of
random data. We ran our tests on an Intel i7-7700 CPU clocked at 3.60 GHz, with
8 GB of RAM and Ubuntu 16.04.5 OS.
Figures 6.2, 6.3 and 6.4 show the time required to perform the three algorithms
Share, Renew, and Reconstruct using different values for our parameters, namely
{n = 3, t = 2}, {n = 5, t = 3}, {n = 7, t = 4}, {n = 9, t = 5}, and {n = 11, t = 6}.
In our experiment, the time required to perform the secret-sharing computations
themselves scales linearly in our whole document size range. The time required to
sign a document scales linearly as well, but there is also a constant-time component
of approximately 2 ms. Similarly, verifying a signature has a linear component
and a constant-time component of approximately 60 µs. Creating and renewing
shares (Figures 6.2, 6.3) requires multiple signatures, so the time required does
not increase significantly until 3 KB, while it increases linearly after 10 KB. For a
30 MB document, creating the shares takes between 21 s and 90 s depending on the
parameters n and t; renewing the shares takes between 27 s and 109 s. Reconstructing
the shares (Figure 6.4) only requires signatures verification, so it increases linearly
in the whole range. Reconstructing the shares of a 30 MB document takes between
23 s and 128 s depending on the parameters.
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Figure 6.2: Time required to create a set of shares.
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Our prototype implementation stores the whole document and the shares in
enclave memory, which results in a bound on the size of the document in our
experiments. Modifying the implementation to stream the document shares to the
enclave eliminates this bound entirely. We can directly see that the computation
time scales linearly, since the generation and verification of signatures contribute
with only a linear overhead to the overall runtime of the protocols.
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Figure 6.3: Time required to renew a set of shares.
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Figure 6.4: Time required to reconstruct a set of shares.
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6.7 Summary and Future Work
Long-term secure protection of the confidentiality and integrity in secret sharing-
based distributed storage systems can be carried out by proactive secret sharing in
combination with verifiable secret sharing. This way, the validity of updated shares
that are computed periodically to protect the confidentiality can be verified. This
infrastructure relies on point-to-point information-theoretic secure communication
channels between any two storage servers and the computation of commitment
schemes.
In this chapter, we introduced LSTee, a TEE-based long-term secure distributed
storage system that provides a significantly more efficient means to protect the
confidentiality and the integrity of outsourced data compared to state of the art
approaches. LSTee uses TEEs for the secure generation and update of shares of
the outsourced data at regular time intervals. LSTee needs significantly fewer
information-theoretically secure channel to securely carry out the share renewal
protocol because information-theoretically secure channel need to be established only
between each data owner and the TEE operator and between each storage server
and the TEE. Furthermore, commitment schemes are no longer required because
the validity of shares with respect to the original document is preserved by the
TEE, while their integrity is protected by signatures. This guarantees that the
updated shares computed by the TEE reconstruct the original data. These shares are
then signed and distributed to the respective storage server through a information-
theoretically secure channel. The signatures allow the TEE to check whether the
storage server and the share were compromised before running again the renewing
protocol. We validated LSTee by providing a proof-of-concept implementation and
evaluated the computation runtimes of the protocols. Although our implementation
is prototyped on Intel SGX, we showed why LSTee is TEE-agnostic, and any other
TEE could be deployed. Moreover, migration from one TEE to another is supported
in LSTee, thus enabling stronger security and robustness guarantees, in case a TEE
instance is compromised or unavailable. LSTee is also independent of the underlying
secret sharing primitive, e.g., Shamir’s secret sharing can be replaced with Tassa’s
hierarchical secret sharing schemes.
As future work, we plan to address scenarios where the data not only long-term
secure storage of data but also privacy-preserving computations on those data are
needed (e.g. studies on genomic data). Secure multi-party computation offers a viable
solution to the above mentioned scenarios and LSTee can be used for a more efficient
instantiation of these protocols. We leave adapting LSTee to secure multi-party
computation as future work.
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In this thesis, we investigated secure storage solutions that can be adopted in practice
by companies, hospitals, and institutions to protect the confidentiality and the in-
tegrity of their data in the long term. We evolved state of the art secret sharing-based
distributed storage systems from theory to a more practical state. In order to do that,
we focused our attention on the needs and wants of the end users so that we could
improve on secret sharing-based distributed storage systems accordingly. Besides
confidentiality and integrity protection guarantees, we individuated three main needs
in terms of secure storage and, respectively, three main roadblocks that, if removed,
would render secret sharing-based distributed storage systems a much feasible and
affordable solution for the storage protection of data in real world scenarios. In the
following, we present these needs and explain how in this thesis we contributed to
meet them.
First, there is the need for storage solutions whose access to the outsourced data
mirrors the rules and policies to access regular documents and files that are already
in place within the company, the hospital, the institution. More precisely, the data
owner outsourcing the data to a secret sharing-based distributed storage system is
likely not an isolated entity, but is rather part of a larger hierarchical organization
and has specific rights and powers. This hierarchical structure should be maintained
by the storage system, which, in addition, should allow to flexibly modify the access
rules of the underlying secret sharing scheme to address promotions, and employees
that leave or join. In Chapter 3, we proposed a hierarchical and dynamic secret
sharing-based distributed storage systems that fulfills all the above requirements and
that, being backward compatible with proactive secret sharing and verifiable secret
sharing, fulfills as well the security requirements in terms of long-term confidentiality
and integrity. We did this by providing verifiable algorithms to add shareholders,
reset the access rules, and to renew the shares for Tassa’s conjunctive and disjunctive
secret sharing schemes. Furthermore, we ensured the possibility to perform compu-
tations over such outsourced data (e.g. statistics on electronic health records for
research-related purposes) by providing algorithms to perform linear operation and
multiplications for Tassa’s schemes. The algorithms for Tassa’s hierarchical secret
sharing schemes that we presented are equivalent with the corresponding algorithms
139
7 Conclusion
for Shamir’s secret sharing scheme (used in state of the art approaches), both in
term of security and in computational complexity, as we demonstrated.
Second, there is the need for guidance and support in both setting up and main-
taining the long-term storage. This is due to the lack of clarity with respect of the
quality of service of available storage servers and the lack of cryptographic expertise
on the data owners’ side. More precisely, secret sharing-based distributed storage
systems are in practice composed of storage servers (i.e. the data centers) of multiple
storage service providers. Up to now, there is no standardized and transparent means
to test the quality of service of the storage service providers and of the storage servers
they offer in the marketplace. In Chapter 5, we designed a performance scoring
mechanism run by a trust authority, which enforces the storage servers to behave
honestly and to submit accurate performance ratings with respect to storage servers
owned by competitor storage service providers. We formalized for the first time the
rationality of the storage service providers and their preferences in terms of being
assigned to a high or low aggregate score and treated this problem as an economic
game. By leveraging this through incentives and penalties in terms of the final
aggregate scores, our performance scoring mechanism outputs accurate scores that
reflect the actual performance of the storage servers. Furthermore, in Chapter 4, we
introduced AS3, an adaptive social secret sharing scheme that combines the need for
hierarchical rules to access the outsourced data and the need for guidance in setting
up and maintaining the storage system. More precisely, given the aggregate scores
of the storage servers, AS3 supports data owners in choosing the best parameters of
the underlying hierarchical secret sharing scheme. Also, throughout the life of the
storage systems, it alerts data owners with warnings whenever the performance of the
storage servers is not satisfying and there is the risk to either break confidentiality
of the data or not being able to retrieve them.
Third, there is the need for efficient and affordable storage solutions that scale.
More precisely, state of the art approaches need point-to-point information-theoretically
secure channel between any two storage servers in order to periodically renew the
shares without leaking any information about them. Establishing these channels is
either not practical (i.e. using pre-distributed one-time pad key material) or very
expensive (i.e. using quantum key distribution protocols). Thus, configurations
reducing the amount of such channels while stile guaranteeing confidentiality are
desirable to contain the costs of such distributed storage system infrastructure. Fur-
thermore, the cryptographic primitives used to protect the integrity of the outsourced
data over time are commitment schemes, which are computationally intensive so that
they cannot be used for large files. In Chapter 4, we introduced the first third-party
audit mechanism able to check the validity of the shares stored across the storage
servers of a distributed storage system while preserving their confidentiality in an
information-theoretic manner. Since the mechanism enables the audit of multiple
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data at once to lower communication complexity and does not use intensive com-
putations, it is a valuable solution for companies, hospitals, and institutions for
outsourcing the integrity check of their data. In Chapter 6, we took a further step
towards a more efficient storage solution with low communication complexity by
presenting LSTee, a long-term secure distributed storage system based on a trusted
execution environment. LSTee uses a trusted execution environment for the secure
and correct computation of shares, both during the generation phase and during
the periodical renewing phases, as well as for the reconstruction of the originally
outsourced data. This enables to establish a distributed storage system with signifi-
cantly less information-theoretically secure channel than state of the art approaches.
Furthermore, integrity of the the outsourced data is provided through signature
schemes and because the trusted execution environment never deviates from the
protocol it is supposed to run and, thus, always computes valid shares. Moreover,
LSTee is not tied to a specific trusted execution environment and can migrate to a
new one in case this gets compromised.
Future Work
As future work, we plan to take further steps towards a practical deployment of
long-term secure storage solutions based on secret sharing. More precisely, we
plan to instantiate LSTee based on AS3 so that it addresses hierarchical scenarios
and distributes the shares to high-performing storage servers. We want to use
trusted execution environments also to perform secure multi-party computations. For
scenarios where the renewal of the shares is rarely performed, we want the trusted
execution environment to take over also the third party audit mechanism, so that
integrity can be verified more regularly. As for supporting data owners with accurate
performance figures, we want to strengthen our performance scoring mechanism so
that it can cope with rational storage service providers that may decide to submit
inaccurate ratings with a certain probability only, so as to lower detection likelihood.
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